Tong Li

The authors study identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible entry and bidding framework they call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS- RA) model.

This paper considers nonparametric identification of a two-stage entry and bidding game we call the Affiliated-Signal (AS) model.

This paper considers nonparametric identifiation of a two-stage entry and bidding model for auctions which we call the Affiliated-Signal (AS) Model.

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry.

This paper proposes a formal model selection test for choosing between two competing structural econometric models.

We propose a two-stage procurement auction model with endogenous entry and uncertain number of actual bidders.

This paper proposes a formal model selection test for choosing between two competing structural econometric models.

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from TexasDepartment of Transportation, we propose a two-stage procurement auction model withendogenous entry and uncertain number of actual bidders. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications.