The Changing Face of Retirement
Future Patterns of Work, Health, Care and Income among the Older Population

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Preface

This report presents results from the IFS retirement simulator (RetSim). Full details of the methodology and modelling assumptions are presented in Browne et al. (2014), which is published online alongside this document.

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The authors would like to thank James Banks, Daniel Chandler, Paul Johnson, Gemma Tetlow and members of the IFS Retirement Saving Consortium for comments and advice. The authors are particularly grateful to Rowena Crawford and Zoe Oldfield for invaluable assistance with the construction of some of the data in the report and to James Browne for his work on the construction of the RetSim model. The views expressed and any remaining errors are the authors’ alone.

Data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) are made available through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). ELSA was developed by a team of researchers based at the National Centre for Social Research, University College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The data were collected by the National Centre for Social Research. The funding is provided by the National Institute of Aging in the United States and a consortium of UK government departments co-ordinated by the Office for National Statistics. The developers and funders of ELSA and the UKDA do not bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.
Executive Summary

This report presents projections of mortality, family composition, health, care receipt, care provision, labour supply and receipt of disability benefits for people aged 65 and over from 2010–11 through to 2022–23, as well as projections of their wealth and incomes, in order to offer commentary on the net income distribution and rates of poverty for those aged 65 and over through to the early 2020s. We also discuss the effect some alternative policy scenarios could have on the evolution of these incomes.

Demographic circumstances

- Mortality rates are projected to improve, particularly for men, over the simulation period, leading to an increase in the proportion of older pensioners living in couples rather than alone. In 2010–11, 25% of those aged 85 and over lived in couples; we predict that this will rise to 38% by 2022–23. While the percentage of those aged 85 and over who are in couples has been increasing in recent decades (for example, by around 5 percentage points a decade between 1990 and 2010), the projected increase over the next decade would represent an acceleration of this trend.

- Women aged 65 and over generally report being in poorer health than men at a given age, but we project that the health of women at all ages will increase consistently over the simulation period, continuing a trend seen in the recent past. On our five-level health index, the proportion of women in the best health group rises within each age group by around 7 percentage points – for example, from 39% in 2010–11 to 47% in 2022–23 for women aged 65 to 74; for men, the increases within each age band are more modest.

- The proportion of women receiving some form of care falls slightly in all age groups as projected health improves, with a sharper fall among those aged 65 to 74, for whom the projected decline is from 29% in 2010–11 to 24% in 2022–23.

- We predict that care provision among older women will almost double over the simulation period (from 4% in 2010–11 to 7% in 2022–23 for those aged 85 and over) as their husbands live longer. Although this might suggest that an excessive burden could be placed on these carers, we see that in fact they generally come from the increased number of older women in good health. Provision of care from both men and women in the worst health category is found to have declined in recent years (from 20% in 2002–03 to 17% in 2010–11 for men and from 14% to 10% for women over the same period) and our model projects that this decline will continue through to 2022–23 (to 15% and 8% for men and women respectively).
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- Our labour supply model shows the effects of the rising state pension age (SPA), with both men and women remaining in paid work longer as the SPA rises. The majority of the increase is for women, whose SPA is rising the most (and among whom health is projected to improve): 16% of 65- to 69-year-old women are in work in 2010–11 and we expect this to rise to 37% in 2022–23. Our model projects that 60- to 64-year-old women will be as likely to be in paid work as men of that age by 2018–19, with the equivalent being true of 65- to 69-year-old women by 2020–21.

- Despite rising employment rates among older people, we do not see a projected increase in employment among those in poor health. Instead, the additional female workers are drawn predominantly from the healthiest of our five health categories: the employment rate of 65- to 79-year-old women in the best health is projected to rise by 9ppts from 15% in 2010–11 to 23% in 2022–23 (therefore rising at a faster rate than it has been in recent years), while we project that the rate among the least healthy women remains static at just 3%.

- In line with the results of the care receipt simulations described above, we see receipt of attendance allowance falling for women, from 58% in 2010–11 to 48% in 2022–23 for those aged 85 and over, and rising for men from 43% to 48% for the same age group. Receipt of this benefit is concentrated among the very elderly, so the rate for all those aged 65 and over was 12% for men and 20% for women in 2010–11 and we project this to rise to 14% for men and fall to 17% for women.

- The receipt of disability living allowance (DLA) is projected to fall, partly because of improvements in health but also because of the lagged effect of reforms to DLA for working-age individuals, which reduce the claimant rate at younger ages and then gradually feed through into reduced receipt of DLA among those aged 65 and over. Between 2010–11 and 2022–23, we project that receipt of DLA among those aged 65 to 74 will fall from 10% to 6% among men and from 10% to 8% among women.

Gross incomes

- We project that between 2010–11 and 2022–23 the average real gross income among those aged 65 to 74 will grow by an average of 3.8% per year. Average growth within the top quintile of the individual gross income distribution is projected to be greater than that within the bottom quintile (4.9% compared with 1.5%). This growth in income – and the fact that it is greater for the top quintile – is driven by an increase in earned income, which is projected to grow by an average of 8% per year for this age group. This increase in mean earnings occurs as the state pension age rises and some people remain in work for longer. In addition, real median earnings for 65- to 74-year-old women in paid work are projected to rise over the period,
suggesting the additional older workers are earning more on average than workers aged 65 and over were in the past.

• For older age groups, the model projects slower growth in average incomes, and growth is again projected to be greater towards the top of the income distribution than the bottom, due to rising asset income.

• Despite the increase in earnings, most gross income for the 65-and-over population comes from state and private pensions. For those in the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution, state pensions form the majority of gross income in 2010–11 and this is projected to remain the case through to 2022–23. The variation in income levels among those aged 65 and over is driven primarily by the size of private pension income and, for younger individuals within this age group, income from earnings.

• Families’ net wealth is projected to rise and is primarily made up of housing wealth rather than financial assets. Property wealth is projected to grow in all groups as a result of both increasing house values and an increasing proportion of older individuals being owner-occupiers. In particular, we project that by 2018–19 over 75% of single pensioners will be owner-occupiers, compared with 68% in 2010–11.

**Net incomes and poverty**

• Between 2010–11 and 2014–15, our model predicts slow growth in median net incomes among those aged 65 and over. Our projections suggest that median income growth will then increase, averaging 2.0% a year between 2014–15 and 2022–23, moving back towards the rate of growth in net family incomes for this group through the 2000s, which averaged just over 2.8% per year.

• Median income is projected to grow faster than during the 2000s for younger pensioners (3.0% per year versus 2.7% per year for those aged 65 to 74) but more slowly for older pensioners (1.6% per year versus 3.0% per year for those aged 75 and over), something of a reversal of fortunes within the pensioner population.

• Income inequality among the 65-and-over population is projected to increase, with incomes at the 90th percentile growing at 3.3% per year in real terms and incomes at the 10th percentile growing at just 0.6% per year. The 90/10 measure of income inequality is thus projected to rise from 2.7 to 3.8 over the course of the 2010s. This increase is primarily driven by rising earned income among 65- to 74-year-olds.

• Absolute poverty using a benchmark uprated in line with the consumer price index (CPI) is projected to fall sharply from 20.1% in 2014–15 to 12.7% in 2022–23, around a third of its 2000–01 level.
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- As rates of poverty decline among those in couples, being an older single woman will become a stronger indicator of being in income poverty, which could have important implications for the targeting of policy. By this, we do not mean that specific single women in our model will fall into poverty – we project that income poverty actually falls among women who are alive and single in both 2010–11 and 2022–23 – but that this association is the result of the changing composition of the single pensioner population.

Policy reforms

- We project that retaining disability living allowance until 2022–23, rather than replacing it with personal independence payment (PIP), would only lead to a small increase in the proportion of those aged 65 and over receiving disability, incapacity or carers’ benefits (from 21% to 22%), but would increase the mean income of those affected by £17 per week.

- We estimate that indexing the state pension by the CPI rather than by the triple lock after the end of this parliament would reduce average net incomes among those aged 65 and over by around 3% in 2022–23, with the losses concentrated in the middle and lower middle of the distribution. We estimate that this would increase rates of absolute poverty in 2022–23 by 2ppts, from 13% to 15%. This is against the backdrop of public spending on state pension provision being projected (by the Department for Work and Pensions) to rise by 24% between 2010–11 and 2018–19 while spending on all other benefits and tax credits falls by 7%.

- Many with unannuitised defined contribution (DC) pension pots will, as a result of Budget 2014, have greater flexibility in how they use their DC pension wealth. We project that those retiring with unannuitised DC pots between 2016–17 and 2022–23 will have funds worth an average of £200,000. A fund of this size would provide a choice between roughly £200 per week of gross income and £200,000 in wealth. This unannuitised DC wealth is larger, on average, among those with more non-pension wealth in 2022–23. However, we project that among the least wealthy fifth of the population, this is around 16% of the size of non-pension wealth holdings, whereas it is only 3% of the size of non-pension wealth for the wealthiest fifth.

- Our model suggests that changes to annuity rates would only have a limited impact on the incomes of those aged 65 to 74 over the next few years. We project that a 20% rise or fall in annuity rates from 2016–17 would lead to a rise or fall in the average net incomes of those aged 65 to 74 of less than 1% in 2022–23. In part, this is because only a minority of families would be affected by such a change; but even across those families who would be affected, the average increase or fall in their net incomes would be less than 3.5%.

A summary of some of the key results can be found in Table ES.1.
Table ES.1. Selected results from each of the models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic outcomes</th>
<th>2010–11</th>
<th>2022–23</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those aged 85 and over: single men</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>−3.0ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those aged 85 and over: single women</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>−10.3ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those aged 85 and over: couples</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>13.3ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 65+ in best health</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>−0.1ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women aged 65+ in best health</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>5.3ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 65 to 74 getting care</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>1.1ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women aged 65 to 74 getting care</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>−5.1ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 85 and over providing care</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>4.9ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women aged 85 and over providing care</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.1ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 65 to 69 in paid work</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>1.3ppts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women aged 65 to 69 in paid work</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>21.4ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 65 to 74 receiving DLA</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>−4.2ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women aged 65 to 74 receiving DLA</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>−2.1ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men aged 85 and over receiving AA</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>5.0ppts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women aged 85 and over receiving AA</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>−9.7ppts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross individual income of those aged 65 to 74</td>
<td>£321.1</td>
<td>£502.1</td>
<td>3.8% p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of which gross earnings</td>
<td>£37.3</td>
<td>£94.7</td>
<td>8.1% p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net family income: 10th percentile</td>
<td>£278.7</td>
<td>£299.4</td>
<td>0.6% p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net family income: 50th percentile</td>
<td>£432.7</td>
<td>£507.7</td>
<td>1.3% p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net family income: 90th percentile</td>
<td>£740.7</td>
<td>£1,088.5</td>
<td>3.3% p.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute income poverty (CPI uprated)</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>−4.9ppts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

The UK population is ageing, a process which brings with it a variety of concerns around the prospects for pensioner incomes and the appropriate design of taxpayer-funded support for pensioners. These concerns have led to substantial reforms in recent years. For example, the last government increased financial support for pensioners substantially and, following the recommendations of its Pensions Commission, legislated to introduce automatic enrolment into workplace-based pensions for most employees. In addition to introducing automatic enrolment, the current government has legislated to speed up the move to a single-tier state pension system, tasked the Dilnot Commission to review the funding of adult social care and, in its most recent Budget, announced a relaxation of the rules governing annuitisation of defined contribution pension schemes. The first change to the state pension age in over half a century is also under way, with the female state pension age rising gradually from age 60 since April 2010. These are all truly radical changes.

Over the decade from 2002 to 2012, data from the Office for National Statistics show that the population aged 65 and over increased by 15%, compared with growth in the population as a whole of 7%, meaning that the percentage of the population aged 65 and over edged up from 16% to 17%. Over the next few years, with the baby boomers born just after the end of the Second World War now starting to celebrate their 65th birthdays, the number of individuals aged 65 and over will increase sharply. Over the decade between 2012 and 2022, official projections suggest that growth in the population aged 65 and over will accelerate to 22%, while growth in the overall population will drop back slightly to 6%. If correct, this suggests that in 2022 the percentage of the population aged 65 and over will rise to 20%.

This changing structure of the population will have many economic implications, affecting the labour market, the demand for different goods and services (both publicly and privately provided), and the demand for, and provision of, informal care between family members. The comparatively rapid growth of the older population makes it increasingly important that public policies targeted at this group are well designed, both for those who benefit from these policies and for those who pay for them.

In 2014–15, an estimated £114.1 billion (6.6% of national income) will be spent by the government on state pensions and benefits to pensioners across Great Britain, making up just over half (55%) of total government spending on benefits and tax credits.1 Three-quarters of this state support for pensioner incomes is spent on providing the state pension, with the remainder funding support targeted at those with disabilities and those on lower incomes, as well as

universal benefits for older individuals such as the winter fuel payment. State support for pensioners also comes in other guises such as spending on public services, with the National Health Service and the provision of adult social care of particular benefit to the older population.

We cannot assume simply that the pensioner population a decade from now will look similar to today’s population. There will not just be more pensioners but those retiring over the next few years will have experienced different economic conditions in their working lives, been subject to a different policy environment at different points in their lives, benefited from different technological and medical advances, and made different decisions about their savings than have today’s pensioners.

Indeed, we can see from recent history how quickly things can change. The proportion of 65- to 69-year-old men in work fell from over 33% in 1970 to a low point of 11% in 1987, before recovering to 22% in 2010. Meanwhile, the proportion of 60- to 64-year-old women in work also rose substantially, from 17% in 1985 to 31% in 2010.2 Perhaps most dramatically, income has risen much faster among pensioners than among the non-pensioner population over the last 20 years. In 1990, median income among pensioner households was a third lower than among the rest of the population; by 2010–11, it was only 10% lower.3 The pensioner population now is quite different from that of a decade ago and dramatically different from that of just 30 years ago. Understanding whether and how this might change over the next decade will be crucial to policy development and also to thinking about longer-term priorities.

In this report, we model the future demographic structure of the population aged 65 and over up to 2022–23 by simulating six broad groups of outcomes – mortality, health, care receipt (both formal and informal), care provision, labour market outcomes and receipt of disability benefits – for thousands of individuals using a dynamic microsimulation model. This model takes those individuals who were aged 52 and over in 2010–11 and interviewed as part of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) – a representative sample of the household population in England – and ‘ages’ them throughout the simulation period to 2022–23. Our demographic model, RetSim, simulates the changes in outcomes using observed transitions, and information about the characteristics of the people who make those transitions, from the first five waves of ELSA (from 2002–03 to 2010–11). Applying the model to the latest wave of ELSA provides a simulation of the population aged 65 and over in every other year up to 2022–23.4

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3 Authors’ calculations using Family Expenditure Survey 1990 and the Family Resources Survey 2010–11.

4 As those in the ELSA sample were aged 52 and over in 2010–11, our simulations cannot run past 2023–24, the point at which all these individuals will be aged 65 or over. The biennial nature of the ELSA survey means that it is natural to project outcomes for alternate future years.
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The work that we present here aims to shed some light on how the demographic and financial circumstances of this group will change. This report contains several important results. First, it shows how the household structure of the population aged 65 and over, and the health of this population, are likely to evolve over the next decade. Second, it documents patterns of both care provision and care receipt (both formal and informal) in recent years – for example, by age and family type – alongside projections through to 2022–23, which, in addition to being of direct interest, are also an important determinant of subsequent labour market activity. Third, we examine patterns of labour market activity among older men and women and how these are likely to evolve given, among other things, the ongoing increase in the female state pension age and the planned increase in the male state pension age, which will see both rising to 66 in 2020. Fourth, we utilise the detailed information on state and private pension rights available in ELSA alongside information on income from employment and income from savings and other assets, and feed this into the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, to project how pensioners’ incomes are likely to evolve over the next decade. Finally, we set out what effect some alternative policy scenarios could have on the evolution of these incomes. In particular, we look at two possible alternative reforms to state support for pensioner incomes and two scenarios for the evolution of the market for annuities.

The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 briefly outlines the methodology used to produce the results. Much more detail is available in the technical report published alongside this report (Browne et al., 2014). Chapter 3 presents the results of each of the eight modules within the model and describes some of the reasons for the trends and changes that we see in the data. Having generated the demographic outputs, we then construct the gross income and wealth for each benefit unit in each year of the simulation; these results are presented in Chapter 4. Again, the detail of this modelling is presented in Browne et al. (2014). Next, we pass the gross income data through TAXBEN, the IFS tax and benefit model, which allocates means-tested benefits to each benefit unit and derives its net income. We present these net income results in Chapter 5 (including projections for income inequality among pensioners and for trends in absolute income poverty) and then, in Chapter 6, go on to present and discuss the impact of some different policy scenarios on the distribution of net incomes. Chapter 7 concludes.
2. Methodology

The demographic results in this report are produced by RetSim, a model that is estimated on the first five waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a panel survey that interviews adults aged 50 and over, and their partners, every two years. The structure of the survey means that we can predict, for example, how likely someone is to change working status or become more or less healthy in the next two-year period, based on their characteristics now. This kind of prediction is the basis of the RetSim dynamic microsimulation model. An overview of the model’s structure is shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Overview of the model

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5 A dynamic microsimulation model takes a group of people who are representative of the population to be modelled and ‘ages’ them, simulating their characteristics of interest in future time periods. This is different from a static model, which only simulates circumstances in a single time period, and from analysis of specimen households, which looks at the circumstances of a handful of ‘typical’ families. A microsimulation approach lets us model a diverse population more representatively than would a specimen family approach, without having to account explicitly for the range of combinations of characteristics and circumstances. Instead, we gain these automatically by drawing our group of individuals from survey data that are designed to be representative of the population of interest.
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We examine the evolution of the health, care needs, care provision, retirement decisions, incomes and wealth of the population aged 65 and over in England from 2010–11 through to the early 2020s by simulating the future circumstances of the population that is aged 52 and over in 2010–11. Starting with this age group means that we have a representative sample of the 65-and-over age group in 2022–23. Simulated individuals leave the model when they die, but for no other reason, and no one enters the model population after 2010–11. While divorce, marriage and childbirth are all possible within the population aged 52 and over, the rates at which they occur are much lower than in younger age groups and so we do not add to the complexity of the model by attempting to model fertility or relationship formation and dissolution.

Taking respondents to the fifth wave of ELSA in 2010–11 as our base population, we simulate changes in individuals’ characteristics for each two-year simulation period from 2010–11 to 2022–23. To simulate an individual from one period to the next, we pass them through a series of modules, each modelling the evolution of one characteristic.

Having produced the demographic outputs, we are in a position to construct gross incomes for each individual and family over the course of the simulation period. We also allow families’ wealth holdings to evolve throughout the simulation period and add the income from this wealth (interest from financial assets and rental income from rental property) to their gross income measure.

We then pass families’ gross income into the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, to derive their net incomes. Specifically, this takes into account payments of income tax, National Insurance contributions and council tax and receipt of means-tested and universal benefits. For 2010–11, 2012–13 and 2014–15, we use the tax and benefit systems that were actually in place. For later years, we incorporate any future policy changes announced up to and including Budget 2014 and we assume that universal credit is partially rolled out in 2016–17 and fully rolled out in 2018–19. Benefit rates and tax thresholds are uprated in line with public finance defaults as currently forecasted by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).

Full details of the model specifications and modelling assumptions can be found in Browne et al. (2014), the technical paper that accompanies this report.
3. Results: Demographics, Health, Care, Employment, and Disability Benefits

This chapter presents the non-financial results from our model, showing the projected change in the characteristics and activities of the population aged 65 and over in England during the period from 2010–11 to 2022–23. The discussion of results follows the ordering of the model set out in Figure 2.1. We start by describing the mortality projections and their implications for family composition (Section 3.1). We then turn to look at the changing health of the older population (Section 3.2), before examining predicted trends in the receipt, and the giving, of care (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). We go on to look at trends in employment outcomes and the receipt of disability benefits (Section 3.6). Finally, we consider the interactions between the different sub-models (Section 3.7).

3.1 Mortality and family composition

Our model uses estimates of how the mortality probabilities of those aged 52 and over vary with characteristics observed in the ELSA data over the period between 2002–03 and 2010–11. Under the assumption that these associations continue to hold in the future, it then uses these relationships to project the likelihood that each individual will survive until the next simulated year.

In order to incorporate the fact that longevity at older ages is expected to continue to improve, we adjust our model so that the predicted mortality rates by age, sex and year of birth match projections made by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These projections suggest that, in the UK, a man aged 65 in 2000 was expected to live to 84, whereas by 2010 a man aged 65 would be expected to live to 86. For women average life expectancy of those aged 65 is projected to have increased from 87 in 2000 to 89 in 2010. As we discuss below, changing life expectancies in the older population will have important implications for the household structure of the older population.

Figure 3.1 shows how the one-year mortality projections from the ONS vary by age and sex for selected years of birth (but for England not the UK, since our model runs on English data). Unsurprisingly, at a given age, men have a greater chance of dying than women while, more generally, older individuals have a greater chance of dying than younger individuals. Again, the projected improvement in mortality prospects across successive cohorts is noticeable. For example, the chance of a woman aged 80 dying in the next year is projected to fall from 2.9% for those born in 1945 to 2.5% for those born in 1955 (and compared

6 Unless otherwise stated, the source of all data from 2002–03 to 2010–11 is ELSA waves 1 to 5, and the source of all data in later years is the RetSim model running on ELSA wave 5 data. All years in the figures refer to financial years: i.e. 2002 is 2002–03, etc.

7 See Office for National Statistics (2014).
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with 3.7% among those born in 1935). For men aged 80, a slightly larger difference is projected, from 4.1% for those born in 1945 to 3.6% for those born in 1955 (compared with 5.1% among those born in 1935). The key assumption we make when incorporating these projected improvements in mortality into our model is that they occur uniformly (within each age, sex and year-of-birth group) rather than being concentrated on a particular set of individuals. So, for example, we assume that improvements in mortality are not different by socio-economic group, education or region. Over the course of our simulation, we see the median age among those aged 65 and over rise from 73 in 2010–11 to 75 in 2022–23.

Figure 3.1. Improvements in mortality rates by birth cohort

The value that our mortality model adds to the simulation, in contrast to simply taking the ONS projections and applying them directly to those in our baseline data (the 2010–11 wave of ELSA), is that it allows for variation in mortality probabilities between individuals of the same sex, age and year of birth. So, for example, because individuals with better health are found, on average, to have a considerably greater chance of surviving for the next two years (over and above the effect of other characteristics, including sex and age) over the period between 2002–03 and 2008–09, our model will continue to give individuals with better levels of health a greater chance of survival in future. Other factors that are found to be associated with a statistically significant increase in the chance of dying in

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8 This assumes that inequalities in mortality across the characteristics included in our model remain constant over time. Recent evidence suggests that relative inequality in mortality across socio-economic classes has been widening (Office for National Statistics, 2013b).

9 Similarly, the age marking the 25th percentile rises from 69 to 70 and that marking the 75th percentile rises from 79 to 82.
the next two years include being single, receiving care, not being in paid work and smoking.

The projected chance of death over the next two years among those aged 75 to 84,\(^{10}\) and how this varies with their current health, is shown in Figure 3.2. Among this age group, men have on average a 9% chance, and women a 7% chance, of dying over the next two years. However, there is a clear relationship between the predicted two-year mortality rate and the measure of health we construct from the ELSA data.\(^{11}\) Among those judged to be in the best health, men have on average a 6% chance, and women a 4% chance, of dying in the next two years, whereas for those in the worst health the average chances of death are over three times as great, at 20% for men and 12% for women. This relationship comes both from the fact that being in better health is directly associated with being less likely to die in the next two years and from the impact of other factors associated with our health measure that are also associated with a reduced chance of death, such as being in a couple or not smoking.

Figure 3.2. Probability of death in next two years, for 75- to 84-year-olds by health status

The fact that our model predicts that different individuals have a different chance of dying between one period and the next means that the composition of each birth cohort within our sample, in terms of characteristics such as financial circumstances or household composition, will also change over the course of the simulation.

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\(^{10}\) This is the average probability for all 75- to 84-year-olds throughout the simulation period.

\(^{11}\) Our measure of health is constructed using individual responses to a set of objective questions. More details are provided in Section 3.2. More individuals are in the best health category, and fewer are in the worst health category, than in any of the others.
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One example of this is wealth. Our model suggests that an individual’s position in the wealth distribution does not have a statistically significant association with subsequent mortality once other observed characteristics are controlled for. However, wealth is correlated with characteristics (such as health and smoking behaviour) that are found to have a statistically significant association with an individual’s own chances of survival. This correlation means that, on average, those with lower wealth are less likely to survive over a two-year period.

A similar phenomenon occurs with both education and an individual’s position in the income distribution. Note that this is not to say that wealth, income and education are not determinants of subsequent mortality. Rather, it suggests that if lower wealth, education or income does lead to a greater likelihood of an individual dying, then this operates through, for example, a prior deterioration in the measure of health we construct rather than having an additional impact over and above health.

Evidence on the magnitude of the correlation between wealth and subsequent mortality among men and women aged 75 to 84 is shown in Figure 3.3. Men in the fifth of the population with the lowest wealth at baseline are 1.5 times as likely to die in the next two years than those in the richest fifth of the population.

Figure 3.3. Probability of death in next two years, for 75- to 84-year-olds by wealth quintile

Note: Quintiles defined on family net non-pension wealth when first observed in ELSA, by age group and couple status.

Evidence on the magnitude of the correlation between wealth and subsequent mortality among men and women aged 75 to 84 is shown in Figure 3.3. Men in the fifth of the population with the lowest wealth at baseline are 1.5 times as likely to die in the next two years than those in the richest fifth of the population.

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12 Computed separately for singles and couples, by age band, using data from the first year in which the household was interviewed.

13 Previous work in the UK has found a relationship between position in the wealth distribution and subsequent mortality (Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003), although this was not able to control for as rich a measure of health as we use here. Our finding is in line with ongoing work by Gemma Tetlow at IFS.
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(11% compared with 8%), while for women the relationship is slightly stronger, at 1.7 times as likely (9% compared with 6%). This means that as we project further forwards in time, our model predicts that the population within each birth cohort will become disproportionately comprised of individuals from towards the top of the 2010–11 wealth distribution.

The relationship between position in the wealth distribution and subsequent mortality is found to be stronger among younger age groups than among older age groups. Among men aged 52 to 64, the chances of dying in the next two years are twice as great among those in the lowest wealth quintile as among those in the highest wealth quintile. This falls to 1.9, 1.5 and 1.2 times as great among those aged 65 to 74, 75 to 84 (as shown in Figure 3.3) and 85 and over, respectively. Among women, there is slightly less variation in this ratio by age group: it falls from 2.0 times among those aged 52 to 64 to 1.7 among those aged 65 to 74 and those aged 75 to 84 (again as shown in Figure 3.3) and to 1.4 times among those aged 85 and over.

Figure 3.4. Probability of death by 2012–13, modelled in 2010–11, by age, sex and couple status

Our model also predicts that mortality rates will be much greater among single men than among men in couples and among single women than among women in couples. This is partly explained by the fact that singles start in worse health, on average, and are more likely to smoke, but there appears to be an additional association with being single even after controlling for other characteristics. The resulting mortality projections by sex, couple status and age are shown in Figure 3.4. For example, our model predicts that, in 2010–11, single 80-year-old men are 1.6 times as likely to die by 2012–13 as are 80-year-old men in couples (14%
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compared with 9%), while for women the relationship is stronger, at 1.8 times (9% compared with 5%).

One particularly striking output of our model is its prediction of how the family composition of the older population, and in particular the population at very old ages, will change between 2010–11 and 2022–23. In 2010–11 among individuals aged 85 and over, 55% were single women, 19% were single men and 25% were in couples. As shown in Figure 3.5, we project that, by 2022–23, these proportions will be 45%, 16% and 38%, respectively. While the percentage of those aged 85 and over who are in couples has been increasing in recent decades (for example, by around 5 percentage points a decade between 1990 and 2010), the projected increase over the next decade would represent an acceleration of this trend.14 This trend is driven, in part, by the ONS projection that male life expectancy at older ages is catching up (if only slightly) with female life expectancy. It could also be due to other characteristics that are associated with mortality changing across successive cohorts.

Figure 3.5. Proportion of individuals in each benefit unit type: age 85 and over

Also shown in Figure 3.5 is the extent to which the RetSim model builds on the raw age, sex and birth-year projections produced by ONS. The result of running RetSim without our mortality model – instead giving everyone within an age, sex and birth-year cell the same probability of dying – is shown by the dotted lines. This distributes the improvements in mortality equally between single people and those in couples, increasing the proportion of people in couples over time as husbands (and some wives) live longer and partnerships dissolve more slowly as

14 Authors’ calculations using weighted data from the Family Resources Survey and the Family Expenditure Survey.
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a result of death. Our model builds on this by allowing the probability of death to vary within age, sex and birth-year cells, leading (as discussed above) to those in couples having a lower chance of death in a given period than single people. This strengthens the effect predicted by using the ONS projections alone that a higher proportion of pensioners will live in couples in the future.

This anticipated increase in the proportion of older individuals who are in couples will have many implications for the well-being and needs of this group of the population. There is evidence that, in many dimensions, individuals at older ages who are in couples are better off than those who are single,15 so this is likely to be a very good news story. Policymakers working in areas relating to the older population will need to consider how this increased likelihood of remaining in a couple until much later in life affects their policy formation and communication. For example, communicating policy to the person in a couple who has habitually managed all the finances could be very different from communicating with a widow or widower who is not used to that responsibility. In addition, there are implications of this trend for families planning their own future – for example, in considering likely future social care needs or when and whether to move to a smaller property.

3.2 Health

Once our model has projected who survives into the next period, it then takes the group of survivors and predicts the level of their health, which is measured as an index that takes one of five possible values ranked from best health to worst health.

This five-category measure of health is based on individual responses to a range of objective questions regarding problems with mobility, eyesight, hearing, urinary incontinence, stress and clinical depression. Those with no reported problems are ranked as being in the best health, those with one problem as having good health, those with two or three problems as having OK health, those with four or five problems as having poor health and those with six or more flags (of a maximum of 13) as being in the worst health category.16 Unsurprisingly, health in the previous period is a key predictor of health in the current period. For example, both men and women who are currently in the best health category are 17 percentage points (ppts) more likely to stay there than those in the second-best health category are to move up to the best health category in the next period. Those currently in the worst health category are 61ppts (men) and 63ppts (women) more likely to stay there than those in the second-worst health category are to move down to the worst health category in the next period.

15 For example, chronic loneliness significantly increases mortality(Patterson and Veenstra, 2010), single pensioners are more likely to be in poverty than pensioners in couples, though rates are falling (The Poverty Site, 2010, chart 1), and our own results presented in this report show that being in a couple is positively correlated with improved mortality rates and health.

16 This index has been developed by James Banks, Richard Blundell and James Browne for the purposes of predicting eligibility for disability benefits as part of an ongoing project at IFS.
Attributes associated with a reduced probability of moving into (or remaining in) the best health category (after taking into account other factors, including health in the previous period) are being older, reporting having had poor health in childhood, receiving care and smoking. Interestingly, providing care is also found to be associated with being less likely to move into the best health category. We find that those in couples – and particularly women in couples – are relatively more likely than single individuals to move into the best health category. As healthier individuals are subsequently more likely to survive, this last relationship will contribute towards the better mortality rates predicted for those in couples compared with those for single individuals, which were highlighted in the previous section.

Among individuals aged 65 and over, our model predicts a slight increase over the simulation period in the proportion who are in the top two health categories. This increase comes mainly from a decline in the proportion who are in the middle health category, and holds for both men and women. However, since the age structure of the population aged 65 and over is changing over this period, and given that older individuals are more likely to be in poor health than younger individuals, it is more informative to look at the trends in health among individuals of similar ages. For this reason, Figure 3.6 presents the proportion of men who are projected to be in the best health category over time by age group. Figure 3.7 gives the same information for women.

Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of men aged 75–84 who are in the best health category increasing by 5ppts to 48% between 2010–11 and 2022–23, with smaller increases among other age groups.

Among women, who are on average found to be in worse health than men, and therefore of whom fewer are in the best health category at the start of the

Figure 3.6. Proportion in best health by age group: men
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Figure 3.7. Proportion in best health by age group: women

![Graph showing the proportion in best health by age group for women. The graph displays the percentage of the age group in the best health category for each year from 2002 to 2022. The age groups are 65–74, 75–84, 85+, and all age groups combined. The trend shows an increase in the proportion in the best health category over the years.]

Figure 3.8. Proportion in best health by couple status: age 65 and over

![Graph showing the proportion in best health by couple status for age 65 and over. The graph displays the percentage in the best health category for single males, single females, couple males, and couple females over the years from 2002 to 2022. The trend shows an increase in the proportion in the best health category over the years.]

Simulation, our model predicts a larger increase in the proportion in the best health category. This percentage increases by around 7 ppts in each age group, reaching 47% for those aged 65–74, 33% for 75- to 84-year-olds and 21% for the 85-and-over group.

The breakdown of the proportion in best health by couple status, as shown in Figure 3.8, shows us two key things: first, that – as alluded to above – those in couples are generally healthier than single people of the same sex; and second, that the increase in healthier women between 2010–11 and 2022–23 is primarily
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being seen in the group of single women. Both of these trends will have implications for the care results we discuss below.

3.3 Care receipt

Our model estimates whether an individual will be in receipt of care and, if so, whether that will be informal or formal care. This is of interest for a number of reasons, most obviously that any change in receipt of formal care will affect demands on the social care system. Changes in receipt of informal care could also have important implications, most significantly for those providing that care (who, for many of those in couples, is likely to be their partner).

Those who receive care in one period are estimated to be more likely to receive care in both the next period and the subsequent period. Over and above lagged receipt of care, we find that health in the current period has a large impact on whether an individual receives care: compared with those in the best health group, even those in the second-best health group are found to be up to 12ppts more likely to receive care, while those in the worst health group are up to 35ppts more likely to receive care than those in the best health group. Other characteristics found to be statistically significantly associated with being more likely to receive care include being single, being older, not being in paid work in the previous period and receiving disability living allowance in the previous period.

Most of the factors that we find to be associated with being more likely to receive care – such as lagged care receipt, being older and being in less good health – are found to be associated with an individual both being more likely to receive informal care and being more likely to receive formal care. There are some characteristics where this is not the case: for example, being in a couple is associated with being more likely to receive informal care but with being less likely to receive formal care. We also find that those who have had children (who, as adults, could provide care) are more likely to receive informal care and less likely to receive formal care than those who have not had children.

Projected receipt of both informal and formal care in 2010–11 and 2022–23 is shown in Table 3.1. This is shown separately for men and women split by age band and couple status. Receipt of care (either informal or formal) is more prevalent among older age groups than among younger age groups. The model also suggests that receipt of care is greater among women than men. This latter association could be genuine: for example, it would be consistent with the evidence presented in the previous section that women have, on average, worse health.

17 Care is defined, for our purposes, as assistance with day-to-day tasks that an individual has difficulty completing unaided; this could be help from a partner, family member, friend, charity worker, paid carer, etc. We classify help from a professional as formal care and any other help (including from those receiving carer’s allowance) as informal care. Although ELSA contains data on individuals who move into care homes, we do not include these individuals in our model, as this report is intended to capture the circumstances and finances of the household population in England.
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Levels of health than men; it would also be consistent with women being more likely than men to be widowed and to need additional help. However, it could also be an effect of traditional gender roles in couples in this cohort, with what we define as care being less likely to be reported as such by some husbands who receive it or some wives who provide it.\(^{18}\)

Table 3.1. Receipt of formal and informal care (%), by sex, age band and couple status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010–11</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2022–23</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 65 to 74</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 75 to 84</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 85 &amp; over</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 65 to 74</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 75 to 84</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 85 &amp; over</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single men</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single women</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in couples</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in couples</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Patterns of receipt of formal care are slightly different from those of informal care, with single individuals being more likely to receive formal care than those in couples and the reverse being true of informal care. A greater proportion of care at older ages is formal rather than informal; in particular, while women aged 85 and over are not appreciably more likely to receive informal care than women aged 75 to 84, they are much more likely to receive formal care. The shift from informal to formal care at older ages is perhaps explained by the declining probability of having a partner who is able to provide informal care, or by an increase in the intensity and complexity of care needed at older ages, which is then best provided by a professional.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) Note that we record an individual as receiving care (a) if they report receiving care in their own questionnaire (97% of recipients in all five waves of ELSA) or (b) if their partner reports providing care for them when they have not reported receiving it (3% of recipients). We do not model how much care (i.e. how many hours or what kind of support) they receive.

\(^{19}\) Note that we do not attempt to model constraints on the supply of formal care: any national or local policy changes affecting the eligibility criteria for receipt of formal care, or any changes in the market for privately provided care, are not picked up in our modelling.
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Overall, receipt of care is projected to be fairly flat between 2010–11 and 2022–23, but the model projects that the proportion receiving care will decline for women in all age groups and rise slightly for certain groups of men. The trend among women is linked to the projected improvement in their health, as set out in the previous section.

There is also a projected decline in receipt of formal care among men and women aged between 75 and 84, and among women aged 85 and over. The fact that this trend is not visible by family type suggests that this decline is offset by an increase in the number of older people in couples, who instead receive informal care.

### 3.4 Care provision

The next section of our model estimates whether or not an individual provides care. The care burden faced by the population aged 65 and over will be of direct interest to policymakers. In addition, provision of care is an important determinant of changes in labour market behaviour (as we will see in the next section), and so can indirectly affect the family incomes of this group. As well as projecting whether or not an individual gives care, our model also predicts whether they give ‘high-intensity’ care, which we define as being care of 35 hours or more per week. Those providing this amount of care, if they have earnings of no more than £100 per week, can be eligible for carer's allowance.

Those providing care in the previous period are more likely to provide care in the current period, with this being particularly true of those who were providing high-intensity care in the previous period. Those in couples, those not in bad health and those not in paid work are also found to be more likely to provide care. For those in couples, a particularly strong relationship is found with the health of their partner. Compared with those whose partner is in the best health category, those whose partner is in the second-best health category are up to 10ppts more likely to provide care. This association is much larger for those with partners in worse categories of health: those whose partner is in the worst health category are up to 31ppts more likely to provide care than those whose partner is in the best health category. Of those 6% of people in couples with a partner in the worst health category, 83% provided care in 2010–11 (of which 28% was high-intensity care).

Actual care provision in 2010–11 and projected care provision in 2022–23 are shown in Table 3.2. As with care receipt, care provision is shown separately for men and women split by age band and couple status.

Those in couples are more likely to provide care than those who are single, with men in couples being more likely to provide care than women in couples. As with the receipt of care, this could be genuine – perhaps reflecting the poorer health, on average, of female partners than of male partners. Alternatively, it could, at least in part, be due to social norms leading to men and women having a different threshold for what they decide to report as providing care for their spouse.
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Table 3.2. Care provision (%), by sex, age band and couple status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010–11</th>
<th>2022–23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 65 to 74</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 75 to 84</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 85 &amp; over</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 65 to 74</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 75 to 84</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. aged 85 &amp; over</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single men</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single women</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in couples</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in couples</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no clear pattern of care provision among men across age groups, whereas among women it is younger individuals who are more likely, on average, to provide care than older individuals.

Overall, care provision is projected to be flat between 2010–11 and 2022–23 (as was the case with receipt of care), but there is some variation among different subgroups. Provision of care among women is projected to rise relatively sharply over the period. The fact that this sharp increase is not seen in the couple status subgroups means that the increase in care provision by older women is best explained by the projected shift in couple status among older women over the period: i.e. there are more women providing care because there are more women in couples, and women in couples are more likely to give care than single women. This is a potential downside to the story that more of the elderly will be in couples in future if the change results in additional, and potentially unduly straining, caring responsibilities for older women. We revisit this further at the end of this chapter by exploring the trends in care provision by health.

The model projects a slight decline in the provision of care among men in couples, which could be explained by the projected improvement in health among women, leading to husbands having less need to provide care for their wives. Among men aged 65 to 74 and men aged 75 to 84, we predict that provision of care will decline. In contrast, the provision of care among men aged 85 and over is projected to increase.

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Note that those aged 85 and over are a small proportion of all those aged 65 and over, so any trend among this oldest age group will always be diluted in the aggregate figure.
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Our simulations suggest that, as has been the case in the past, most incidences of care provision will be 'low intensity', i.e. for fewer than 35 hours per week. Figure 3.9 shows the proportion of those who provide high-intensity care who also receive carer's allowance\(^{21}\) (averaged across the whole simulation). At younger ages, when individuals are conceivably still in the labour market, high-intensity care may well be viewed as an alternative to work and so prompt people to claim the benefit if they are eligible for it. At older ages, we step tentatively back towards the 'gender roles' explanation, with men potentially more likely to view the role as an unusual responsibility. That said, the absolute numbers of people caring at a high intensity are small, and this is particularly true at older ages: overall, far fewer than 1% of people aged 65 and over claim carer's allowance.

Figure 3.9. Proportion of high-intensity carers receiving carer's allowance, by age and sex

3.5 Employment status

RetSim projects whether individuals are in full-time work, part-time work or not in paid work at all, using separate models for people in each of these three states in the previous period. Individuals are allowed to remain in paid work until age 79, while those not in paid work are allowed to enter the labour market up until age 69.

A summary of some of the most important characteristics that are found to determine whether men remain in full-time paid work is presented in Table 3.3. Being in the worst health category is found to lead to a man who was working

\(^{21}\) Carer’s allowance can be received by anyone caring for an eligible person (someone receiving attendance allowance or the middle or higher care component of disability living allowance) for at least 35 hours per week, while not earning more than £100 per week.
### Table 3.3. Statistically significant determinants of men remaining in full-time work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Estimated marginal effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worst health category</td>
<td>(-24.2) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives informal care</td>
<td>(-8.1) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides high-intensity care</td>
<td>(-16.6) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below state pension age</td>
<td>(+19.5) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner below state pension age</td>
<td>(+5.0) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In defined contribution pension</td>
<td>(+5.9) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In defined benefit pension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. and below normal retirement age</td>
<td>(+1.0) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. and above normal retirement age</td>
<td>(-15.1) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has outstanding mortgage</td>
<td>(+4.7) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Membership of defined benefit and defined contribution pensions fixed at baseline; all other characteristics modelled contemporaneously. Significance stars indicate a p value of <0.001 (***), <0.005 (**), and <0.01 (*).

full-time being 24ppts less likely to remain in full-time employment. Receiving informal care, and providing high-intensity care, are both also found to lead to men being much less likely to remain in full-time work.

Pensions, and the age at which these pensions are often drawn, are found to be very important determinants of whether or not men remain in full-time work. Men who are below the state pension age (SPA) are found to be almost 20ppts more likely to remain in full-time work, with those whose partner is below the SPA being a further 5ppts more likely to remain in full-time work. These effects will be particularly important for our projections: the gradual rise in the female SPA to age 65, and the subsequent rise in both the male and the female SPA to age 66, will lead to both those directly affected by the change and their partners being more likely to remain in the labour market at older ages.

Private pension arrangements are also found to be an important determinant of whether men remain in full-time work. In particular, those in defined benefit pension schemes become much more likely (by 15ppts) to leave full-time work as soon as they reach the normal retirement age in that scheme (that is, the age at which they can typically first claim an unreduced pension), while those with defined contribution pensions are found to be 6ppts more likely to remain in full-time work. Finally, we find that men who have an outstanding mortgage are 5ppts more likely to remain in full-time work than those who do not.

Gender has a material effect on all the employment transitions we consider, with women being more likely to be in part-time work and less likely to stay in, or move into, full-time work. Being in a couple significantly increases the probability of moving from full- to part-time work, particularly for men. Having a partner in part-time work also has a significant effect, increasing the probability of both
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sexes moving from full-time to part-time work and making women more likely to leave work altogether. Along with other effects described in Browne et al. (2014), this suggests some element of joint retirement planning is implicitly captured by our model.

Projected trends in the proportion of people in paid work (either full-time or part-time), split by sex and age group, are shown in Figure 3.10. Throughout the period for which we have ELSA data, younger individuals are more likely to be in paid work than older individuals and, within a given age band, men are more likely to be in paid work than women. Over a longer time scale, employment rates of older women have been rising since the mid 1980s while employment rates of older men have been rising since the mid 1990s. While employment rates of older women are now at the highest level seen since the mid-1960s, those of older men are still below the levels seen prior to the recession of the early 1980s.

Figure 3.10. Proportion in any work by age and sex

The most striking trend is a sharp increase between 2012–13 and 2016–17 in the percentage of women aged 60 to 64 who are projected to be in paid work, which is then followed by a sharp increase in the percentage of women aged 65 to 69 who are projected to be in paid work between 2016–17 and 2020–21. In part, this will be due to the projected improvement in the health of these women, but the main driver of the rise in employment among 60- to 64-year-old women is the increase in the female SPA from 60 to 66 between 2010 and 2020. Our projections rely on the assumption that all the retirements (and moves to part-time work) that occurred at age 60 in the recent past, over and above those that are explained by other observed characteristics including age, are due to age 60
Results: demographics, health, care, employment, and disability benefits

being the SPA. Therefore, as the SPA rises, these employment changes are automatically pushed to later ages.\textsuperscript{22}

Justification for our approach is provided by Cribb, Emmerson and Tetlow (2013), who used the increase in the female SPA from age 60 to 61 that occurred between April 2010 and March 2012 to look at the impact of reaching the SPA on the labour market behaviour of women (and their husbands). This found that, at least for this increase, all of the excess retirements that previously occurred at age 60 were indeed due to a SPA effect rather than, for example, a specific preference among women to retire at age 60 that was not related to it being the SPA.

The increases in projected employment rates of older women mean we estimate that, by 2018–19, 60- to 64-year-old women will be as likely to be in paid work as 60- to 64-year-old men, with the equivalent being true of 65- to 69-year-olds by 2020–21.

Figure 3.11. Proportion in part-time work by age and sex

The projected trends in employment are split into trends in part-time and full-time work in Figures 3.11 and 3.12. The projected increases in part-time employment are such that, by 2016–17, part-time employment of women aged 60 to 64 is estimated to be closer to the three-in-ten rate observed among women aged 55 to 59 in recent years. Similarly, by 2022–23, part-time employment of women aged 65 to 69 is projected to be closer to the one-in-four rate observed among women aged 60 to 64 in recent years. Among men, the model does not project any increase in the rate of part-time employment, suggesting that the rise

\textsuperscript{22} Note that the effect of lagged employment status in the model means that we will always expect to see an increase in employment beyond the new SPA when the SPA is raised.
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in part-time employment seen in recent years among men aged 60 to 64 and 65 to 69 will not continue.

Figure 3.12 shows an increase in full-time employment for women aged 60 to 69 and for men aged 65 to 69.

Figure 3.12. Proportion in full-time work by age and sex

Taken together, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show that the increase in employment for older women is shared across part-time and full-time work, but that the increase for men is coming from full-time work only. This is in line with the historically much lower part-time employment rate for men than for women and, again, is consistent with the evidence from Cribb, Emmerson and Tetlow (2013), which found that the rise in the female SPA from age 60 to 61 led to an increase in both full-time and part-time employment of women.

3.6 Disability benefit receipt

The final outcome incorporated into our model is receipt of disability benefits. Specifically, our model projects receipt of incapacity benefit (IB) and its replacement employment and support allowance (ESA), disability living allowance (DLA) and its replacement personal independence payment (PIP), and attendance allowance (AA). We also allow existing claimants of severe

23 In this section, we present data from our simulation but not from the ELSA data back to 2002–03. This is because we scale up the claimant rate in the simulation to be more representative of that observed in reality (see Browne et al. (2014) for detail) and so there is a significant discontinuity in the time series between 2008–09 and 2010–11.
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disablement allowance (SDA) to continue receiving that benefit. More details on each of these benefits can be found in Box 3.1.

Box 3.1. Detail of disability and incapacity benefits

**Incapacity benefit** is paid to those who are judged to be incapable of work, are aged below the SPA, and either have paid or been credited with sufficient National Insurance contributions or became incapable of work in youth.

**Employment and support allowance** is replacing IB: all new claims from October 2008 have been for ESA rather than IB, and the rollover of existing claimants from IB to ESA is underway. Similarly to IB, ESA is a benefit aimed at those judged to have ‘limited capability for work’.

**Disability living allowance** is paid as a combination of two components: care and mobility. A person can be entitled to one or both components. Individuals can make new claims for DLA until the age of 64 (inclusive), and any DLA claimed at age 64 may continue to be claimed beyond that age. DLA is currently being reformed, and will ultimately be replaced by personal independence payments for claimants aged under 65.

**Personal independence payments** are being rolled out to replace DLA for claimants aged under 65. The reform makes a number of changes to the way the benefit is administered, including: the facility to review more frequently the awards made; a new, ‘more objective’ assessment; and the removal of automatic entitlement for certain conditions. DWP’s impact assessment predicts that these reforms will lead to a 20% reduction in working-age spending on DLA/PIP (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012).

**Attendance allowance** is paid to those aged 65 and over who otherwise satisfy the conditions for the middle or higher rates of the care component of DLA. To date, no plans to reform AA have been announced.

**Severe disablement allowance** is a legacy benefit: there have been no new claims allowed since April 2001. Existing claimants continue to claim.

*While the policy rule prevents new claims after the age of 64, we set the cut-off in our model at 65 because our model works on two-year transitions. Doing this means we ensure that all men below the SPA are able to make new claims in the model as well as in reality (i.e. if we observe them aged 63 and 65, we do not make 63 the last age at which they can make a new claim). This maintains the link between working age and DLA, and we amend the lower age limit for AA in the model accordingly, although it is still not a completely accurate representation of reality.*

**Incapacity benefits**

Receipt of IB is found to be statistically significantly associated with both receipt of IB and receipt of DLA in the previous period. In addition, we find that receipt of IB is greater among those who receive informal care, who do not have a degree, who are not currently in paid work or who have moved out of full-time work since the previous period. A strong association is found with current health, with
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those in the worst health group being up to 10ppts more likely to receive IB than those in the best health category.

Figure 3.13 shows the projected trend in the receipt of incapacity benefits, split between IB, ESA and SDA. In 2010–11, those aged 55 to 59 were more likely to receive these benefits than those aged 60 to 64. The sharp drop in the line for IB and the counteracting increase in ESA are a result of the reform to the system that replaces IB and SDA with ESA by 2018–19. This is against a background of relatively static claimant rates for IB and SDA in working age: data from DWP show that the claimant rate in England was essentially static from 2002 to 2006, when a slight downward trend in the number of claimants of between 1 and 2% per year began. This trend accelerated in 2008 when ESA was introduced, but an increase in ESA claimants will have compensated, at least partially, for this decline.24

Figure 3.13. Receipt of incapacity benefits by type and age

We model ESA as partially rolled out in 2010–11 and fully rolled out by 2018–19. The effect of the modelled rollout alone (which assumes a 15% drop in claimant numbers in steady state) would be to reduce the overall claimant rate from 9% in 2010–11 (for those aged 60–64) to 8% in 2018–19. The fact that we do not see a steady downward trend reflects that more is going on in our model than the rollout of ESA, not least the increasing eligibility of women to the benefit as their SPA rises. More detail on the modelling of the reform is given in section 7 of Browne et al. (2014).

Disability living allowance

Receipt of DLA among those aged 65 and under is found to be statistically significantly associated with both receipt of IB and receipt of DLA in the previous

24 [http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/ibsda/ccdate/ccgor/a_carate_r_ccdate_c_ccgor.html](http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/ibsda/ccdate/ccgor/a_carate_r_ccdate_c_ccgor.html).
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period: those who received DLA in the last period are up to 13ppts more likely to receive it in the current period, while those who received IB in the last period are up to 3ppts more likely to receive DLA in the current period. Conditional on this lagged receipt, we also find that receipt of DLA is more common among those who are single, those currently receiving informal or formal care, those in poor health and those not in paid work. For those aged over 65, for whom new claims of DLA in our model are not possible, continued receipt is related to being older and, more materially, being in poor health.

Projected receipt of DLA through to 2022–23 is shown, by age band, for men in Figure 3.14 and for women in Figure 3.15. In 2010–11, receipt among 55- to 59-year-olds is lower than receipt among 60- to 64-year-olds and 65- to 74-year-olds but greater than receipt among those aged 75 to 84 and those aged 85 and

Figure 3.14. DLA receipt by age group: men

Figure 3.15. DLA receipt by age group: women
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over. Among both men and women aged 60 to 64, the model projects a significant decline in receipt between 2014–15 and 2018–19, a fall of 3ppts for men and 4ppts for women. These falls are driven by our modelling of the replacement of DLA with PIP over the period from 2014–15 to 2018–19. We base our assumptions on the DWP impact assessment for the change (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012), which predicts that spending on working-age DLA will fall by 20% as a result of the reform.

While DLA is not being replaced by PIP for those aged 65 and over, the fact that this group cannot make a new claim for DLA/PIP but can only continue an existing working-age claim means that the drop in receipt in the younger group feeds through into a subsequent, gradual decline in receipt among older individuals. From 2014–15 to 2022–23, our model projects that receipt of DLA/PIP among those aged 65 to 74 will fall by 4ppts for men and 3ppts for women. In Chapter 6, we explore the impact of the reform on the incomes of those aged 65 and over.

The model also projects that receipt of DLA/PIP among men and women aged 85 and over will decline over time; this may be linked to improving health and more persistent couple status within this group.

Attendance allowance

Finally, our model projects receipt of attendance allowance. The model finds that current receipt of informal care, having poor health in the previous period and (in particular) in the current period, and not having a degree are positively and statistically significantly associated with receipt of AA. A further key determinant is receipt of AA in the previous period, which increases the likelihood of receiving AA now by 13ppts for men and by 14ppts for women.

The projected trend in AA receipt by age band is shown in Figure 3.16. In 2010–11, receipt is much higher among those in older age groups than among those in younger age groups and, within each age group, is more common among women than men. Among women aged 85 and over in 2010–11, almost 60% are receiving AA. The most noticeable trend is the decline in receipt of AA for women aged 85 and over, who see a drop of 10ppts over the simulation period (though

25 These trends in DLA receipt are in contrast to DWP figures from 2002–03 to 2010–11, which show an increase of 50% (equivalent to about 5% per year) in the number of claimants aged 65 and over (http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/dia/ccdate/cnage/a_carate_r_ccdate_c_cnage.html). However, the DWP statistical release refers to the ‘maturing’ of the benefit as a reason for this seemingly rapid growth: there were (almost) no claimants aged over 65 in 1992, when DLA was introduced, because new claims can only be made before that age. At the start of 2002–03, the oldest claimant was 75, but by the end of 2010–11 this had risen to 84 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2011). It is perfectly plausible, in view of the likely life expectancy of those who are sufficiently disabled to claim benefits in working age, that we are seeing the tailing-off of this effect over our simulation period.

26 The modelling of the transition from DLA to PIP is discussed in detail in Browne et al. (2014). The fall in claimant rate that we model as resulting from the reform is based on assumptions derived from the projected pre- and post-reform claimant numbers for each combination of mobility and daily living award, as provided in the impact assessment.
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their level of receipt remains well above that of younger people). This is driven by the improvement in health among this group, as well as by the increase in the proportion of older women in couples, both of which act to reduce the probability of receiving AA in our model. DWP data show a historical trend of a fairly steady increase in claimant numbers in England of about 3% per year from 2002–03 to 2010–11.27

Figure 3.16. AA receipt by age group and sex

Over the simulation period, we see the level of receipt among the oldest men rise by 5ppts. It is less clear why this is the case but it is likely to be linked to the slight increase in levels of informal care receipt in this group shown in Table 3.1, which has a statistically significant effect on the probability of receiving AA.

3.7 Interactions between sub-models

A key benefit of using a dynamic simulation model to produce projections such as those presented in this report is that it allows us to examine how the projected trends in each element of the model interact with each other. For example, our model suggests that provision of informal care will increase among women aged 75 and over (driven in part by their partners being more likely to be alive at these ages in future) and that employment rates will increase among women aged 65 to 74 (driven in part by the increase in the female SPA from age 60 to age 66 between 2010–11 and 2020–21). One key concern might be whether it is realistic that these women will be able to carry out this increased activity without it adversely affecting their well-being: for example, if the additional workers were already caring, or the additional carers were in poor health, this could be unsustainably stressful. Therefore, in this section, we explore the extent to which

27 http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/aa/ccdate/ccgor/a_carate_r_ccdate_c_ccgor.html.
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the model projects an increased employment rate among women who also have caring responsibilities, before turning to whether the projected increase in employment or provision of care among older women is visible among those projected to be in bad health, in a way which might substantiate these concerns.

Work and care provision

The extent to which the model projects that increasing numbers of individuals aged between 65 and 74 might have to combine the provision of care with being in paid work is shown in Figure 3.17. Our simulations suggest that, between 2010–11 and 2022–23, there will be an increase in employment within this age group among single women, women in couples and men in couples as the SPA rises. Among single women and men in couples, the model does not project any increase in the proportion who will be both in paid work and providing informal care, potentially alleviating concerns about these individuals’ ability to remain in the labour market for longer. Among men in couples, the increase in employment is occurring alongside a drop in the proportion providing informal care, which might raise the question of whether these men are remaining in paid work at the expense of providing care, but should be taken in the context of improving health and declining need for care in the older female population.28

Among women in couples, a slightly different trend is projected. Rather than the increase in employment being associated with a drop in the proportion who are providing informal care, two things are projected to happen. First, there is a

Figure 3.17. Combinations of working and care provision: 65- to 74-year-olds

28 It should be noted that the ordering of our model means that, in each period, the informal care decision is modelled before the employment decision. However, remaining in work in one period means that our model will reduce the likelihood that an individual will provide informal care in the subsequent period.
slight increase in the proportion who are projected to be in paid work and simultaneously providing informal care, although it should be noted that this is still only projected to be true of a very small proportion of women. Second, there is a sharp drop in the proportion of women who are projected to be neither in paid work nor providing informal care.

**Care provision and health**

As alluded to in our discussion of care provision, we might be concerned that the increasing life expectancy of men will place an unsustainable burden on the partners who care for them. Instead, we show in Table 3.4 that the proportion of women in each of our health categories providing care is relatively static between 2010–11 and 2022–23, implying that the increasing numbers of older female carers are being predominantly drawn from the increasing numbers of older women in better health.

**Table 3.4. Care provision (%) among those aged 65 and over, by sex and health status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Best health</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good health</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK health</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor health</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst health</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect to the story is that the men who are living longer may now start to care for women who would have been cared for in the past by other family members. Again, we see no evidence that an increasing burden is being placed on the least healthy.

We do see that men in the poorer health groups give a substantial amount of care throughout both the ELSA data and the simulation, with less differentiation between health levels than we see for women. One possible explanation for this is that most care is provided within couples, and the health of couples is generally interrelated, so it is not necessarily surprising that people in less healthy couples are also in couples where care is being provided. This would also explain why some 10% of women in the worst health category also provided care in 2010–11.

**Working status and health**

We saw in our analysis of projected employment trends that the rising SPA is inducing both women and men to work until later in life. One potential concern is that this trend would imply a less healthy workforce and an excessive strain being placed on the less well members of the population. Figures 3.18 and 3.19
show that our model does not suggest that will be the case. Looking at Figure 3.18, it seems that, if anything, labour market participation among men in poorer health is falling over the course of the simulation. Similarly, Figure 3.19 shows that the increase in the number of women in work as a result of the rising SPA is overwhelmingly being drawn from the healthiest two groups, with less dramatic trends for those in the middle group and almost no change in the two least healthy groups.

Figure 3.18. Working by health status: men aged 65 to 79

Figure 3.19. Working by health status: women aged 65 to 79
4. **Results: Gross Income and Wealth**

Having produced the demographic outputs described above (in particular those relating to employment status and disability benefit receipt), alongside estimates of individuals’ state and private pension incomes (which depend, in part, on when they leave the labour market), we are in a position to construct gross incomes at the individual and family level over the course of the simulation period.

In addition, as described in more detail in Browne et al. (2014), we allow families’ wealth holdings to evolve throughout the simulation period and add the income from this wealth (interest from financial assets and rental income from rental property) to their simulated gross income.

The purpose of these calculations is to enable us to pass families’ gross income through the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, to obtain their net incomes. Specifically, this process takes into account payments of income tax, National Insurance contributions and council tax and receipt of means-tested and universal benefits. This chapter outlines the results before that stage, i.e. how the distribution of wealth and gross income evolves over the course of the simulation.\(^\text{29}\)

### 4.1 Gross income

We pass six major elements of gross income to the TAXBEN model: earnings, income from state pensions, income from private pensions, income from returns on financial assets,\(^\text{30}\) income from property and income from disability benefits.

As we are considering the population aged 65 and over, some of these components will clearly be more important than others: in each year, we see median earnings of zero, but we see median state pension income of up to £150pw and median private pension income of up to £60pw.

Between 2010–11 and 2022–23, our model projects that real gross incomes for 65- to 74-year-olds will grow on average by 56%, which is equivalent to an

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\(^{29}\) Unless otherwise stated, the source of all is the RetSim model running on ELSA wave 5 data. All income figures in this chapter are presented in 2014–15 prices (deflated using the consumer price index) and all wealth figures are nominal. Income is generally presented as pounds per week (£pw) and wealth is generally the stock held (£). We do not equivalise incomes in this chapter and we specify in each case whether an amount is a household or an individual figure; in general, income is per person and wealth is per household. All years in the figures refer to financial years: i.e. 2010 is 2010–11, etc.

The ‘households’ in our model are actually benefit units. This means that a couple living together is treated as one household, but the fact that they might also be living with a grown-up child, for example, is not accounted for. That means that we implicitly assume that the living standards of benefit units in the model are directly related to their own incomes and wealth holdings, and not to the circumstances of any other benefit unit that might live with them. In by far the majority of cases, the individuals in our model are living as couples or alone.

\(^{30}\) Savings and investments, including stocks, shares, bonds and savings accounts.
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annual average increase of 3.8% per year. Growth in the mean income of the top quintile is projected to be greater than that of the bottom quintile, at 78% (or 4.9% per year) and 20% (1.5% per year) respectively.

This is not the same as saying that, on average, those in the richest quintile of the 65–74 distribution in 2010–11 will have an income that is 78% higher in 2022–23 than their income was in 2010–11. Instead, it means that, on average, the richest quintile of those aged 65 to 74 in 2022–23 will have an income that is 78% higher than the income of the richest quintile in 2010–11. The key point is that these two cases are not the same individuals: as we set out in Chapter 1, the people who will make up the 65-and-over population in 2022–23 will look very different from the 65-and-over population in 2010–11 as a result of their life experiences, retirement decisions and demographics, as well as the policies and economic conditions they were exposed to during their working life. So it is unsurprising that their incomes are also substantially different. In particular, it is important not to interpret the ‘average annual growth rates’ we talk about as being growth in income experienced by specific individuals, but instead to understand them as the average growth in the mean income of a changing group of people.

Figure 4.1 shows the relative importance of the different sources of gross income for 65- to 74-year-olds, split by gross income quintile. Quintiles are defined by ordering all people in the age group by their individual gross income in the specified year and splitting them into five equally-sized groups. We then show the average (mean) amount of income within each quintile for each source of gross income.

Figure 4.1. Sources of gross income by gross income quintile: age 65–74

Note: Quintiles are defined within the age group on unequivalised individual gross income.
Pensions are by far the largest source of income for this age group, and the difference in incomes across the quintiles is driven by private pensions and earnings. For the bottom three quintiles, in both 2010–11 and 2022–23, state pensions account for over half of income. By contrast, in the top two quintiles, the majority of income is, on average, from private sources.

A noticeable difference between the sources of income in the two years is that earnings play a much bigger role in 2022–23, as the rising SPA extends people’s working lives. We project that the mean earnings of 65- to 74-year-olds will increase by 154% between 2010–11 and 2022–23, equivalent to around 8% per year. This is because of two things: the people who are working later in life are earning more than people of that age earned in the past (as we will see in Figures 4.6 and 4.7) and substantially more people are working in 2022–23 (21% of the age group) than in 2010–11 (16%). In the richest quintile, where we see the biggest role for earnings, the employment rate rises from 39% to 50%. By contrast, it rises from just 4% to 5% in the poorest quintile. This is unsurprising: it is hard to be in paid work and still be in the poorest fifth of individuals aged 65 to 74. Because we are looking at mean, rather than median, incomes in this section, every additional person who earns any money from paid work will increase the average earnings figure.

There is also an increase in the amount of income in the highest quintile coming from property or financial assets in 2022–23 compared with 2010–11. We will see in Figure 4.9 that this is partly due to greater-than-inflation increases in financial wealth for those with the largest wealth holdings, although again the changing composition of the age group will play a significant role.

These two factors – higher average earnings and higher average income from financial assets – help to explain why higher growth in average incomes is projected for the highest-income fifth of the population aged 65 to 74 than for the poorest fifth: those in paid work and those with greater amounts of financial wealth are typically found towards the top of this income distribution. In addition, we predict that average private pension income will grow faster than average state pension income and that the mean income from disability benefits among this age group will fall over the course of the simulation, not least as a result of policy reform.

Our projections suggest that mean real gross income from private pensions will have increased over the course of the simulation period by an average of 5% per year for the 65–74 age group, 3% per year for the 75–84 age group and 2% per year for the 85-and-over age group. Data from earlier waves of ELSA\(^{31}\) show the mean net equivalised family income from private pensions increasing at an average of 5% per year for those aged 65 to 69, and of 8–9% per year for those aged 70 and above, between 2002–03 and 2010–11. To the extent that these two

\(^{31}\) [http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/uploads/elsa/data/economic/t1.xlsx](http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/uploads/elsa/data/economic/t1.xlsx) deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). Source uses the unmodified OECD equivalence scale.
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sets of figures are comparable, this suggests a slowing in the growth of income from private pensions between cohorts of pensioners.

Figure 4.2 provides the same breakdown of sources of gross income for those aged 75 to 84. The increase in employment rates mainly occurs among those aged under 75, so for this age group we see much less of a role for changes in earnings, and comparatively less change in the composition or scale of gross incomes, between the two years. Average incomes are projected to grow by 25% in total, or an average of 1.9% per year, with average annual growth in mean incomes of 0.4% in the poorest quintile, rising to 2.7% in the richest.

Figure 4.2. Sources of gross income by gross income quintile: age 75–84

Finally, we present the results for those aged 85 and over in Figure 4.3. By assumption, there are no earnings for this group (our model does not allow people to be in paid work above the age of 79), but disability benefits make up a more substantial proportion of income on average than for younger age groups. Again, pensions are the main source of income, and here, in the absence of earnings, private pension income very visibly dictates the shape of the charts. On average, gross incomes of those aged 85 and over increase by 18% over the period, or by 1.4% a year on average. Growth is slightly faster towards the top of the income distribution, with average incomes in the poorest quintile growing by an average of 0.2% per year, increasing to 1.0% in the fourth quintile and jumping to 2.3% per year for the richest quintile. This latter effect is due to income from financial assets – the fastest-growing component of income – being concentrated in the top quintile in both years.
Results: gross income and wealth

Figure 4.3. Sources of gross income by gross income quintile: age 85 and over

2010–11 individual gross income

![Graph showing mean individual income by gross income quintile: age 85 and over for 2010–11 individual gross income.](image)

2022–23 individual gross income

![Graph showing mean individual income by gross income quintile: age 85 and over for 2022–23 individual gross income.](image)

Note: Quintiles are defined within the age group on unequivalised individual gross income.

It is interesting to compare the size of gross incomes across groups other than those defined by age. In Figures 4.4 and 4.5, we present projected percentiles of gross income for men and for women, respectively, for each simulated year from 2010–11 to 2022–23.

Figure 4.4. Gross income distribution: men

![Graph showing gross income distribution for men.](image)

Note: Quintiles are defined within the age group on unequivalised individual gross income.

P25, the lower quartile, is the income level that 25% of the group fall below (and so 75% fall above). P50, or the median, is the amount such that half the group has a higher income and half the group a lower income. P75, the upper quartile, is the income level exceeded by 25% of the group.
The changing face of retirement

Figure 4.5. Gross income distribution: women

We see that, while men in couples have higher individual gross incomes than do single men, the pattern is reversed for women, with single women having the higher incomes. However, the differences between singles and couples are not exceedingly large for either sex: the medians for both singles and couples nearly always both lie above the two lower quartiles and below the two upper quartiles.

We project that real gross incomes for both men and women will grow over the simulation period. In terms of the change over time, the gross incomes of men are projected to increase gradually over the period, with little difference in the growth of incomes at each of the percentiles presented in Figure 4.4. Among women, gross incomes at each of these percentiles are projected to increase more quickly, with the average income of relatively high-income women in couples projected to increase most quickly: the gross income of women in couples at the 75th percentile is projected to rise from £233 per week in 2010–11 to £346 per week in 2022–23.

As described above, these increases come predominantly from private sources: we see a larger increase in average earnings for women than for men, as shown below, and the median income from private pensions among women in couples aged 65 and over rises from zero in 2010–11 to just over £20pw in 2022–23. This is compared with just over £30pw for single women, a figure that remains fairly stable over the course of the simulation, £150pw in 2022–23 for men in couples, up from £100 in 2010–11, and almost £115 for single men in 2022–23, up from just over £70. Median income from state pensions also grows more quickly among women in couples, at around 5% per year, than among men in couples, at around 2%. This reflects the fact that successive generations of women are increasingly likely to be entitled to higher state pensions, due to having spent a greater proportion of their lives in work. In addition, those reaching state pension age after April 2010 were required to have fewer years of National Insurance contributions in order to qualify for a full pension.
In the same way that Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the distribution of gross income, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the distribution of weekly earnings for working men and women by couple status: note that taking percentiles of only earners (rather than of the whole population) means any increase arises not because there are more people in paid work but rather because the earners are, on average, earning more.

Figure 4.6. Distribution of non-zero earnings: men

Among both men and women, there are only slight differences between the earnings of those in couples and those who are single, with the most obvious difference being that single women earn slightly more than women in couples. We see a marked upward trend in wages for both sexes, but the most visible increase is in the 75th percentile of the single women’s distribution, suggesting either that the women who are staying in the labour market for longer are
disproportionately those who have earned higher wages throughout their lives or that the kind of work that the additional women in the labour market choose to do is more highly paid (e.g. full-time rather than part-time) than was the work chosen by older female workers in the past.

On average, the median real earnings of women aged 65 and over increase by around 8% per year for single women and 9% for women in couples between 2010–11 and 2022–23. The equivalent figures for men are 9% and 7% respectively. Again, note that this is not the rate at which an individual sees his earnings grow, but the average change in the median earnings of the changing group of those aged 65 and over.33

4.2 Wealth

In this section, we describe the results of our modelling of non-pension wealth over the simulation period. We take property wealth and financial assets reported in 2010–11 and grow them over the period, as described in more detail in Browne et al. (2014).34

Net property wealth is calculated as the gross value of both owner-occupied and second homes, less any outstanding mortgage. Figure 4.8 shows net property wealth for single and couple families in each year. Interestingly, we see that by 2018–19 the 25th percentile line for single people is no longer zero, i.e. over 75% of single people aged 65 and over are owner-occupiers by 2018–19. This is because our model population is drawn from a cohort in which home ownership had not yet peaked.

Throughout the rest of the period, net housing wealth is projected to increase, which is due to a combination of both rising house prices (which we model based on the latest forecasts from the OBR) and any changes in the value of mortgage debt outstanding, relative to gross property values.

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33 ONS data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings show the median gross weekly earnings of full-time workers aged 60 and over growing by an average of around 5% (nominal) per year between 2004 and 2008, then by around 2% per year to 2012 (table 11, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ashe/patterns-of-pay/1997-to-2012-ashe-results/ref-tables-pop-2012.xls). Over the same periods, prices (CPI) rose by an average of 2.6% and 3.2% per year respectively.

34 We increase property values by changes in average house price indices and account for outstanding mortgages in each year to arrive at the net property value. For house price growth beyond 2013–14 we use OBR house price growth projections to extrapolate from regional data. We assume that individuals use their full mortgage term to pay off their mortgage debt. We change the value of financial assets by the average change in average financial wealth holdings between periods as reported in the ELSA data, calculated separately for each age group and wealth quantile. This growth rate (which can be negative) reflects the combination of saving and dis-saving that will be seen within this age group. Full details of the assumptions used are given in Browne, Emmerson, Heald & Hood (2014). Wealth figures are nominal.
Results: gross income and wealth

Figure 4.8. Families’ net property wealth (nominal)

Figure 4.9 shows families’ net financial wealth – i.e. holdings in savings accounts, stocks, shares and bonds net of any non-mortgage debt – over the course of the simulation period. While these nominal holdings are projected to be broadly flat on average at the middle and lower end of the wealth distribution, we see average increases at the 75th percentile of around 5% per year among couples and 7% among singles. This growth is due to a combination of the reinvestment of returns to assets and additional active saving and investment from income among the population as a whole over time.

It should be noted, by comparing Figures 4.8 and 4.9, that the majority of households hold a very small proportion of their wealth in financial assets as opposed to property. This balance of relatively liquid versus relatively illiquid assets is of considerable importance in the debate on the financing of social care.

Figure 4.9. Families’ net financial wealth (nominal)
The changing face of retirement

In the next chapter, we pass the gross income results through the IFS tax and benefit model, TAXBEN, to arrive at net incomes for the modelled population and then combine these with the wealth results above to provide commentary on the living standards of the pensioner population through to the early 2020s. In Chapter 6, we model the effect of several recent or possible policy changes on the incomes of this group and discuss the impact that they might have on levels of poverty and the distribution of incomes.
5. Results: Net Income

In this chapter, we present our projections for the net incomes of the pensioner population through to 2022–23, using the gross income results described in Chapter 4 and TAXBEN, the IFS tax and benefit model. For 2010–11, 2012–13 and 2014–15, we use the tax and benefit systems that were actually in place. For later years, we incorporate any future policy changes announced up to and including Budget 2014 and we assume that universal credit is partially rolled out in 2016–17 and fully rolled out in 2018–19. Benefit rates and tax thresholds are uprated in line with public finance defaults as currently forecasted by the OBR. Further detail on the assumptions in the modelling is given in Browne et al. (2014).35

Throughout this chapter, we look at changes in equivalised36 net income at the family level (an individual, their spouse if they have one and any dependent children) rather than at the household level. This is simply because ELSA does not contain comprehensive data on the incomes of individuals who live in the same household as ELSA sample members if they are not in the same family unit: so, it has comprehensive information on the sample member’s spouse, but not on any adult children that they live with, for example. The family incomes of our population will of course be lower, if anything, than their household incomes, but this difference will be small on average – median net equivalised family income for the 65-and-over population was about 4% lower than median net equivalised household income for the same age group in 2010–11.37

5.1 Net income projections

The projected evolution of different percentiles in the net family income distribution is presented in Figure 5.1. Between 2010–11 and 2014–15, our model predicts slow growth in median net incomes among those aged 65 and over. Our projections suggest that median income growth will then increase, averaging 2.0% a year between 2014–15 and 2022–23, moving back towards the rate of growth in net family incomes for this group through the 2000s, which averaged just over 2.8% per year.38

35 Unless otherwise stated, the source of all is the RetSim model running on ELSA wave 5 data and TAXBEN. We assume full take-up of means-tested benefits. All years in the figures refer to financial years: i.e. 2010 is 2010–11, etc. All income figures in this section are presented in 2014–15 prices and before housing costs are deducted.

36 For comparability with HBAI poverty statistics, we use the modified OECD equivalence scale, which assumes that a single individual needs two-thirds of the income of a couple to enjoy the same standard of living.

37 Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey 2010–11.

38 Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey, various years.
The changing face of retirement

Figure 5.1. Distribution of family incomes

Although our model projects growth in incomes at all the points in the distribution presented in Figure 5.1, growth towards the top of the income distribution is expected to be much faster than that towards the bottom. Between 2010–11 and 2022–23, incomes are projected to grow by 3.3% a year in real terms at the 90th percentile, compared with only 0.6% at the 10th percentile. As a result, income inequality among those aged 65 and over is projected to increase: the 90/10 ratio (i.e. the income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution relative to the income at the 10th percentile of the income distribution) is projected to increase from 2.7 to 3.8 over the decade from 2010–11 to 2020–21. It is worth noting that this would still leave inequality among pensioners (as measured by the 90/10 ratio) slightly below the level of inequality among the population as a whole reported in the most recent official data (for 2011–12).

A key reason for the growth in incomes towards the top of the income distribution – and therefore for the increase in income inequality projected over this period – is the projected increase in earned income among younger pensioner families (itself partly driven by the response to increases in the state pension age). This is made clear by Figure 5.2, which shows the projected 10th, 50th (median) and 90th percentiles of income split by age. Between 2010–11 and 2022–23, net family income at the 90th percentile is projected to grow at an annual average of 4.0% a year among those aged 65 to 74, compared with 2.2% among those aged 75 to 84 and only 0.7% for those aged 85 and over. As a result, our model projects that, among those aged 65 to 74, the 90/10 ratio will increase by 1.2 (from 2.9 to 4.1) over the period as a whole, whereas among older age groups the model projects a smaller increase (a 0.6 increase from 2.4 to 3.1 among those aged 75 to 84 and a 0.1 increase from 2.4 to 2.5 among those aged 85 and over).
Figure 5.2. Distribution of family incomes by age group

Note: The little shapes indicate the 50th percentile (median) and the horizontal dashes the 10th and 90th percentiles.

Figure 5.2 also shows that the effect of increases in earned income among those aged 65 to 74 is likely not to be limited to the top of the income distribution. Between 2014–15 and 2022–23, median income among that group is projected to grow at an average annualised rate of over 3%, faster than the 2.7% it enjoyed through the 2000s. In contrast, median income among those aged 75 and over is projected to grow at 1.6% a year between 2014–15 and 2022–23, around half the rate of growth that group enjoyed through the 2000s. Our model is therefore projecting something of a reversal of fortunes within the pensioner population, with income growth slowing for older pensioners, but increasing for younger pensioners as a result of greater labour force participation.

Projected growth in net incomes varies significantly by family type, as well as by age. Figure 5.3 shows unequivalised net family incomes for single men, single women and couples (so that the reported incomes for each group are simply its actual or projected cash incomes). Our model projects stronger growth in average incomes among those in couples either than among single men or, in particular, among single women. While the average incomes of couples aged 65 and over are projected to grow at an average annual rate of 2.2% between 2010–11 and 2022–23 (and the incomes of single men are projected to grow at 0.9% per year), the average incomes of single women aged 65 and over are projected to fall very slightly in real terms (at 0.2% a year).

39 Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey, various years.
It is important to bear in mind that this slight fall in net incomes is likely to reflect a change in the composition of the group of single women over time, rather than implying that the incomes of similar single women are falling over time. As discussed in Chapter 3, the model projects a sizeable decline in the proportion of pensioners who are single women (shown for those aged 85 and over in Figure 3.5), with a corresponding increase in the proportion of pensioners who are in couples. If the chance that a woman’s husband survives increases by more over time for those with a high family income than for those with a low family income (i.e. if improvements in mortality are concentrated among richer men), this would put downward pressure on the average income among single women. Indeed, when we restrict our attention to women who were already single in 2010–11 (and who are projected to be alive in 2022–23), their incomes are projected to increase by 0.8% a year through to 2022–23, a very similar increase to that projected for single men.

5.2 Absolute poverty projections

The simulated income distributions also allow us to project the percentage of those aged 65 and over who will be below certain levels of income in each year, and hence below a chosen poverty threshold. In the following, we present results for absolute income poverty as defined for the 2020 child poverty targets: that is, having an income that is less than 60% of the 2010–11 median income in real terms, before housing costs are deducted. Using the data underlying the UK government’s official poverty statistics, we calculate that 17.6% of those aged 65
and over in England were judged to be in income poverty on this basis in 2010–11.\textsuperscript{40} We do not present results for relative income poverty, as this would require us to project median income among the population as a whole. To the extent that median incomes grow faster than prices, relative poverty will fall less quickly (or rise more quickly) than absolute poverty.

Our model projects a different measure of income from that used in calculating official poverty statistics; for example, we can only model family income, not household income, as discussed at the start of this chapter. In producing our absolute income poverty projections, we adjust for this difference by selecting as our poverty line the income level that gives the same poverty rate in our modelled population in 2010–11 as the official data suggest for that age group. In 2010–11, this poverty line is roughly £280 a week for couples and £190 a week for a single person.

Absolute poverty lines are supposed to remain constant in real terms and so need to be increased over time in line with inflation. Official UK poverty statistics currently use the retail price index (RPI) to make this adjustment. However, the Office for National Statistics (2013a) acknowledges that, due to the formula used, the RPI tends to overstate inflation.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, it has been shown that this problem has been exacerbated by changes to the methodology in 2010, and so the RPI’s overstatement of inflation is likely to be more significant going forwards than it was in the past.\textsuperscript{42} This would imply that the official statistics will underestimate real income growth going forwards and overstate increases (and understate falls) in absolute poverty.

Figure 5.4 shows our projections for absolute poverty among those aged 65 and over, both when we uprate our absolute poverty line with the RPI and when we use the consumer price index (CPI) instead.\textsuperscript{43} For context, we also show absolute poverty rates from official data back to 2000–01. Using the RPI, our model suggests a significant rise in absolute income poverty between 2010–11 and 2014–15 (from 17.6% to 23.3%). On this basis, absolute poverty is then expected to remain roughly constant through to 2022–23, at around the same level as in 2003–04. However, the picture is very different when we use the (more accurate) CPI measure of inflation to uprate the absolute poverty line. Absolute income poverty still rises, to 20.1% in 2014–15, but then falls sharply to 12.7% in 2022–23, around a third of its level in 2000–01. This pattern is consistent across different age groups within our modelled population, with lower poverty rates among 65- to 74-year-olds throughout.

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\textsuperscript{40} Family Resources Survey, 2010–11.

\textsuperscript{41} See Levell (2012).

\textsuperscript{42} See Miller (2011).

\textsuperscript{43} We are unable to use either of the new CPIH or RPIJ inflation measures to uprate our poverty line, since forecasts of these measures are not currently available.
Figure 5.4. Absolute poverty among those aged 65 and over

Figure 5.5. Absolute poverty by family type: 2010–11 to 2022–23

Note: Poverty line is uprated in line with CPI.

Figure 5.5 shows the projected evolution of poverty among different family types through to 2022–23 (the poverty line is uprated in line with the CPI). Our model projects a particularly sharp decline in absolute poverty among those in couples (from over 15% in 2010–11 to less than 10% in 2022–23) and an accompanying increase in poverty among single women, which is particularly pronounced between 2010–11 and 2014–15 before falling back to just above the 2010–11 poverty rate by 2022–23. In 2010–11, single women aged 65 and over are around 0%.
Results: net income

one-and-a-half times as likely to be in absolute income poverty, on this measure, as individuals living in couples. By 2022–23, because of the falling levels of income poverty among those in couples, they are projected to be more than three times as likely to be in poverty. As with the trends in net incomes among these family types, this is explained by changes in the composition of the group of single women over time. Looking just at those women who are single in 2010–11 (and who are projected to be alive in 2022–23), absolute income poverty falls from 28% to 17%.

While the rise in absolute income poverty among single women relative to those in couples does not represent particular women falling into poverty, it does still have important consequences for policies designed to combat poverty among the pensioner population. The fact that being a single female pensioner looks likely to become an increasingly powerful predictor of low family income may allow policymakers to focus services on vulnerable households relatively effectively, simply by targeting older single women.
6. Results: Effect of Alternative Reforms

In this chapter, we examine the projected incomes of those aged 65 and over under different policy scenarios and compare these with the projected incomes set out in Chapter 5. We first consider two reforms to state benefits:

- We assume that DLA is retained throughout the simulation period rather than being replaced by PIP for working-age claimants by 2018–19. This reform would increase state spending and so boost family incomes on average.

- We assume that the basic state pension and the new single-tier pension are indexed in line with the CPI after the current parliament rather than ‘triple locked’. This would lower state spending and so reduce family incomes on average.

We then model two changes that would affect those with wealth accumulated in defined contribution (DC) private pensions:

- In the light of the Budget 2014 decision to extend flexibility over how DC pensions can be drawn, we consider what would happen to incomes and wealth holdings if individuals chose to annuitise none, or only part, of their accumulated DC pension pots.

- We examine what would happen were annuity rates to fall (or increase) by 20% from 2016–17.

6.1 Reform 1: retain disability living allowance

In the results presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we model the planned transition from DLA to PIP for working-age claimants. In this section, we present the results of the counterfactual scenario in which DLA is retained throughout the simulation period.

The retention of DLA would not have a direct impact on the incomes of most individuals aged 65 and over, since DLA is only due to replace PIP for ‘working-age’ claimants. Instead, the impact of the retention of DLA on these older people would increase over time, as more people would continue to claim DLA after their 65th birthday than were able to claim PIP beyond that point. As a result, the

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44 Under the ‘triple lock’, the basic state pension is uprated by the lowest of CPI inflation, earnings growth and 2.5%.

45 We set out the modelling of the reform in much more detail in Browne et al. (2014), as well as earlier in this report, but the broad picture is that we use estimates of claimant numbers from the DWP impact assessment of the reform to place people into PIP levels, given their modelled DLA level, a process that results in many people either moving to a level of award that attracts a lower amount of money or moving off DLA/PIP altogether.

46 Although their family income can be affected if they live with a younger partner.
impacts on those aged 65 and over are initially concentrated at the younger end of the age range, spreading to older individuals as the simulation progresses.

The individuals who gain from the retention of DLA in our simulation are those we model as being eligible for DLA but not PIP and those we model as being entitled to a larger amount of DLA than of PIP. Because of interactions between various benefits, the results we present below are essentially our projections of a change in the overall generosity of the disability, incapacity and caring benefit system.

In 2022–23, the total claimant rate for disability, incapacity and caring benefits for those aged 65 and over is projected to be 21%. We estimate that this would rise to 22% if DLA were retained throughout the simulation period, with those affected by the change gaining £17 per week on average.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, the median income from DLA/PIP among those who receive the benefit would actually fall as a result of retaining DLA, from about £54 per week to about £42 per week. This is because, in attempting to focus support on those who need it most, the move to PIP is most likely to affect those with the lowest entitlements under the existing DLA system. That means that, while fewer people are modelled as receiving PIP, the average amount of income each one receives is higher than under DLA. This decrease in the average award is projected to be outweighed, however, by the increase in the claimant rate, leading to an overall increase in income (and therefore state spending) under DLA.

Because disability benefit income is such a small proportion of the income of the 65-and-over population who are most affected by this reform (those aged 65 to 74 and, to a lesser extent, those aged 75 to 84), changes to overall net incomes or poverty are negligible.

### 6.2 Reform 2: less generous indexation of state pensions

The cost of providing the state pension is substantial and growing. DWP figures show that spending on the state pension is projected to grow by 24% in real terms from 2010–11 to 2018–19, a period over which it is projected to rise from 37% to 44% of total spending on benefits and tax credits. This is against the backdrop of contrasting trends in other elements of benefit spending: overall

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47 There is an interaction with the attendance allowance system in that individuals can claim only one of AA and DLA. When PIP is introduced, those who were not entitled to PIP would have the opportunity to claim AA. When DLA is retained, individuals who gain DLA income may lose AA income as a result. Because DLA awards are higher than AA awards, this results in a net gain to the individual and a net increase in state spending. A further interaction is with the carer’s allowance system, where the receipt by the individual being cared for of DLA or AA affects the carer’s eligibility for carer’s allowance. We allow this to impact in our model by including partner’s receipt of disability benefits in the regression specification for the carer’s allowance model. The reforms do not affect receipt of incapacity benefits (IB, ESA and SDA) and the inclusion of these benefits in mean incomes has a negligible effect for those aged 65 and over.
The changing face of retirement

benefit and tax credit spending in Great Britain is projected to grow by just 5% over the same period and, within this, non-state-pension spending is anticipated to fall by 7%.48

In this section, we consider the impact of deviating from our baseline assumption that the basic state pension and the new single-tier state pension rises in line with the triple lock throughout the simulation, and instead allow them to rise only in line with the CPI from 2016–17 onwards (i.e. after the end of the current parliament). This would result in a lower state pension payment to pensioners and a reduction in state spending. Almost all the individuals in our model would be affected by such a change, since it would affect anyone in receipt of a state pension (95% of everyone aged 65 and over in 2016–17).

Under the triple lock assumption, we project that the state pension will account for 31% of gross income among those aged 65 to 74, 42% among those aged 75 to 84 and 46% among those aged 85 and over in 2022–23. Under the assumption of CPI uprating in the next parliament, we project that these figures would fall to 30%, 39% and 44% respectively.

Figure 6.1. Impact of change to state pension indexation by income quintile, 2022–23

Figure 6.1 shows the projected impact of the change to indexation of the state pension on the equivalised net incomes of the population aged 65 and over in 2022–23. The average change in income is projected to be a fall of almost 3%, with losses concentrated around the middle and lower middle of the income distribution. The average cash loss is projected to be just over £15 per week in

2014–15 prices. The cash loss in the poorest quintile is lower, at around £8, because of the lower state pension entitlements of this group and the safety net provided by pension credit. The percentage losses tail off towards the top of the distribution as similarly-sized cash losses form a smaller proportion of overall income. This reduction in state support is projected to increase the absolute income poverty rate in 2022–23 by 2ppts, from 13% to 15%.

6.3 Reform 3: changes to the proportion of DC pension wealth annuitised on retirement

In this section, we consider potential impacts of the recent relaxation of the rules surrounding the annuitisation of DC pension pots. At Budget 2014, the Chancellor announced the removal, from April 2015, of the requirement for individuals to buy an annuity (a guaranteed lifetime income) with their accumulated DC pension wealth, instead allowing them to annuitise part or none of the pot and spend, invest or bequeath the remainder as they choose.

We model this reform as first becoming visible in our model in 2016–17 (i.e. the first simulated year after the policy comes into force) and compare the scenario in which no one with unannuitised DC pension wealth who retires in 2016–17 or later buys an annuity with the baseline assumption of full annuitisation. We make no assumption about how these individuals then choose to invest, spend or bequeath their ‘additional’ wealth, but we compare its size with average non-pension wealth holdings. For the purposes of this analysis, we do not take account of the fact that those with large secure income, and those with only small DC pension pots, already did not have to annuitise their DC pensions and therefore may not be directly affected by the latest Budget measure.

Since we assume that everyone annuitises their pension wealth by the age of 65, the oldest affected person in our model in 2022–23 has reached age 72. We find that 14% of people aged 65 to 74 in 2022–23, and 7% of all people aged 65 and over, are affected by this reform by this point: that is, that they have unannuitised DC pots at the point at which they start to draw their full private pension and that this point is no earlier than 2016–17.

The mean gross weekly income in 2022–23 for those who have an annuitisation decision to make over the period from 2016–17 would be £530 if they annuitised all of their accumulated DC pension wealth and also left the labour market, of which £300 would come from private pension income. Their income if they annuitised half of their unannuitised DC pots would instead be £430, and it would be £330 if they annuitised none (of which an average of £100 would come from

49 Note we assume 100% annuitisation at baseline, i.e. we do not reduce DC pension pot sizes by an amount taken as a lump sum.

50 The impact of these assumptions is that we will most likely understate incomes (to the extent to which individuals invest the unannuitised funds in assets that deliver an income stream) but overstate their wealth (to the extent to which they spend or bequeath their unannuitised funds).
private pension income). The fact that there is still an average of £100 per week of private pension income among this group is due to some, but a minority, of those with unannuitised DC pension pots having other private pension income – for example, from a defined benefit (DB) pension scheme or from another DC pension that they have already annuitised. The mean amount of unannuitised DC wealth per affected person is around £200,000 in 2022–23, with the median being just under £75,000. At the extreme, then, the individual with mean unannuitised DC wealth can choose between around £200 per week of guaranteed gross income (fixed in cash terms) and roughly £200,000 in wealth. In reality, individuals can choose any point on the continuum between these two extremes.

These amounts are much larger than the average annuity purchases seen today. But our figures relate to the period up to 2022 and new retirees will have spent longer working after 1988 when DC pensions became more prevalent. Furthermore, our figures relate to the entire DC wealth of an individual, which in many cases is shared across more than one DC pot.

To put that £200,000 in context, we now look in more detail at the change in wealth that we project would occur if no one annuitised their DC pension wealth.

Figure 6.2 shows that just under 15% of the 65- to 74-year-olds in our model have an unannuitised DC pot or pots, with this proportion being lowest at the

Figure 6.2. Mean amount of unannuitised DC wealth by non-pension wealth quintile: 65- to 74-year-olds

Note: Quintiles relate to net non-pension wealth and are defined across all individuals aged 65 and over in 2022–23, separately for singles and those in couples. Results presented are for all individuals aged 65 to 74 in 2022–23. Cash figures are nominal. Figures are for all those who have been eligible to make use of the relaxation to the rules from 2016–17 to 2022–23.
Results: effect of alternative reforms

bottom of the wealth distribution and peaking in the middle. Those towards the top of the wealth distribution may have already annuitised their pots (as they could afford to retire earlier than average) or may be more likely to have DB rather than DC pensions, accounting for the drop-off in eligibility. The black bars in Figure 6.2 show the mean size of the unannuitised DC wealth among people who hold at least one unannuitised pot, which rises steeply with increasing non-pension wealth. At the top of the wealth distribution, the average amount of DC wealth is around £325,000; at the bottom, it is just under £100,000. The grey bars show that the mean amount of unannuitised DC wealth across all 65- to 74-year-olds is greater in higher wealth quintiles than in lower wealth quintiles. This is due to the combined effect of the increasing average amount of DC pension wealth and the humped pattern of the proportion of people eligible to make use of the new flexibilities across the wealth distribution. For the alternative scenario where individuals still annuitise half of their DC pension wealth, the height of all the bars would simply be halved.

Although the absolute amount of unannuitised DC pension wealth is much greater at the top of the wealth distribution than at the bottom, the opposite is true of its size relative to non-pension wealth. Figure 6.3 shows that if no one annuitises their pension pot from 2016–17 onwards, the overall change in mean net wealth among 65- to 74-year-olds is an increase of 9%; there are increases of 16% at the poorer end of the distribution and 3% at the richer end. Again for the alternative scenario where individuals still annuitise half of their DC pension wealth, the height of all these bars would simply be halved.

Figure 6.3. Mean percentage increase in wealth by non-pension wealth quintile: 65- to 74-year-olds

Note: Quintiles relate to net non-pension wealth and are defined across all individuals aged 65 and over in 2022–23, separately for singles and those in couples. Results presented are for all individuals aged 65 to 74 in 2022–23. Percentage changes are the mean amount of DC wealth as a percentage of mean family non-pension net wealth in 2022–23. This assumes that the DC wealth of those retiring (and not annuitising) before 2022–23 has remained constant.
Within this section, we have discussed the implications of the annuitisation decision on gross rather than net incomes. This is because the way in which individuals choose to use or invest any unannuitised wealth will have implications for their tax liabilities and eligibility to benefits, and so the effect on net income is by no means straightforward. Individuals’ ability to navigate the range of options available to them will likely be linked in part to their previous experience of investing or managing their wealth. We saw in Chapter 4 that financial wealth (outside of private pensions) and buy-to-let property wealth are primarily held by individuals at the top of the wealth distribution, but we have seen in this section that a significant share of those with relatively little non-pension wealth are likely to hold unannuitised DC pots. These factors, combined with the wide range of pension pot sizes in relation to other wealth, will have implications both for the individuals making decisions about their own retirement and for those providing them with information and advice.

6.4 Reform 4: changes in annuity rates

In this final section, we consider the impact of different annuity rates on the incomes of future pensioners. These rates could change due to fluctuations in interest rates, unexpected changes in life expectancy or other changes in the market – for example, as a result of the government’s decision to remove compulsory annuitisation of DC pensions. Again, we vary our assumptions from 2016–17 onwards and the group affected is those annuitising a DC pot between that point and the end of the simulation, so it is the same group as was affected by the annuitisation reforms considered above. The difference in this case is that there is no change in wealth holdings – the changes in income from DC pensions simply reflect changes in the annuity market leading to a given size of DC pension pot providing a different amount of retirement income.\(^{51}\) Hence, the particular value of these comparisons is in highlighting the sensitivity or otherwise of pensioner incomes to annuity rate changes. In all of the figures below, we assume that the full DC pot is annuitised.

The projected mean gross weekly income from private pensions in 2022–23 for those aged 65 and over who had unannuitised DC pension wealth in 2016–17 is £300 in the baseline scenario. A change in the annuity rate of 20% is projected to increase or decrease this income by 13% (about £40 per week). This translates into a change in mean gross weekly income from all sources, which is £700 in 2022–23 for those affected, of 6%.

Unlike in reform 3, in this case we are able to consider the effect of changes to DC pension income on net income because the relationship with the tax and benefit system is not complicated by the need to make assumptions about the use of new-found wealth. In Figure 6.4, we see that the average projected change in net

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\(^{51}\) The annuity rates assumed in the baseline were the second-best annuity rates by year of age obtained on 29 April 2014 from the Money Advice Service website at http://pluto.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/annuities.
Results: effect of alternative reforms

Figure 6.4. Mean percentage change in equivalised net income by income quintile: 65- to 74-year-olds

Note: Quintiles are defined on the equivalised net income distribution under the annuity rates assumed in the baseline scenario.

income as a result of a 20% fall in annuity rates from 2016–17 is a fall of just under 1% across all 65- to 74-year-olds and a fall of just under 3.5% among those whose family income is directly affected (defined as those in families whose income changes by at least £1 a week). For a 20% increase in annuity rates from 2016–17, our model suggests an almost exactly symmetrical effect on income: an increase of just under 1% across all 65- to 74-year-olds and an increase of just under 3.5% among those whose income is directly affected. In the bottom four income quintiles, the percentage change across those whose income is directly affected (shown in the grey bars) is around a 3% rise or a 3% fall in net incomes resulting from a 20% increase or decrease in annuity prices, with the changes being slightly larger towards the bottom of the income distribution. The largest increase or decline in income would be seen for those in the richest fifth of the population. Averaging across all individuals, rather than just those directly affected (as shown in the black and white bars), we project that the increase in incomes resulting from a 20% increase in annuity prices, and the fall in incomes from a 20% decline in annuity prices, are both greater further up the income distribution because a higher percentage of people in the upper quintiles would be affected by such a change.
7. Conclusion

From increased flexibility around the annuitisation of DC pensions to the introduction of the single-tier pension, the last few years have seen a number of significant changes to the policy environment facing retirees. To the extent that this flurry of activity reflects a response to an ageing population, it is unlikely to slow in the years to come. The 22% increase in the 65-and-over population projected between 2012 and 2022 brings with it a number of challenges. The growing cost of providing the state pension, alongside other aspects of state support for those at older ages (such as the NHS and social care), makes it more important than ever that public policies targeted at this group are well designed, both for those who benefit from these policies and for those who pay for them.

Our model suggests that the trend for those aged 85 and over to be in couples rather than to be single (and, in particular, rather than to be single women) is to accelerate and that by 2022–23 38% of those aged 85 and over will be in a couple compared with 25% in 2010–11. Given the evidence that, in many dimensions, individuals at older ages who are in couples are better off than those who are single, this is likely to be a good news story.

Many of our most striking findings are the projected changes for older women, not least because each generation of women has had very different experiences from the one preceding it. This is precisely the type of change that a dynamic (rather than a static) microsimulation model is designed to allow for. Employment rates for women in their late 60s, which are already at their highest level since the late 1960s, are set to increase faster, approaching or even overtaking men’s in the early 2020s. We project that 37% of women aged 65 to 69 will be in paid work in 2020–21, compared with 16% in 2010–11 and just 8% in 2000. This growth in employment is shared between full- and part-time work and is most strongly observed among women in better health.

Our model also suggests that the proportion of women aged 65 and over who are in the best health will increase substantially between 2010–11 and 2022–23, which, along with increases to the female state pension age over this period, drives the increase in projected employment rates. Improved health of older women is also projected to reduce the receipt of informal care among women in couples, and while our model does project increasing provision of care among older women (in part because more of them will have surviving partners to care for), again this is not projected to occur for women in particularly poor health. We also predict that it will continue to be the case that relatively few older women will combine caring with paid work.

Over the 2000s, the incomes of those aged 65 and over rose by 2.8% a year on average, faster than the incomes of working-age people, as state pensions and benefits and private pensions have grown rapidly. We project that the incomes of those aged 65 and over will grow slowly between 2010–11 and 2014–15 before
recovering to grow by 2.0% a year on average over the period from 2014–15 to 2022–23, with this growth driven mostly by increased earnings.

We see something of a reversal of fortunes within the population aged 65 and over: the equivalised net incomes of 65- to 74-year-olds are projected to grow by 3% a year on average between 2014–15 and 2022–23, while income among those aged 75 and over will only grow half as fast, at 1.6% per year. This difference is driven by changes in earnings and income from private pensions. Gross income from earnings is projected to grow by an average of 8% per year between 2010–11 and 2022–23 among those aged 65 to 74, and gross income from private pensions is projected to grow by an average of 5% a year for this group. We project slower growth in private pension income among older age groups over the same period, which represents a reversal of trends seen in the previous decade. Growth of income from state pensions and disability benefits is projected to be slower than that of income from private sources.

The growing importance of earnings also contributes to an increase in income inequality among those aged 65 and over, but the average increase in incomes leads to a fall in the projected absolute poverty rate.

It is important to remember that financial well-being and income poverty are not the full story: while we project that the incomes of older people will grow strongly with increased employment, this is clearly at the expense of leisure time. With the growing number of older people in work comes a falling number available to provide care to grandchildren or voluntary support in their communities, perhaps tempering what initially appears to be an unequivocally positive story.
## Glossary

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<td>attendance allowance</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>carer's allowance</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>consumer price index</td>
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<td>DB</td>
<td>defined benefit (pension scheme)</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>defined contribution (pension scheme)</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>disability living allowance</td>
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<td>DWP</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions</td>
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<td>ELSA</td>
<td>English Longitudinal Study of Ageing</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>employment and support allowance</td>
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<td>IB</td>
<td>incapacity benefit</td>
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<td>IFS</td>
<td>Institute for Fiscal Studies</td>
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<td>OBR</td>
<td>Office for Budget Responsibility</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>personal independence payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>ppts</td>
<td>percentage points</td>
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<tr>
<td>pw</td>
<td>per week</td>
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<td>RetSim</td>
<td>the IFS retirement simulator – a dynamic microsimulation model</td>
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<td>RPI</td>
<td>retail price index</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>severe disablement allowance</td>
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References


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