Corrective Taxes

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January 2017
What are corrective taxes?

Corrective (or “Pigouvian”) taxes can be used to correct for the presence of externalities or “internalities” in a market:

- externality: costs imposed on others
- internality: costs imposed on the individual themselves

Corrective taxes are commonly implemented as “excise taxes”:

- e.g. on motor fuels, tobacco, and alcohol
- taxes on these goods comprise 7.2% of total tax receipts

Taxes should be set based on the marginal social harm associated with consumption.
Outline

1. Principles of corrective taxation

2. Theory and application I: alcohol taxes

3. Theory and application II: sugar taxes
Introduction to corrective taxation

If there are externalities or internalities (and in the absence of government intervention) individuals will tend to consume a socially excessive quantity:

- they will equate their perceived marginal benefit from consumption to the perceived marginal cost (which includes the price)

The case for taxation rests on discouraging socially harmful consumption by aligning the perceived private marginal costs with its actual social costs.

A corrective tax raises the price by the amount of the marginal externality or internality.

- which leads consumers to take account of the social cost associated with their behaviour
Corrective tax = marginal externality
Consider a social planner who maximises the sum of consumer surplus, tax revenue minus the externality cost:

$$\max_t W(t) = \left[ \frac{V(t)}{\alpha} \right] + R(t) - \phi(Q(t))$$

- $t$ is the tax policy
- $\alpha$: marginal utility of income
- $V(t)$: indirect utility from consumption
- $Q(t)$: quantity consumed of externality generating good
- $\phi(Q(t))$: externality generated

What is the optimal $t$ in this case?
Differentiating $W(t)$ with respect to $t$ and using Roy’s identity yields the familiar Pigouvian tax result:

$$t^* = \phi'(Q(t^*))$$

i.e. the optimal tax equals the marginal externality of consumption at that tax rate.

This looks very simple, BUT, in reality there are complicating factors:

- variation across consumers
- measuring the externality
- restricted instruments available to government
Three principles of corrective taxation

1. Tax should target the externality or internality generating behaviour as directly as possible

2. Governments should not hesitate to set corrective taxes above the revenue maximising rate if the targeted activity is particularly harmful.

3. The regressivity of a corrective tax is not a sufficiently good reason for not implementing it.
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The externalities of alcohol consumption

Significant health costs:

- 5.9% global deaths, and 5.1% of the global burden of disease and injury is attributable to alcohol (WHO, 2014)
- roughly 70% of liver cirrhosis is attributable to alcohol

Linked to violence and crime:

- almost half of all violent crime is alcohol related
- around 1/3 domestic violence occurs when the perpetrator is under the influence of alcohol
- the alcohol attributable fraction of road traffic deaths is 16.6% for men and 6.7% for women
Variation in the marginal externality

There is a large amount of evidence that suggests that externalities are convex in alcohol consumption

• i.e. the more you drink the greater the external cost associated with one more drink

Threshold effect with some diseases: at low levels of alcohol consumption the risk is not elevated, but this risk increases sharply above a certain point.

Higher levels of alcohol consumption create an exponential risk of accidents:

• odds of injury from 8 pints almost 18 times greater than the odds of injury from 1 pint
What is the optimal ethanol tax in this case?

Recall that the optimal Pigouvian tax, that achieves the first best, is to set the tax equal to the marginal externality:

\[ t^* = \phi'(Q(t^*)) \]

But if the marginal externality varies across consumers (indexed \( i \)) and we have to set a single tax rate for all consumers, we can no longer achieve the first best:

- some consumers will face a tax rate that’s too high, and some too low

Diamond (1973) showed that the second best ethanol tax in this case is to set the tax equal to a weighted average of the marginal externalities:

\[ t^* = \sum_i \phi_i w_i \]

But can we improve upon this?
Differentiating tax rates across products

Although ethanol (pure alcohol) consumption generates the externality, ethanol content is only a product characteristic that consumers value:

- consumers have preferences over whether a product is beer, or a spirit, and if beer, whether it is lager or stout
- these give rise to demands for distinct alcohol products

Correlation between ethanol demand and demand for distinct alcohol products provides the opportunity to design feasible corrective taxes that can improve on the Diamond prescription:

- higher tax rates on products preferred by high marginal externality individuals
- if high marginal externality individuals have high cross price effects, this acts to lower optimal tax rates
Cross price elasticities and marginal externalities

Variation across households

Cross price elasticity for product pair

Variation across products

<7
7-14
14-21
21-35
>35

Units of ethanol per adult per week

Mean cross price elasticity across product pairs

95% confidence interval

Product pair cross price elasticity
Price elasticity of demand for ethanol

Price elasticity of demand for ethanol

<-7  7-14  14-21  21-35  >35
Units of pure alcohol per adult per week

-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0
Current UK alcohol tax system

The graph illustrates the excise duty per unit of ethanol (pence) based on alcoholic strength (ABV %) for different types of alcoholic beverages:

- **Beer**
- **Still wine**
- **Sparkling wine**
- **Spirits**
- **Cider**

The graph shows the varying excise duty rates across different ABV percentages, highlighting the tax implications for each category of alcoholic beverage.
Optimal alcohol taxes
The welfare impact of reforming alcohol taxation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£billion per year</th>
<th>(1) External cost</th>
<th>(2) Tax revenue</th>
<th>(3) Change in consumer surplus</th>
<th>(3) + (4) − (2) Change in consumer welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK taxes</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol tax</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% difference</td>
<td>-27.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type taxes</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% difference</td>
<td>-29.7</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer specific taxes</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% difference</td>
<td>-19.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outline

1. Principles of corrective taxation

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3. Theory and application II: sugar taxes
A tax on sugar?

In the March 2016 Budget, the government introduced a tax on sugar-sweetened soft drinks.

1. What is the economic justification for a sugar tax?

2. Is the proposed tax structure sensible?
Rationale for policies to curb sugar consumption

Health risks:

- increases risk of consuming too many calories, hence obesity
- obesity increases risk of heart disease, type 2 diabetes, strokes
- linked to tooth decay in children

Many of the health costs are borne by the individual, but may also generate external costs borne by society (e.g. public health costs).

Also likely that the full costs of sugar consumption are not taken into account by the individual at the point of consumption.

- especially true for children
- evidence of self-control problems
In order to correct for these excess costs, we need to set the tax equal to the marginal externality or internality.

But the marginal externality (or internality) is likely to vary across people and consumption occasions:

• compare an obese person and a competitive athlete eating the same chocolate bar

This means that there is a trade-off between reducing the consumption of people who consume more than is ideal and raising the prices faced by individuals whose behaviour does not generate external costs:

• suggests that we should target products disproportionately bought by those about whom we’re particularly concerned
Sources of dietary sugar
By total added sugar purchases

Share of total calories from processed added sugar:
- 0.0% - 6.9%
- 6.9% - 9.4%
- 9.4% - 11.7%
- 11.7% - 14.8%
- 14.8% - 95.0%
Sources of dietary sugar
By age of youngest child

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of youngest child:</th>
<th>No children</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>5-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chocolate and confectionery</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuits and cake</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbonated soft drinks</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-carbonated soft drinks</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit juice</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserves</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakery and cereals</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foods and drinks</td>
<td>Bar chart description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Households who consume too much sugar, and households with children, get a disproportionate amount of sugar from soft drinks

- suggests that a soft drinks tax might be reasonably well targeted

But how will consumers respond to the price changes induced by a tax?

- if they switch to chocolate or confectionery then this could offset the reduction in sugar from soft drinks
### Illustrative example

#### Scenario:

1. (1) (2) (3) (4)

**Taste for sugar**

For households that buy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Sugar Level</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% change in total sugar**

For households that buy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Sugar Level</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average**

-3.0% -2.4% -1.6% -2.1%

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**Notes:** We assume that: a tax on sugary drinks (carbonated, non-carbonated and fruit juice) would lead to a price increase of 15%, the own-price elasticity of sugary drinks is -1.0, the cross price elasticities of chocolate and confectionery with respect to the change in the price of sugary drinks is 0 in scenario (1), 0.2 in scenario (2), 0.5 in scenario (3) and 0.5 for high added sugar households and 0.2 for low added sugar households in scenario (4). We consider households that purchase less/more than 15% of their calories from added sugar as households that buy a high/low amount of sugar.

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The ‘Soft Drinks Levy’

Tax paid by producers and importers of soft drinks that contain added sugar implemented from April 2018 onwards

- excludes pure fruit juices and milk-based drinks

The tax will operate with a specific revenue target of £500 million for the second year of implementation (2019-20).

The OBR estimates that this implies levy rates of:

- main rate charge: 18p/litre for drinks with 5-8g of sugar per 100ml
- higher rate charge: 24p/litre for drinks with >8g sugar per 100ml

The tax is levied per litre of product, which means that tax per gram of sugar is lower for sugar products.
Incentives for reformulation

The declared intention of the levy is to encourage manufacturers to reformulate their products.

The proposed structure will only set limited incentives to reformulate:

- strong incentives to reformulate if the product is just above the 5g or 8g threshold
- for products further above the threshold, there are much weaker incentives for reformulation

If the tax were levied per gram of sugar, then there would be clearer incentives for all manufacturers to lower the sugar contents of their products.
The design of the proposed ‘Soft Drinks Levy’

- Fraction of purchases at each sugar content
- Tax (p) per 100 grams of sugar: proposed soft drinks levy
- Tax (p) per 100 grams of sugar: alternative soft drinks tax
Other anomalies of the proposed design

Someone could pay less tax and consume more sugar by choosing different products:

- 3l Coca Cola: 318 grams of sugar, 72p of tax
- 2l Sainsbury’s Orange Energy Drink: 318 grams of sugar, 48p of tax
Corrective taxes are effective instruments for correcting for the presence of externalities or internalities in a market.

Implementing them involves overcoming complicating factors:

- variation in the marginal externality of consumption across individuals
- often poor measurement of the external costs
- legislative barriers to designing the taxes that would be optimal

But we can use economic theory and empirical analysis to tackle these issues and help guide better corrective tax design.