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## UK Pensions Policy

Rowena Crawford


Public Economics Lectures: 13<sup>th</sup> December 2010

# Outline

- State provision of pensions
  - Why might we want it?
  - What kind of provision is possible/desirable?
- The structure of the UK pension system
  - BRIEFLY!
- Are UK state pensions adequate?
  - The effect of the Pensions Act 2007 reforms
- Is pension income more generally adequate?
- Auto enrolment
  - Likely effects?


# How do we think about pensions saving in economics?

## Life-cycle model of consumption smoothing




# Why might people have insufficient resources in retirement? (1)

- Rational individuals
  - Insufficient earnings over the lifetime




# Why might people have insufficient resources in retirement? (1)

- Rational individuals
  - Insufficient earnings over the lifetime
  - Adverse shocks (particularly near or after retirement)



# Why might people have insufficient resources in retirement? (2)

- Behavioural issues
  - Bad planning/Myopia



# Role for the state in pension provision?

- Redistribution?
- Insurance?
- Paternalistic intervention?


# What do we want state provided pensions to do?

- Avert poverty in older age?
- Ensure a decent replacement rate?



# What do we want state provided pensions to do?

- Avert poverty in older age?
  - Universal benefits
  - Means tested benefits




# UK State Pension System

- 3 main components:
  - Basic State Pension (BSP)
  - Additional pension (SERPS/S2P)
  - Means-tested Benefits
- State Pension Age (SPA): Earliest age at which an individual can start to claim their state pension
  - 1948 – 2010: 65 for men, 60 for women
  - From April 2010: female SPA will gradually increase to 65
  - Under current legislation SPA will increase to 68 by 2046

# UK state pension system: BSP

- Flat rate benefit (£97.65 per week in 2010-11)
- Payable to those aged over the state pension age who have made sufficient National Insurance contributions
  - Also credits for caring responsibilities and some out-of-work benefits
- Since 1981 (until 2011), value was linked to prices
  - Made the pension system much more sustainable
  - Value relative to average earnings declined

# UK state pension system: BSP value over time



Source: Bozio et al (2010)

# UK state pension system: Additional pension

- State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)
  - Operated between 1978 and 2002
  - Value of the pension related to level of earnings
  - Made successively less generous over time once the future cost of the pension commitments became clear
- State Second Pension (S2P)
  - Replaced SERPS in 2002
  - Aimed to give more help to those who may not have previously qualified for SERPS (carers, low incomes etc)
- Individuals can (currently) contract out of the additional pension

# UK state pension system: Means tested benefits

- Pension credit: Guarantee credit (PCGC)
  - Ensures all over the female SPA have a minimum level of income
  - 100% taper
- Pension credit: Savings credit (PCSC)
  - Reduce the disincentives to save created by the PCGC
  - Available to those aged over 65
  - Effectively reduces the PCGC taper to 40%
- Pensioners also eligible for other benefits if they have low incomes
  - Most important: housing benefit, council tax benefit

# How do we measure pension ‘adequacy’?

- What is an ‘adequate’ retirement income?
  - Sufficient to avoid poverty?
    - Absolute poverty?
    - Relative poverty?
  - Certain level of earnings replacement?
    - Same for everyone?
    - Decreasing with income level?


# Are current state pensions likely to be adequate? (pre Pensions Act 2007 reforms)

- Sufficient to avoid poverty
- Provide a low replacement rate on average




# Income replacement by the state pension (pre Pensions Act 2007 reforms)

- Income replacement rates for a median male earner




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
- Sufficient to avoid poverty
- Provide a low replacement rate on average
- Reliance on means tested benefits even for those on median earnings

# UK State Pension Reform: Pensions Act 2007

- Aim was to **reduce poverty** for all pensioners, while ensuring **incentives remain to save privately** to increase pension incomes above the level that would be provided by the state
- Changes:
  - Entitlement to the full BSP to be more widespread
  - Value of BSP relative to average earnings to be maintained
  - S2P to become flat rate
  - => In the long run, BSP and S2P will end up being near universal flat-rate benefits, reducing the reliance on means tested benefits
  - Increased the SPA to improve the financial viability of the system
    - Increase from 65 to 68 by 2046

# Income replacement by the state pension (post Pensions Act 2007 reforms)


- Income replacement rates for median male earner



Source: Bozio et al (2010)

# Income replacement by the state pension (post Pensions Act 2007 reforms)

- Income replacement rates for median male earner



# Are current state pensions likely to be adequate? (post Pensions Act 2007 reforms)

- Sufficient to avoid poverty
- Provide a low replacement rate on average
  
- => **Need for private saving**



# Adequacy of total retirement incomes

- Banks et al (2007) calculated the likely retirement income of the generation approaching retirement (aged 50 to SPA)
- Proportion of individuals who will have income below a variety of thresholds:

Income coming from:		Proportion falling below thresholds			
		PCG	67%	80%	Pen. Com.
(1)	Pension wealth only	18	37	52	39
(2)	(1) plus non-housing wealth				
(3)	(2) plus ½ housing wealth				
(4)	(3) plus expected inheritances				
(5)	(4) plus pension credit				

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
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(5)	(4) plus pension credit	0	10	21	11

# Encouraging private saving

- Still a lot of concern that individuals aren't making appropriate retirement decisions



Source: British Household Panel Survey (2005). Base population is employees aged 22 to the SPA, earning above £5,035

# Encouraging private saving: Pensions Act 2008


- Requires employers to **automatically enrol** all eligible jobholders into a workplace pension scheme
  - Aged 22 to SPA
  - Earn more than income tax threshold (£7,475 in 2011-12)
- Employees **can** choose to opt out
- Pension scheme must be of a minimum standard
  - DC scheme: 8% contribution.
  - ‘Minimum’ contribution composition: **Employer contributes 3%**, employee contributes 4%, government contributed 1% (tax relief on the employee contribution)
  - Employer/employee can choose to contribute more
  - Employee can choose to contribute less but is likely to lose the employer contribution (effectively opted out)

# Will auto enrolment boost pension saving?

- Likely to increase participation
  - Easier to be a member of a pension (standard economic model)
  - Choice made for those who ‘do not choose’ (behavioural economics)




# US evidence on auto enrolment and coverage



# Will auto enrolment boost pension saving?

- Likely to increase participation
  - Easier to be a member of a pension (standard economic model)
  - Choice made for those who ‘do not choose’ (behavioural economics)
- Effect on contributions?
  - Could reduce the contributions of those who would have contributed more than the default amount

# US evidence on auto enrolment and contributions



# Will the employer contribution boost pension saving?

- Likely to increase participation
  - Incentive to join/remain in pension scheme to get employer's contribution
- Effect on contributions?
  - Financial incentive for those contributing below 4% to contribute 4% (to get the employer match)
  - Employer match could reduce employee contributions if employee already saving optimally

# Conclusions


- Need for state pension provision
  - Low lifetime incomes (redistribution), shocks (insurance)
- UK state pension system
  - Avoids poverty
  - Provides a relatively low replacement rate
- Recent reforms to state pensions:
  - Aim to reduce poverty for all pensioners by providing a flat-rate, near universal benefit
  - Remove disincentives from the state pension system (means testing)
- Policy to encourage private pension saving:
  - Aim to encourage a decent replacement rate through private pensions
  - Introduction of auto enrolment

# References (1)

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