Matthew D. Rablen

Matthew D. Rablen

Research Fellow


PhD Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, 2006
MSc Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, 2003
BSc Economics and Econometrics, University of Nottingham, 2002

ORCID: 0000-0002-3521-096X

Matthew Rablen is a Reader in Economics at the University of Sheffield. He obtained his Ph.D. (2006) from the University of Warwick under the supervision of Professor Andrew Oswald. He worked as an Assistant Economist in HM Revenue and Customs for two years, advising on compliance enforcement and saving tax policy. He has previously held positions at the University of Westminster and Brunel University London

Matthew's major research interest is in public economics and his publications include papers in the Economic Journal, the Journal of Health Economics, the Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

His leisure activities are focused around hiking, distance running, and football.

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External web page: Sheffield University

Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement

| Working Paper

We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progressive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-known Yitzhaki paradox.

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