Different this time – microeconomic consequences of the recession
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Based on papers in June 2013 special edition of Fiscal Studies
Different this time

- Output has fallen further and stayed low longer
  - With well known consequences for public finances
Output has not recovered in this recession

![Graph showing output over quarters since the last pre-recession quarter for 2008Q1, 1979Q4, and 1990Q2. The y-axis represents output levels, normalized to 100 in Quarter 0. The x-axis represents quarters since the last pre-recession quarter. The graph illustrates that output has not fully recovered, with significant differences between the years.]
Leaving borrowing at historically high levels
6-year squeeze on public service spending

Note: Figure shows total public spending less spending on net social benefits and public sector net debt interest. Data exclude 3G and 4G spectrum sales and Royal Mail pension transfer.
But these aren’t the only things different this time

• Employment levels have held up well
• Productivity has fallen dramatically
• Incomes have become more equal
  – Though that will likely unwind
• Consumption patterns have changed
  – With the young suffering much worse than older groups
• Though some in older groups have been exposed to wealth losses
• And policy of course is different
Employment, productivity and wages

- Employment is back at pre-recession levels
  - Output is not
Changes to output, employment and hours since 2008

- Real output
- Employment, 16+
- Total weekly hours
Employment, productivity and wages

• Employment is back at pre-recession levels
  – Output is not
• So output per hour has fallen
  – In a way not seen in previous recessions
Changes to real output per hour by recession

Labelled quarter indexed to 100

Quarter since the start of recession

2008Q1  1990Q2  1979Q4

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Employment, productivity and wages

• Employment is back at pre-recession levels
  – Output is not

• So output per hour has fallen
  – In a way not seen in previous recessions

• Wages have also fallen
  – They were 6% lower in real (CPI adjusted terms) at end 2012 compared with start 2008
  – Again we did not see this in previous recessions
Changes in real wages by recession

Growth of mean wage since April of the labelled year

Year since the labeled year

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1979
1990
2008
Of course this will hit incomes

- The surprise is that incomes continued growing up to 2009-10
  - Supported by fiscal expansion
- They then fell sharply
  - By more at the top than at the bottom resulting in a big fall in inequality
Inequality simulations: 2007-08 to 2011-12

Source: Figure 3.3 of *Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013*
Of course this will hit incomes

• The surprise is that incomes continued growing up to 2009-10
  – Supported by fiscal expansion
• They then fell sharply
  – By more at the top than at the bottom
• The next couple of years will see poorer households do worse as benefit cuts bite
• Simulations suggest that by 2015-16 incomes will have fallen by around 5 per cent across the distribution
Inequality simulations:
2007-08 to 2011-12 and 2011-12 to 2015-16

Source: Figure 3.3 of *Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013*
Relationship between benefit levels and average earnings is a key driver.
Consumption

• Has of course fallen – but again the patterns are unusual
• Consumption of non-durables (like food) fell further and for longer than in previous recessions
Consumption of non durables fell much more than in previous recessions
Consumption

- Has of course fallen – but again the patterns are unusual
- Consumption of non-durables (like food) fell further and for longer than in previous recessions
- And the pattern by age is different
  - Spending by those under 35 fell the most
  - Spending by those over 65 and over did not fall at all
  - Pattern much more pronounced than in previous recessions
Wealth holdings

• The recession was of course accompanied by falls in house prices and in the stock market
  – But to what extent were people exposed to these?
• Simulations suggest a fall in total wealth averaging £60,000 (about 10%) for the over 60s
  – A bit more than half that from falling property prices
• Crucially the impact of falls in asset prices (and annuity rates) is likely to grow over time as more depend on DC pension
  – About 40% of 50-60 year olds currently have an unannuitised DC pension
  – For many it is a key source of financial wealth
For those 50-64 year olds with a DC pension it is a big share of wealth

Source: Crawford and Tetlow (2012)
Policy responses

• Paper by Nick Crafts points out that austerity itself need not lead to slow growth
  – But additional policy activity is needed

• 1930s saw higher inflation reducing real interest rates
  – Loose monetary policy transmitted to real economy through housing
  – Loose planning rules and cheap money leading to huge house building

• 1980s saw financial liberalisation and supply side reform
  – Tax system reform, deregulation of labour and product markets, focus on competition

• Post 2008 strategy is less clear
  – Real interest rates constrained by low inflation
  – No clear supply side strategy on tax, planning, infrastructure etc
To conclude

- Productivity has fallen as employment has stayed high
- In part this has contributed to a remarkable fall in income inequality
  - Though benefit cuts will see inequality return to pre-recession levels
- Consumption has also stayed lower longer than after previous recessions
  - With the young suffering particularly badly
- Wealth shocks are likely to become an increasingly important aspect of downturns
- The policy outlook remains rather unclear