## Empirically Probing the Quantity-Quality Model

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Emla Fitzsimons
Bansi Malde

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Emla Fitzsimons* and Bansi Malde ${ }^{\dagger}$

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#### Abstract

This paper tests whether family size has a causal effect on girls' education in Mexico. It exploits son preference as the main source of random variation in the propensity to have more children, and estimates causal effects using instrumental variables. Overall, it finds no evidence of family size having an adverse effect on education, once the endogeneity of family size is accounted for. Results are robust to another commonly used instrument in this literature, the occurrence of twin births. A divisive concern throughout this literature is that the instruments are invalid, so that inferences including policy recommendations may be misleading. An important contribution of this paper is to allow for the possibility that the instruments are invalid and to provide an answer to the question of just how much the assumption of instrument exogeneity drives findings. It concludes that the assumption of exogeneity does not affect the results that much, and the effects of family size on girls' schooling remain extremely modest at most.


Keywords: Fertility; Education; Instrumental Variables; Latin America.

## JEL classification: I20, J13

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Correspondence: emla_f@ifs.org.uk, bansi_m@ifs.org.uk

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## 1 Introduction

This paper investigates the effect of family size on schooling in a Latin American country Mexico. Policymakers in developing countries, including a number in Latin America, have often advocated policies promoting smaller families as a way of improving human capital accumulation and economic development. Though the quantity-quality model suggests that this type of policy is likely to be effective - since as quantity (number of children) rises, the total cost of quality (investment into children) also rises, thus decreasing the demand for quality (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976) - other fields such as psychology suggest that large families may be advantageous for children's human capital due to the potentially beneficial effects of children on each other's development (Zajonc, 1976). Further, in developing countries, some siblings may bring resources and thus contribute to the household budget to the benefit of other siblings, or households may adjust on margins such as mother's labour supply, leading to an ambiguous effect of family size on children's schooling. The issue is, hence, largely an empirical one, and indeed one on which causal evidence in developing countries remains scarce. ${ }^{1}$

The most widely used approaches to identify the causal effects of family size on children's education use same sex composition and/or twin births as instruments for family size and so require very large samples, which until recently have been scarce in developing countries. Further, with the exception of Lee (2008) for Korea, the existing work on developing countries pertains to China, and findings are contradictory and difficult to extrapolate to other contexts given China's one child policy (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Li, Zhang and Zhu, 2007; Qian, 2009). ${ }^{2,3}$ Our paper contributes to this gap in the literature by providing evidence on how family size affects girls' education in the rural population of a large Latin American country, where fertility remains high. The main source of exogenous variation in family size exploited is parental preferences for having at least one son. We find no evidence to support the quantity-quality trade-off for girls' accumulated stock of,education: the negative

[^1]correlation between family size and measures of the stock of education observed in the data disappears when we allow for the endogeneity of family size. This is a robust finding, which is true across different family size margins, and different measures of the stock of education. It is also robust to another source of exogenous variation in family size, the birth of twins. We find evidence however that families are adjusting on another margin, with mothers increasing labour supply in response to having more children.

What remains contentious throughout this literature is the extent to which findings are an artefact of instrument invalidity. This is evident from two recent papers: Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find that differential birth endowments of twins are important for education choices; they also find evidence of economies of scale with respect to gender sameness, and suggest that these could be driving the findings commonly found in the literature. Angrist et al. (2011) on the other hand find no evidence invalidating the identifying restrictions in an Israeli context. ${ }^{4}$ Very few other studies directly examine the extent to which concerns about instrument validity underlies findings. In this paper on the other hand, we investigate the extent to which our findings are driven by instrument invalidity. We first show that the particular concerns about validity (son preferences and economies of scale) are not important from an empirical viewpoint in our context. Thereafter, the paper allows for the possibility that the instrument is indeed imperfect, using the methods recently developed by Nevo and Rosen (2008). It shows that even if the instrument is invalid, the qualitative findings are not affected much: the effects of family size on children's outcomes remain modest at best. Another contribution of the paper is to show that although what is identified are local average treatment effects, our findings are likely to generalise to our entire sample, which comprises the population of rural indigent households in Mexico. We do this by characterising the complier sub-populations across different instruments. These contributions of the paper set it apart from other related studies and fill an important gap in a literature.

Furthermore, the data used in this paper, spanning over half a million relatively poor households in marginalised communities in rural Mexico, allow us to test the effect at different margins of increase in family size, and for children of different birth orders. Indeed, this is one of the few studies to consider family size increases above 2 to 3 . These higher

[^2]margins are arguably the more important ones to consider for developing countries: the average family size in the Mexican sample used here is just over 4. Moreover to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to test the quantity-quality model in Mexico, thus providing evidence from a new country to add to the growing body of studies. Such replication of IV estimates on new data sets has indeed been stressed by Angrist (2004) as a crucial component in establishing the external validity of IV estimates.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the methodology for estimating the effects of family size on children's school outcomes. In section 3, the data used in the analysis are described, alongside some descriptive statistics. The main body of the paper is contained in section 4 , where the results are shown. Section 5 contains robustness tests and a discussion of findings, and the paper concludes in section 6.

## 2 Methodology

The basic model to be estimated, is the following

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} X+\beta_{2} F_{i}+u_{i} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the outcome variables, $Y_{i}$, pertain to child $i$ 's education and include a $0-1$ indicator of participation in school, accumulated years of schooling, a 0-1 indicator for completed primary schooling, and a 0-1 indicator for completed lower secondary schooling; $X$ is a vector of covariates including individual, parental, household and village characteristics; $F_{i}$ is family size of child $i$; and the error term $u_{i}$ denotes unobserved factors that affect $Y_{i}$ and that may be correlated with $F_{i}{ }^{5}$ This model is estimated using pooled cross sections of data from 1996 through 1999, covering the entire population of rural indigent communities in Mexico (detailed in section 3).

Estimating equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) would render the coefficient of interest, $\beta_{2}$, biased and inconsistent if omitted variables, such as parental preferences, influence both children's outcomes and family size. To obtain a consistent estimate of $\beta_{2}$, an instrumental variable method is used, that requires the existence of a variable, Z , which is correlated with $F_{i}$ but uncorrelated with $u_{i}$. In a first-stage regression, we estimate

[^3]\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{i}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} Z+\alpha_{3} X+\xi_{i} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

The main source of exogenous variation in family size used in this paper is all-female births. ${ }^{6}$ Our population exhibits a strong son preference: that the first n births are female is highly correlated with further childbearing; that the first n births are male is not. In a later section we also assess robustness of findings to another instrument commonly used in this literature, the birth of twins. ${ }^{7}$

The instrument is effectively the sex of the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ child in households in which the first $\mathrm{n}-1$ births are female ${ }^{8}$ : we expect (and later show) family size to be higher in households where the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ birth is also female. We do this for $\mathrm{n}=2 \ldots 4$. We consider the outcomes of the first $\mathrm{n}-1$ children, all female by definition. ${ }^{9,10}$ As n increases we can consider outcomes of higher birth parities, so when $\mathrm{n}=2$ we consider the outcomes of first-borns; for $\mathrm{n}=3$ first- and secondborns; for $\mathrm{n}=4$, first-, second- and third-borns. In the first instance, we allow the effects to vary by birth order. However as we will see, we can improve precision considerably by pooling birth parities. ${ }^{11}$

One common criticism of this methodology is the issue of instrument validity. We devote section 5 to this important issue. We first provide evidence relating to its validity in our context. This evidence is reassuring, but to address lingering concerns, we impose weaker assumptions on the instrument and allow for correlation between it and the error term (Nevo and Rosen, 2008). This allows us, for the first time in this literature, to provide bounds on the magnitude of the effect of family size on outcomes. Therefore, we can directly answer the question of how much the assumption of instrument exogeneity drives the results.

[^4]Finally, we note that in the presence of heterogeneous effects, the parameter identified is a local average treatment effect (LATE), the effect of increased family size on education for households whose treatment status is manipulated by the instrumental variable. Hence, for the all-female instrument, we identify the effect of increasing family size on education for the sub-population of households with n girls that go on to have an additional child solely because they wish to have a boy. This sub-population is called the compliers (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)). A potential limitation is that the effect only pertains to this specific group and is not applicable to the wider population. To investigate this, we compare effects obtained from another instrument widely used in the literature, twin births, which affects different complier sub-populations. We also compare characteristics of the compliers for both instruments. This allows us to understand better just how representative our findings are for the population in our survey as a whole.

## 3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

### 3.1 The Data

The data used in this paper are cross-sectional socio-economic data that were collected across marginalised rural areas throughout 31 states in Mexico between 1996 and 1999. ${ }^{12}$ Our sample comprises particularly poor households, as the descriptive statistics will confirm later on. The survey - the Survey of Household Socio-Economic Characteristics (Encuesta de Caracteristicas Socioeconomicas de los Hogares, ENCASEH) - was conducted in order to aid in the targeting of the PROGRESA (now Oportunidades) welfare programme, introduced in selected marginalised rural villages across 7 states in 1998, and later expanded to cover the whole country. The survey collected data from all households in these communities and contains a rich cross-section of information on individual and household characteristics, along with locality data. Moreover, being a census of the rural parts of all states in Mexico, the sample sizes are extremely large, which is very advantageous for the research here as it facilitates an analysis using different instrumental variables, different margins of increase in family size, and different birth orders.

[^5]The analysis is restricted to $12-17$ year olds, as school enrolment before age 12 is practically universal, at just over $97 \%$. Further, we drop households in which the eldest child is 18 or above (39\%). ${ }^{13}$ A potential concern with the remaining sample is that we may miscode family size (and birth orders) if older children have left the household permanently. We believe this to be a relatively minor concern: only $2.1 \%$ of households report having a household member who migrated permanently in the past 5 years. Note also that we retain households in which both parents are married, thus dropping any divorced parents from the analysis. This is relatively innocuous, as divorce is extremely uncommon in the sample, at below $1 \%$. This leaves us with a sample of just over half a million households across just under 1,500 villages. Family size is defined as the number of biological siblings in the household, i.e. the number of children born to the same parents. Other children present in the household (such as nephews and nieces), are not considered to be part of the sibship but their presence is controlled for in all specifications.

### 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

### 3.2.1 Our Sample

We first show some characteristics of the sample of households in Table 1. The average family size is 4 . Around $50 \%$ of households have children of the same sex in the first two births: just under half of these have two girls. Mothers are 38 years old on average and have just over 3 years of schooling; fathers are 42 years old and have just below 4 years of schooling. Less than $30 \%$ of mothers have at least completed primary schooling, while the corresponding figure for fathers is just over $30 \%$. Agricultural work is widespread, with almost $80 \%$ of households involved in it. Indicators of poverty such as the quality of the roof of the dwelling and the availability of a toilet and running water, confirm that the households are quite poor.

Table 1 Mean characteristics of households

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Number of siblings | 3.951 | 1.838 |
| Proportion of households with $1^{\text {st }} 2$ births of the same sex | 0.504 | 0.500 |
| Proportion of households with $1^{\text {st }} 2$ births female (ff) | 0.234 | 0.423 |
| Proportion of households with $1^{\text {st }} 3$ births female (fff) | 0.119 | 0.323 |
| Proportion of households with $1^{\text {st }} 4$ births female (ffff) | 0.062 | 0.241 |

[^6]
## Socio-economic variables

| Father's age | 42.073 | 8.535 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Mother's age | 37.887 | 7.279 |
| Father's years of schooling | 3.607 | 3.021 |
| Mother's years of schooling | 3.252 | 2.859 |
| Father has no schooling | 0.201 | 0.401 |
| Mother has no schooling | 0.267 | 0.442 |
| Father has at least completed primary schooling | 0.308 | 0.462 |
| Mother has at least completed primary schooling | 0.278 | 0.448 |
| Birth spacing b/w 1st and 2nd borns | 2.837 | 1.927 |
| Indigenous language speakers | 0.340 | 0.474 |
| Household owns dwelling | 0.925 | 0.264 |
| Water supply in dwelling | 0.244 | 0.429 |
| Electricity in dwelling | 0.797 | 0.402 |
| Number of rooms in dwelling | 1.921 | 1.207 |
| Household has own toilet | 0.631 | 0.482 |
| Household has water in toilet | 0.199 | 0.399 |
| Household owns land | 0.518 | 0.500 |
| Household head works in agriculture | 0.773 | 0.419 |
| Wall materials of dwelling ( $=$ poor quality $)$ | 0.875 | 0.331 |
| Roof materials of dwelling (0 = poor quality $)$ | 0.409 | 0.492 |
| N | 529,857 |  |

Notes: Sample of households with at least one 12-17 year old, in which the eldest child is <age 18.

### 3.2.2 Measures of Schooling

The objective of this study is to estimate the causal impact of family size on the accumulation of one form of human capital: education. To measure this we use school enrolment at the time of the survey, and three different measures of the stock of education: years of schooling, completion of primary schooling and completion of lower secondary schooling. ${ }^{14}$ The stock variables are our preferred outcome measures, as they embody past investments in education and are thus a cleaner measure of educational attainment and accumulation: school enrolment relates to a one-off decision, and does not necessarily capture accumulation of education. Moreover, enrolment in school is relatively less costly, both in terms of time and other inputs, than is completion of schooling levels. As the stock variables more closely reflect investments in human capital (in terms of time and money), they are the more relevant outcomes for testing the quantity-quality model. They are also more relevant for policymakers: whilst around $85 \%$ of children complete primary school, just over half complete lower secondary

[^7]schooling. This is despite the fact that compulsory basic education (grades $1-9$, covering 6 years of primary and 3 of lower secondary) in Mexico is free of charge and publicly provided. ${ }^{15}$ Completion of levels is also of interest in the presence of non-linearities, or "sheepskin effects" in the returns to schooling.

The following two figures depict these measures for both males and females. They show that educational attainment is fairly equal between males and females: though school enrolment is slightly higher for males after the age of 12 , these differences are very low (see Figure 1). Moreover by age 17 they have converged. Nor do any of the three measures of the stock of education display any stark differences between the sexes: if anything, females are engaged more in education according to these measures. The fact that measures of education are similar across males and females suggests that son preferences do not affect intra-household allocation choices once a child is born. ${ }^{16}$ As we will see in section 4, this is reassuring from the point of view of the validity of the instrument.

The figures also show a sharp drop in school enrolment at age 12, which corresponds to the first year of lower secondary school (see Figure 1). Before that age, school enrolment is practically universal (corresponding to primary schooling). For this reason we consider school choices from age 12 onwards only. Figure 1 also shows that years of schooling are increasing with age, though not one-to-one.

[^8]Figure 1 School enrolment and years of schooling, by age and gender


Figure 2 shows primary school completion and lower secondary school completion for 12-17 year olds (both of which are free and publicly provided). ${ }^{17}$ The proportions completing primary school and lower secondary school are low. By age 12, the age at which a child should have completed primary schooling, less than $40 \%$ of children has done so, and less than $80 \%$ of boys and girls have completed primary schooling by age 17 . For lower secondary schooling, less than $10 \%$ of those who should - those aged 14 and above - have completed lower secondary schooling, and this proportion stands at just under $40 \%$ by age 17 .

[^9]Figure 2 Primary and lower secondary school completion, by age and gender


### 3.2.3 Are the instruments randomly assigned?

The IV methodology, in the presence of heterogeneous effects of family size, requires that the instrument is random conditional on observed covariates. The randomisation assumption could be violated if parents choose the sex of their children (via sex-selective abortions). We believe that this issue is unlikely to arise in our sample: Mexico is a predominantly Catholic country where abortion is highly legally restricted. Indeed Table 2, which compares characteristics of parents (age and education) whose first $\mathrm{n}-1$ births are girls, and who have either a girl or a boy at the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ birth, confirms that the samples are well-balanced, giving us no reason to believe that the instruments are not random.

Table 2 Mean characteristics by sex composition of earlier births

| Variable | $\mathrm{fm}=1$ | $\mathrm{ff}=1$ | Difference in means | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Father's age | 40.912 | 40.885 | -0.027 | 0.394 |
| Mother's age | 36.806 | 36.781 | -0.024 | 0.354 |
| Mother's age at first birth | 22.234 | 22.229 | -0.005 | 0.830 |
| Father's years of schooling | 3.744 | 3.744 | 0.000 | 0.973 |
| Mother's years of schooling | 3.389 | 3.386 | -0.002 | 0.856 |
| Father has no schooling | 0.186 | 0.188 | 0.002 | 0.214 |
| Mother has no schooling | 0.248 | 0.251 | 0.004 | 0.030* |
| Father has at least completed primary school | 0.325 | 0.327 | 0.002 | 0.327 |
| Mother has at least completed primary school | 0.294 | 0.295 | 0.001 | 0.672 |
| Birth spacing b/w $1^{\text {st }}$ and $2^{\text {nd }}$ births | 2.836 | 2.845 | 0.009 | 0.244 |
| Family size | 4.168 | 4.282 | 0.114 | 0.000* |
| N | 111,588 | 108,911 |  |  |
|  | ffm=1 | fff=1 |  |  |
| Father's age | 40.102 | 40.045 | -0.057 | 0.302 |
| Mother's age | 36.027 | 35.994 | -0.032 | 0.425 |
| Mother's age at first birth | 21.462 | 21.440 | -0.023 | 0.540 |
| Father's years of schooling | 3.761 | 3.762 | 0.001 | 0.978 |
| Mother's years of schooling | 3.386 | 3.375 | -0.011 | 0.551 |
| Father has no schooling | 0.184 | 0.185 | 0.001 | 0.852 |
| Mother has no schooling | 0.248 | 0.250 | 0.002 | 0.458 |
| Father has at least completed primary school | 0.330 | 0.331 | 0.001 | 0.690 |
| Mother has at least completed primary school | 0.294 | 0.294 | 0.000 | 0.886 |
| Birth spacing $\mathrm{b} / \mathrm{w} 1^{\text {st }}$ and $2^{\text {nd }}$ births | 2.573 | 2.604 | 0.031 | 0.002* |
| Birth spacing b/w $2^{\text {nd }}$ and $3^{\text {rd }}$ births | 3.016 | 3.017 | 0.001 | 0.919 |
| Family size | 4.597 | 4.717 | 0.119 | 0.000* |
| N | 47,207 | 46,348 |  |  |
|  | fffm $=1$ | ffff=1 |  |  |
| Father's age | 39.555 | 39.563 | 0.008 | 0.923 |
| Mother's age | 35.479 | 35.501 | 0.021 | 0.704 |
| Mother's age at first birth | 20.889 | 20.859 | -0.030 | 0.567 |
| Father's years of schooling | 3.666 | 3.606 | -0.060 | 0.020* |
| Mother's years of schooling | 3.222 | 3.166 | -0.056 | 0.062 |
| Father has no schooling | 0.188 | 0.193 | 0.004 | 0.232 |
| Mother has no schooling | 0.261 | 0.269 | 0.008 | 0.107 |
| Father has at least completed primary school | 0.318 | 0.313 | -0.005 | 0.255 |
| Mother has at least completed primary school | 0.273 | 0.266 | -0.007 | 0.138 |
| Birth spacing $\mathrm{b} / \mathrm{w} 1^{\text {st }}$ and $2^{\text {nd }}$ births | 2.378 | 2.398 | 0.020 | 0.109 |
| Birth spacing $\mathrm{b} / \mathrm{w} 2^{\text {nd }}$ and $3^{\text {rd }}$ births | 2.637 | 2.637 | 0.000 | 0.991 |
| Birth spacing b/w $3^{\text {rd }}$ and $4^{\text {th }}$ births | 2.896 | 2.907 | 0.011 | 0.563 |
| Family size | 5.194 | 5.332 | 0.138 | 0.000* |
| N | 17,571 | 17,588 |  |  |

Notes: N refers to the number of first-born female children. fm=1 indicates female at $1^{\text {st }}$ birth, male at $2^{\text {nd }}$ birth; $\mathrm{ff}=1$ indicates female at $1^{\text {st }} 2$ births, and so on. A * indicates that the variable is statistically different from 0 at the $5 \%$ level or less.

## 4 Results

In this section we first display estimates from the first-stage relationships between family size and the instruments. We then show the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates, alongside the linear probability model (LPM) estimates for comparison. ${ }^{18}$

### 4.1 First-stage relationships

Table 3 shows the first-stage correlations between family size and the instruments. The top panel of each table shows the first-stage coefficients for first-borns, the middle and lower panels show those for second- and third-borns respectively.

|  | $\begin{gathered} {[1]} \\ \text { ff } \end{gathered}$ | [2] fff | $\begin{aligned} & {[3]} \\ & \text { ffff } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| First-Borns <br> Family size | $\begin{gathered} 0.117 * * \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.115^{*} * \\ {[0.009]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.125 * * \\ {[0.012]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations F test | $\begin{gathered} 219563 \\ 349.72 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 93153 \\ & 148.63 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 34998 \\ 114.14 \end{gathered}$ |
| Second-Borns <br> Family size | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.136^{*} * \\ {[0.012]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.141 * * \\ {[0.015]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations <br> F test |  | $\begin{gathered} 55922 \\ 123.66 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 22407 \\ 86.93 \end{gathered}$ |
| Third-Borns <br> Family size | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ | n/a | $\begin{gathered} 0.173 * * \\ {[0.03]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations F test |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 8447 \\ 33.53 \end{gathered}$ |
| Sample | $\begin{gathered} 2+, \\ 1^{\text {st }} \text { born } \\ \text { =female } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3+ \\ \mathrm{ff}=1 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4+, \\ \mathrm{fff}=1 \end{gathered}$ |

Notes: Dependent variable is family size. All regressions control for the socio-economic variables listed in Table 1. * Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level. ** Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. $2+$ indicates households with 2 or more children, etc; ff indicates females at $1^{\text {st }} 2$ births, etc.

The instruments are all very strong, as is evident from the F-tests. Their magnitude is such that they increase family size by an average of 0.1 children, that is, around 1 in 10 first-born

[^10]girls gain an additional sibling due to the instrument. Put differently, the proportion of households in the complier subpopulation ranges between $10 \%$ and $15 \%$.

We further decompose this overall proportion of compliers to obtain more insight into the ranges of variation in family size induced by each instrument. This is displayed graphically in Figure 3 below. ${ }^{19}$ The horizontal axis gives completed family size ${ }^{20}$; the vertical axis gives the proportion of households that has that family size because the instrument is switched on, and that would not otherwise have continued their fertility. So for instance, Figure 3 shows that just over $2 \%$ of the sample is induced to go on to have 3 children because $\mathrm{ff}=1$, around $3.5 \%$ of the sample is induced to go on to have 4 children, and so on, with statistically significant fertility increases occurring up to 7 children (beyond which increases are not longer statistically different from zero, as can be seen from the $95 \%$ confidence intervals around the estimates). More generally, the fertility increases induced by the instruments are high, reaching 8 children for the ffff instrument, implying that the all-female instruments capture the effects of a family size of up to 8 children. ${ }^{21}$ So the effects of family size that we go on to estimate are a weighted average over a wide range of family sizes, a range that contains margins relevant for the population we consider (where the average number of children per household is 4).

[^11]Figure 3 Compliers, all-female instruments


Notes: Dashed lines are 95\% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Figures shown are for first-born females; figures for other parities are very similar.

### 4.2 Two-stage least squares estimates

In this section we display the TSLS estimates of the effect of family size on children's education. The LPM estimates, which do not account for the endogeneity of family size, are also shown. Results are shown separately by birth order, for four outcomes: school enrolment, years of schooling, primary school completion, and lower secondary school completion.

We see from the estimates in Table 4 that regardless of birth parity or outcome considered, the LPM estimates are negative and significantly different from zero. In terms of magnitude, an extra child is associated with a reduction of 2 percentage points in school enrolment, primary school completion and lower secondary school completion for all birth orders. The magnitude for years of schooling is around 0.1 years. These magnitudes are in line with those found by Angrist et al. (2011) for Israel.

When we instrument for family size, the magnitude of the effect of family size on schooling outcomes changes, regardless of birth parity: the coefficient remains generally negative, but in
no case statistically significant from zero. This finding is consistent across the outcomes, birth orders and family sizes considered. However, differences between the OLS and the IV estimates are typically not statistically significant, raising concerns that the IV estimates are not precise enough to be informative, despite the strong first stage estimates.

Table 4 Effects of family size on education, first-borns

|  | LPM | IV | LPM | IV | LPM | IV |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Instrument $\rightarrow$ | $\mathbf{n} / \mathbf{a}$ | ff | n/a | fff | n/a | ffff |
| Outcome $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| School enrolment |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.020^{* *}$ | -0.019 | $-0.020^{* *}$ | 0.007 | $-0.018^{* *}$ | -0.032 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.015]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.025]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.036]$ |
| Observations | 219597 |  | 93158 |  | 35007 |  |
| Years of schooling |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.110^{* *}$ | 0.035 | $-0.110^{* *}$ | -0.017 | $-0.105^{* *}$ | -0.149 |
|  | $[0.004]$ | $[0.085]$ | $[0.006]$ | $[0.123]$ | $[0.011]$ | $[0.176]$ |
| Observations | 218380 |  | 92652 |  | 34813 |  |
| Primary school |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.014^{* *}$ | 0.022 | $-0.014^{* *}$ | 0.003 | $-0.013^{* *}$ | -0.051 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.017]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.026]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.035]$ |
| Observations | 218469 |  | 92688 |  | 34823 |  |
| Lower secondary |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.020^{* *}$ | 0.009 | $-0.021^{* *}$ | -0.017 | $-0.021^{* *}$ | 0.035 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.019]$ | $[0.001]$ | $[0.022]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.034]$ |
| Observations | 150722 |  | 63961 |  | 24508 |  |
| Sample | $2+$ | $2+$ | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ | $4+, \mathrm{fff}=1$ | $4+, \mathrm{fff}=1$ |

Notes: Control for socio-economic variables listed in Table 1. Note also that using the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ birth as an instrument, we condition implicitly on the sex of the first n-1 births. For the lower secondary schooling outcome, sample is restricted to $14-17$ year olds.

* Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.

Table 5 Effects of family size on education, second- and third-borns

|  | Second-borns |  |  |  |  | Third-borns |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LPM | IV | LPM | IV | LPM | IV |  |
| Instrument $\rightarrow$ | n/a | fff |  | ffff |  | fff |  |
| Outcome $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| School Enrolment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.022^{* *}$ | -0.008 | $-0.021^{* *}$ | -0.023 | $-0.018^{* *}$ | -0.008 |  |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.028]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.045]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.047]$ |  |
| Observations | 55921 |  | 22411 |  | 8443 |  |  |
| Years of schooling |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.094^{* *}$ | 0.07 | $-0.086^{* *}$ | -0.118 | $-0.074^{* *}$ | -0.176 |  |
|  | $[0.006]$ | $[0.111]$ | $[0.009]$ | $[0.197]$ | $[0.012]$ | $[0.181]$ |  |
| Observations | 55624 |  | 22310 |  | 8398 |  |  |


| Primary school |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Family Size | $-0.017^{* *}$ | 0.035 | $-0.015^{* *}$ | -0.026 | $-0.016^{* *}$ | -0.024 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.028]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.044]$ | $[0.003]$ | $[0.058]$ |
| Observations | 55626 |  | 22311 |  | 8399 |  |
| Lower secondary |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.012^{* *}$ | -0.007 | $-0.015^{* *}$ | -0.009 | $\mathrm{n} / \mathrm{a}$ |  |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.030]$ | $[0.002]$ | $[0.040]$ |  |  |
| Observations | 25114 |  | 10355 |  |  |  |
| Sample | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ | $4+, \mathrm{fff}=1$ | $4+, \mathrm{fff}=1$ | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ | $3+, \mathrm{ff}=1$ |

Notes: see notes to Table 5. Additionally, note that lower secondary school completion is not considered as an outcome variable for third-borns as they are too young to have completed it.

To help improve precision, we follow Angrist et al. (2011) and pool birth parities, and estimate the effects on this pooled sample. In essence, this restricts the estimates from the different parity-specific subsamples to be the same. We believe this to be justified on the basis of evidence from Tables 4 and 5, where the coefficient estimates for the three birth orders considered are statistically indistinguishable from one another. Further support for the plausibility of this assumption is provided in Figure 4, which plots the relationship between education measures and family size, separately by birth order. ${ }^{22}$ As can be seen from the Figure, the relationship between an additional child and schooling outcomes is similar across all three birth parities (with just minor differences at higher family sizes), which provides further justification for pooling the three birth parities.

[^12]Figure 4: Relationship between family size and education, by birth order


Notes: The figure displays graphs plotting residuals from a regression of years of schooling and school enrolment respectively on the control variables on residuals from a regression of number of siblings on the control variables. Figures for the other outcomes reveal similar patterns, and are available on request.

Table 6 shows the estimates from the specification where the three birth parities are pooled: first-born females in households with at least two children, second-born females in households with at least three children of which the first two are female, and third-born females in households with at least four children of which the first three are female. For any particular birth parity, the instrument is the sex of the subsequent birth: so the instrument for first-born females is that the second-born is female; for second-born females it is that the third-born is female, and for third-born females it is that the fourth born is female.

We see from Table 6 that this method improves precision considerably. For 2 of the 3 stock measures of schooling considered, the IV estimates are statistically different from their OLS counterparts: we can rule out any significant effect of family size on years of schooling and on primary school completion. Moreover, for the remaining stock measure - lower secondary school completion - we are marginally unable to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in a Durbin-Hausman-Wu test, though we should point out that the sample sizes for this outcome are considerably lower (the sample is restricted to 14-17 year olds, the appropriate age range for completion of lower secondary school). For the flow measure, school enrolment, the IV
estimate is still not precise enough to be able to reject that it is different from the OLS estimate. However, we reiterate that this is a weak proxy for parental investment into children's education, and for this reason not our preferred outcome measure. As we are comfortable in pooling the first three birth parities for this sample, for reasons discussed already, and given the considerable gains in precision obtained when we do so, all further analysis in the paper is based on parity pooled samples.

## Table 6 Effects of family size on education, pooled birth parities

| First Stage. | Family Size |
| :--- | :---: |
| Instrument: Subsequent birth a |  |
| female | $0.125^{* *}$ |
|  | $[0.005]$ |
| F - Stat | 388.12 |
| Observations | 283961 |


| Second Stage. <br> Outcome $\downarrow$ | LPM | IV |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| School enrolment |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.018^{* *}$ | -0.015 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.013]$ |
| Observations | 283961 | 283961 |
| p-value of test of exogeneity |  | 0.76 |
| Years of schooling |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.101^{* *}$ | 0.035 |
|  | $[.004]$ | $[0.067]$ |
| Observations | 282402 | 282402 |
| p-value of test of exogeneity |  | 0.03 |
| Primary school completion | $-0.016^{* *}$ |  |
| Family Size | $[0.001]$ | 0.021 |
|  | 282494 | $[0.014]$ |
| Observations |  | 282494 |
| $p-v a l u e ~ o f ~ t e s t ~ o f ~ e x o g e n e i t y ~$ |  | 0.01 |
| Lower secondary school | $-0.019^{* *}$ |  |
| completion | $[0.001]$ | 0.007 |
| Family Size | 177192 | $[0.017]$ |
|  |  | 177192 |
| Observations | $2+, 3+\& f f=1$, | $2+, 3+\& \mathrm{ff}=1$, |
| p-value of test of exogeneity | $4+\& f f f=1$ | $4+\& \mathrm{fff}=1$ |
| Sample |  |  |

Notes: Control for socio-economic variables listed in Table 1. Samples contain first-, second-, and third-borns. For the lower secondary schooling outcome, sample is restricted to $14-17$ year olds.

* Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.

There is very little comparable evidence for developing countries to put our results into some sort of context. The exceptions are Qian (2009) and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), though their estimates pertain to China, a very different environment with strict fertility restrictions. It is thus not surprising that our estimates differ, as we consider a much wider range of fertility change than theirs. That said, it is interesting to note that our findings are very much in line with those for developed countries (Cáceres-Delpiano (2006) for the US; Black et al. (2005) for Norway; Angrist et al. (2011) for Israel).

We conclude from this that when the endogeneity of family size is taken into account, there is fairly strong evidence to reject the quantity-quality trade-off for children's educational attainment and accumulation. We now go on to probe this conclusion further. First, we investigate to what extent the findings are an artefact of invalid instruments, rather than picking up the effects of family size per se. Second, we look into how representative the findings are for the population at large: by first estimating effects using another instrument twin births - which picks up a different set of compliers, and then by characterising the compliers for whom the LATE effects are identified. Third, we investigate whether families are adjusting on margins other than children's education, in particular mother's labour supply.

## 5 Robustness

A key concern throughout this literature relates to the validity of instruments. It is posited in particular that sex composition may affect education directly through economies of scale, which are difficult to control for. Yet despite its importance for inference, more often than not, instrument validity is not directly addressed. ${ }^{23}$ In this paper, we first provide direct evidence on the likely validity of the instrument in our context. Though the evidence we show is reassuring, instrument validity cannot of course ever be established with certainty. We take a new approach in this paper by testing directly the robustness of findings to weaker identification assumptions, allowing explicitly for the instruments to be correlated with the error term in the outcome equation, using methods developed by Nevo and Rosen (2008). With these weaker assumptions on the instrument, we can estimate bounds on the magnitude of the effects of family size. Thus for the first time in this literature, we can show to what

[^13]extent instrument invalidity matters for inference. As a final robustness exercise, we use twin births as an instrument for family size. This instrument affects a different set of compliers, which is useful as a way of assessing whether our findings are specific to the all-female compliers, and whether another instrument may show up evidence of variability in the effects of family size across other groups in the population. Indeed we go on to characterise the two sets of compliers, to see just how comparable they are.

### 5.1.1 Evidence on instrument validity

As has been discussed, the exclusion restriction is that the sex of the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ born has no direct effect on education. There are at least two concerns with this. The first is that son preferences may directly affect education of females in the household. The second is economies of scale in all-female households, arising from children of the same sex being able to share more items. ${ }^{24}$ In both cases, the direction of the resulting bias of the IV estimate is positive: if postnatal son preferences exist (and if they affect education decisions), then a sister is more beneficial for girls' schooling than a brother; if scale economies are important, accumulated savings may be higher in all-female households, yet difficult to control for.

Concerning son preferences, Lee (2008) points out that the instrument concerns prenatal and not postnatal son preferences, in other words that parents prefer to have sons rather than daughters, and not that parents treat sons more favourably than daughters. However if postnatal son preferences exist, the sibship gender composition may affect intra-household schooling choices. We are not unduly concerned about this: we have seen in section 3 that education outcomes for boys and girls are very similar (see Figures 1 and 2), and this conforms to recent trends in Mexico showing convergence in education between the sexes. ${ }^{25}$ In further investigation of this, we estimated a school participation model for girls, including as regressors the number of sisters and brothers (above and below age 5, separately). Neither

[^14]of the coefficients is statistically different from zero, suggesting that males do not have a detrimental effect on their sisters' education.

A potentially more serious concern - and one that has received much attention in the literature - is economies of scale resulting in savings from all-female births which may trickle through to education choices (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)). We argue here that cultural customs are so different from western industrialised countries that the scope for economies of scale is much more limited. Traditional hand-me-downs that can generate economies of scale include children's clothing and shoes, which tend to be unisex in the environment we consider, especially at young ages. Other gender-specific items such as school books are likely to be common to both sexes given the predominance of mixed-sex schools in our setting. Moreover, the sharing of gender-specific goods is unlikely to be restricted to within the household, but to take place across the extended family and social network. ${ }^{26}$

To provide more factual evidence however, we use data on expenditures on children's clothing and shoes. As this information is not available in the ENCASEH survey, we instead use data from the Progresa evaluation survey, which provides information on expenditures on children's clothing and shoes in the previous 6 months for around 26,000 households from 7 states in rural Mexico in 1998/99. These data are informative about our population, as the Progresa sample was drawn from the ENCASEH survey. ${ }^{27}$

The evidence suggests strongly that economies of scale are not an important concern. First, the purchase of children's clothing and shoes is very infrequent: a large proportion of households ( $61 \%$ and $45 \%$ respectively) have purchased neither over a 6 month period; amongst those that have purchased these items, expenditures account for just $1 \%$ of their monthly non-durable consumption. This is consistent with Attanasio et al. (2009), who find that households in this population spend around $70 \%$ of their budget on food, leaving little

[^15]scope for scale economies (compared to a food share of less than $20 \%$ in western industrialised economies).

When we test more directly whether the sex composition of children affects the household's decision to purchase children's clothes and shoes, we find no evidence that it does. We estimate the following equation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{h}}=\lambda_{0}+\lambda_{1} \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{nh}}+\lambda_{2} \mathrm{X}+\lambda_{3} \text { share }_{h}+\xi_{\mathrm{h}} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $D_{h}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household reports positive expenditure on children's clothing/shoes (separately) and 0 otherwise, $\mathrm{f}_{\text {nh }}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the first n children in a household are female and 0 otherwise, X is a vector of control variables including household demographics, parental age and education, ages of the first n borns (to control for age differences between children), family size (to disentangle sex composition effects from family size effects), locality variables such as locality size and distance to the nearest large town (to proxy for costs of purchasing these goods), and share $_{h}$ is the share of non-durable consumption a household spends on food (to control for available household resources). Equation (3) is estimated at the household level using a probit model. Estimates are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. We find no evidence of sex composition affecting these purchase decisions. Nor do we find any evidence of sex composition affecting the amount spent on children's clothing or shoes. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show tobit coefficient estimates from the following model

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{h}}=\theta_{0}+\theta_{1} \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{nh}}+\theta_{2} \mathrm{X}+\theta_{3} \text { share }_{h}+\mathrm{u}_{\mathrm{h}} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{h}}$ is household expenditure on children's clothing/shoes (separately) in pesos, and all other variables are as previously defined.

Table 7 Effects of sex composition on purchase of, and expenditure on, children's clothes/shoes

| Dependent <br> Variable $\rightarrow$ | Purchased <br> children's clothes | Purchased <br> children's shoes | Expenditure on <br> children's clothes | Expenditure on <br> children's shoes |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Indicator for <br> subsequent <br> birth being <br> female | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |
|  | -0.017 | 0.030 | -1.44 | $[1.73]$ |
| Observations | $30.019]$ | $[0.018]$ | 3170 | $2+; 3+, \mathrm{ff}=1 ; 4+$, |
| fample | $2+; 3+, \mathrm{ff}=1 ; 4+$, | $2+; 3+, \mathrm{ff}=1 ; 4+$, | $2+; 3+, \mathrm{ff}=1 ;$ |  |
|  | $\mathrm{fff}=1$ | $\mathrm{fff}=1$ | $4+\mathrm{fff}=1$ |  |

Notes: Progresa data from October 1998 and May 1999, control villages only. Sample includes households where the eldest child is <18 and is female. Marginal effects from probit estimates of equation (3) shown in columns [1] and [2] and those from tobit estimates of equation (4) shown in columns [3] and [4].

* Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level. ** Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses.

This evidence suggests that the threats to the validity of the all-female instrument are not very serious in this context. ${ }^{28}$ Still, this evidence alone does not (and could not) establish validity of the instrument. A contribution of the paper is to allow for the instrument to be imperfect and under weaker identification assumptions, derive bounds on the effects of family size on education, which is what we do next.

### 5.1.2 Bounds

In this section we consider explicitly just how much the assumption of instrument exogeneity drives the results. We do this using the method of Nevo and Rosen (2008), imposing weaker assumptions on the degree of correlation between the instrument and the error term, and estimating bounds on the effects of family size on education. So whilst we no longer point identify model parameters, the advantage is that inferences made are robust to a lack of instrument exogeneity. And more importantly, it is a new and potentially very useful approach in this literature to directly answer the question of how much the assumption of instrument exogeneity drives the results.

[^16]As in Nevo and Rosen (2008), we consider cases where

1. The instruments have the same direction of correlation with the error term as the endogenous regressor [A3]: the potential correlation between the instrument and the error term in the outcome equation is positive (see section 5.1.1). The correlation between the endogenous regressor ( F ) and the error term is negative however. To satisfy [A3], we simply specify the treatment variable as -F .
2. The instruments are less correlated with the error term than the endogenous regressor [A4]: this assumption tightens the bounds further in many cases. We believe it is reasonable to expect the all-female instrument to be less correlated with the error term in the outcome equation than is family size.

Nevo and Rosen show that the correlation between the instrumental variable (all-females) and the endogenous regressor (-F) plays a key role in estimating the bounds: the key condition is that this correlation is negative, which we know to be the case. They also show that the larger its magnitude, the tighter the bounds. ${ }^{29}$

When we implement this method, we derive bounds on the effects of family size on education, as shown in Table 8. Note that we do this on the parity-pooled sample, where we found evidence rejecting the quantity-quality model for years of schooling and primary school completion. The bounds are informative. Focusing on years of schooling and primary school completion, they suggest that even if we allow for the instrument to be invalid, this does not affect findings by much. This conclusion holds for lower secondary school completion as well, where the magnitudes of the effects remain very modest. These estimates are very useful for policy making: even if the identification strategy is flawed, inferences remain the same and we detect no evidence of important effects of family size on children's education. This is a conclusion similar to the one reached by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009).

[^17]Table 8 Estimated Bounds

|  | School |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| enrolment | Years of <br> schooling | Primary school <br> completion | Lower Secondary <br> school completion |  |
| OLS | $-0.018^{* *}$ | $-0.101^{* *}$ | $-0.016^{* *}$ | -0.019 |
| IV | -0.015 | 0.035 | 0.021 | 0.007 |
| Bounds | $[-.017,-.015]$ | $[-.095, .035]$ | $[-.014, .021]$ | $[-.013, .007]$ |
| Observations | 283961 | 282402 | 282494 | 177192 |

Notes: Control for variables listed in Table 1. * Denotes statistical significance at the
$1 \%-5 \%$ level, ${ }^{* *}$ Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less.

### 5.1.3 Twin births as an instrument

To assess further the robustness of our results, we consider another instrument commonly used in this literature: the birth of twins. There are at least two instrument validity concerns, highlighted in a recent paper by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) - differential endowments of twins and singletons, and differential birth spacing between twins than between two singleton births. ${ }^{30}$ Unlike the all-female instrument, the direction of the ensuing bias on the IV estimate is either positive or negative, depending on the interaction of the two effects. ${ }^{31}$ This rules out the method of Nevo and Rosen (Assumption [A3] is violated), unless one is willing to make assumptions on the direction of the likely correlation. Moreover, we have insufficient data to allow us to assess empirically the severity of these concerns in our context. It is for these reasons that twin births are not our preferred source of exogenous variation. Nonetheless, they are a useful specification check since this instrument is affected by different sources of bias, which should affect estimates in a different way.

Even though just under $1 \%$ of the sample reports a twin birth, our samples are so large that we have sufficient observations of twins and adequate statistical power. As before, we pool birth parities to improve statistical precision. ${ }^{32}$ The pooled sample includes $1^{\text {st }}$ born children with

[^18]one or more siblings, $2^{\text {nd }}$ born children with 2 or more siblings, and $3^{\text {rd }}$ born children with 3 or more siblings. For $1^{\text {st }}$ borns, the instrument takes a value equal to one if the second birth in the family is a twin and zero otherwise; for $2^{\text {nd }}$ borns the instrument takes a value equal to one if the third birth in the household is a twin and zero otherwise; for $3^{\text {rd }}$ borns the instrument takes a value equal to one if the $4^{\text {th }}$ birth in the household is a twin and zero otherwise.

The first stage and TSLS estimates are shown in Table 9. The first thing to note is that the first stage coefficient (proportion of compliers) is greater than for the all-female instrument, since, by definition, a twin birth results in an additional family member. In further analysis (not shown) we decomposed the first stage further and found that the range of fertility variation induced by twins is narrower than for the all-female instrument. ${ }^{33}$ The fact that we are picking up different sets of compliers is useful, to show us how robust findings are if estimated on a different subpopulation, and to give a sense as to how representative our main findings are likely to be.

This robustness exercise generates similar estimates as our main specification: in both cases, we can reject the quantity-quality model for two measures of the stock of education - years of schooling and primary school completion. Whilst we could also marginally reject it for lower secondary school completion in our main specification, this is no longer the case in when we use twins as an instrument. As before, the IV estimates are not precise enough to be informative about the effect of family size on the flow measure, school enrolment. Considering this robustness exercise, and our main specification in section 4, we conclude that for poor families in rural Mexico, there is strong evidence to reject the quantity-quality tradeoff for children's educational attainment as measured by accumulated years of schooling and primary school completion, and somewhat weaker evidence for lower secondary school completion. We find no evidence on the other hand of a quantity-quality tradeoff for school enrolment, though as discussed in section 3, we see this as an incomplete and noisy measure of investment in children's human capital.

[^19]Table 9 Effects of family size on education, twins instrument, females

| First Stage | Family Size |
| :--- | :---: |
| Instrument: Subsequent | $0.534^{* *}$ |
| birth a twin | $[0.027]$ |
|  | 363.31 |
| F - Stat | 387895 |
| Observations |  |


| Outcome $\downarrow$ | LPM | IV |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| School enrolment | $-0.019^{* *}$ | -0.019 |
| Family Size | $[0.001]$ | $[0.014]$ |
|  | 390061 |  |
| Observations |  | 0.96 |
| p-value exogeneity test | $-0.106^{* *}$ | 0.096 |
| Years of schooling | $[0.003]$ | $[0.063]$ |
| Family Size | 387899 |  |
|  |  | 0.001 |
| Observations |  |  |
| p-value exogeneity test |  |  |


| Primary school completion |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Family Size | $-0.019^{* *}$ | 0.023 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.014]$ |
| Observations | 388001 |  |
| p-value exogeneity test |  | 0.004 |
| Lower secondary school <br> completion |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.018^{* *}$ | -0.010 |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.021]$ |
| Observations | 220397 |  |
| p-value exogeneity test |  | 0.71 |
|  | $1^{\text {st }}$ borns 2+, | $1^{\text {st }}$ Borns 2+, |
| 2ndnd <br> Sample | $3^{\text {rd }}$ Borns $3+$ | $2^{\text {rd }}$ Borns 3+, |

Notes: Control for socio-economic variables listed in Table 1.

* Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level. ${ }^{* *}$ Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses.


### 5.1.4 Discussion

These findings raise at least three additional questions. The first is, given that they identify a local average treatment effect, just how representative are they for the population (in our survey) at large? The second is whether the lack of variability in treatment effects across instruments is due to similarities in compliant sub-populations, or whether it is evidence of lack of heterogeneity in the effects of family size in the population. Finally, given the lack of
adverse effects of family size on the stock of children's education, a natural question is to what extent families are adjusting on other margins, in particular using mother's labour supply.

### 5.1.4.1 Characterising Compliers

We address the first two of these questions using Table 10: whilst compliers are not an identifiable subpopulation, the table describes them in relation to the general population. This is in the spirit of Angrist and Imbens, 1995. It shows, separately for each instrument, how the two sets of compliers compare to the general population in terms of the observed characteristics listed in the left-hand column of the tables. For instance, the relative likelihood that a complier household has a highly educated mother, compared to the overall sample, is given by the ratio of the first stage for highly educated mothers to the overall first stage.

The characteristics considered include parental education, mother's age, household head occupation, and measures of household wealth including dummy variables for asset ownership. A number of interesting features emerge from the table. First, compliers of the allfemale instrument are relatively better off than the population in our survey at large: they include parents from considerably more educated backgrounds compared to the general population. ${ }^{34}$ They are also relatively more likely to own most of the listed assets. Twin compliers, on the other hand, tend to be more similar to the population at large, and even slightly less educated. Whilst the comparison of asset ownership suggests that they are also better off than the population, they are generally more similar to them than are the all-female compliers.

Table 10 Characteristics of compliers vs. entire population

| Table 10 Characteristics of compliers vs. entire population |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Ratio of $\mathbf{1}^{\text {st }}$ stage for sub-sample listed <br> in column (A) to overall 1 <br> st <br> stage |  |
| Column A | All-females | Twins $^{2}$ |
| Father's education: |  |  |
| No qualification | 0.728 | 1.176 |
| Some primary | 0.876 | 0.979 |
| Min completed primary school | 1.347 | 0.930 |
| Mother's education: |  |  |
| No qualification | 0.739 | 1.083 |
| Some primary | 1.008 | 0.966 |
| Min completed primary school | 1.287 | 0.959 |

[^20]| Mother age 35+ | 0.830 | 1.038 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Head works in agriculture | 0.996 | 1.011 |
| Head indigenous | 0.868 | 0.874 |
| Utilities: |  |  |
| Availability of water in house | 1.284 | 1.235 |
| Availability of light/electricity | 1.048 | 0.977 |
| Has own toilet | 1.090 | 1.046 |
| Has water in toilet | 1.353 | 1.109 |
| Asset ownership: |  |  |
| Blender | 1.195 | 1.106 |
| Fridge | 1.201 | 1.174 |
| Gas stove | 1.231 | 1.023 |
| Radio | 1.033 | 0.981 |
| Gas heater for water | 0.916 | 0.996 |
| Record player | 1.214 | 1.247 |
| TV | 1.127 | 1.066 |
| Video | 1.333 | 1.165 |
| Washing machine | 1.078 | 1.086 |
| Fan | 1.019 | 1.270 |
| Car | 1.601 | 1.352 |
| Truck | 1.294 | 0.939 |
| Land for agric/forestry | 1.008 | 0.920 |
| Animals | 0.920 | 1.092 |

Notes: Sample comprises households with at least 2 children where the first-born is a girl, households with at least 3 children where the first two are females, and households with at least 4 children where the first three are females. Italicised items are those for which $\leq 10 \%$ of the population own one.

We conclude the following from this analysis. Comparing the complier sub-populations to the population at large we see that the all-female compliers tend to be relatively better off than the population, whereas the twin compliers are much more similar. So the LATE effects identified in this paper using twin births as instruments are indeed informative about effects for the population at large. Second, as just noted, we do observe differences in complier subpopulations for both instruments, suggesting that the lack of any effect of family size on some measures of children's human capital for either instrument considered may indeed reflect a lack of heterogeneity of effects in the population of rural indigent households in Mexico.

### 5.1.4.2 Investigating Channels

We have found little evidence in this paper that family size affects the stock of education of girls: we conclude this discussion with an investigation of the extent to which families may be adjusting on margins other than children's education. One that has been commonly looked at in the literature is female labour supply (for instance, Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Angrist and Evans, 1998; Agüero and Marks, 2008). We here investigate the extent to which mothers increase labour supply if they have more children. The definition of labour supply we
consider is wage work, the most reliable measure available in the survey. Around 10 per cent of mothers in our sample report working for a wage.

We see from the LPM estimates in Table 11 that, in line with previous work, mothers with large families work less than those with small families. However, the IV estimates show the opposite: in 2 out of 3 cases, mothers with large families are significantly more likely to work. This evidence, though limited, suggests that families may indeed be adjusting on other margins in an attempt to protect their children's education. A more complete look at this would also consider other margins of adjustment such as health investments, found to be important by Millimet and Wang (forthcoming), though beyond the scope of this present study.

Table 11 Effects of family size on mother's labour supply

|  | LPM | IV |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Instrument $\rightarrow$ | n/a | subsequent <br> birth <br> female |
| Outcome $\downarrow$ |  |  |
| Mother's work |  |  |
| Family Size | $-0.003^{* *}$ | $0.062^{* *}$ |
|  | $[0.001]$ | $[0.010]$ |
| Observations | 285,120 |  |
|  | $2+; 3+$, |  |
|  | $\mathrm{ff}=1 ; 4+$, |  |
| Sample | $\mathrm{fff}=1$ |  |

[^21]
## 6 Conclusion

This paper considers the effect of family size on girls' schooling across a population of relatively poor households in rural Mexico. It accounts for the endogeneity of family size using a succession of female-only births as its main source of exogenous variation in family size. The paper exploits extremely large samples and high fertility rates to consider the effects of family size on a range of different education outcomes. We find fairly strong evidence to reject the quantity-quality model for girls' educational accumulation. When we use instead a measure of schooling that reflects less closely investments in education, school enrolment at a particular point in time, we fail to find any evidence to reject the model. In general, the findings remain consistent across another instrument commonly used in the literature, twin births. This suggests that though they are local average treatment effects, they may be generalisable to other sub-populations. Indeed, when we look at the characteristics of compliers we find that both instruments identify different complier sub-populations, suggesting that the lack of any effect may apply more generally to the population of rural indigent households in Mexico.

A divisive issue in this literature relates to the validity of the instruments. Various threats to instrument validity have been raised by different authors, and evidence on their empirical importance remains mixed. We have taken a new approach to tackling this issue, allowing for the instruments to be imperfect and have estimated bounds on the effects, along the lines of Nevo and Rosen (2008). This is a new and potentially very useful approach in this literature to directly answer the question of how much the assumption of instrument exogeneity drives the results. We find that the bounds on the effect identified by the instruments are informative. Moreover, OLS estimates, which are generally very modest in magnitude, are shown to provide a lower bound of the effect of family size on education. This indicates that the effect of family size on education is very modest at most.

One explanation behind these findings may be that households choose to adjust on margins other than children's education. We investigate one possible channel: mother's labour supply and find evidence to suggest that this may indeed be happening, with mothers engaging more in work in large than in small families. Other margins could be health investments, investigation of which is unfortunately outside the scope of this study, though an important agenda for future work.

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[^0]:    * Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, $\dagger$ Institute for Fiscal Studies, London and University College London.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ More generally, there is an abundant literature showing that parents with large families invest less in children's education than parents with small families, but much of this evidence is non-causal. Schultz (2005) provides a review.
    ${ }^{2}$ Li, Zhang and Zu (2007) and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)) find evidence consistent with the quantity-quality model, whilst Qian (2009) finds a positive effect of an additional child on school enrolment (Qian, 2009).
    ${ }^{3}$ Other than these studies, work that estimates the effects of family size on children's education generally relates to developed countries, and generally shows no or only very weak evidence of a quantity-quality trade-off (Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Cáceres-Delpiano (2006), Conley and Glauber (2006) - all for the U.S.; Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2011) for Israel).

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ Angrist and Evans (1998) also defend the validity of the same-sex instrument for the US; Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) on the other hand find evidence of economies of scale in India.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ We use a linear specification in this paper, given that the instrumental variables are binary.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ The use of sex composition as an instrument for family size was pioneered by Angrist and Evans (1998), and has since been applied by researchers such as Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2009) and Conley and Glauber (2006). These studies use same-sex births as the instrument, whether all boys or all-females; Lee (2008) on the other hand uses all-female births.
    ${ }^{7}$ Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) were the first to use twin births as an instrument for family size; it has since been used by Caceres (2005), Black et al. (2005), and Angrist et al. (2011), among others.
    ${ }^{8}$ We condition on the first $\mathrm{n}-1$ births being female as the instrument is preference for at least one son.
    ${ }^{9}$ The natural reason for this is that children of the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ birth may be of different sexes; another important reason is that it avoids any selection bias arising from families who go on to have children after a male birth being different from those who do not.
    ${ }^{10}$ Whilst the all-female instrument does not allow us to obtain effects for boys, we believe that the advantage, in terms of robustness, outweighs this drawback. We note also that we have estimated effects for boys using the twin births instruments and have found no effects of family size on any education outcome considered.
    ${ }^{11}$ Though the importance of birth order for education choices has been highlighted in the recent literature (Black et al. $(2007,2010)$, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)), as we will see, we find little evidence of heterogeneity in the effects of family size by birth order in the sample considered here.

[^5]:    ${ }^{12}$ Most localities were chosen on the basis of having been graded with a high degree of marginalisation from the 1995 Census data.

[^6]:    ${ }^{13}$ Though we could potentially retain them in the sample when we consider the outcomes of second- and thirdborns, a reason for not doing so is that we have some concerns about coding birth orders for households with children above age 18. Note that we also drop households that reported more than one household head ( $0.03 \%$ ), and households ( $1.5 \%$ ) with suspect data, mainly reporting of implausible ages.

[^7]:    ${ }^{14}$ These latter 2 levels are ones that children of our age range should have achieved (for instance, Mexican children would complete lower secondary school by age 14 if they started primary school at age 6 and progressed through without repeating any grades). Note also that all of these outcomes are measured at a particular point in time between ages 12 and 17 and are thus not necessarily indicators of completed schooling.

[^8]:    ${ }^{15}$ At the basic education level, participation in private education in Mexico is low, at $10 \%$, and is not relevant for the poor population considered here.
    ${ }^{16}$ Schultz (2004) and Behrman et al. (2003) document higher secondary school enrolment amongst girls than boys in the communities comprising the sample for PROGRESA, justifying the premium for girls in the subsidy. However it should be noted that there is a sizeable literature attributing any differences to availability of schools/distance to schools/marriage markets rather than preferences for boys' schooling per se.

[^9]:    ${ }^{17}$ Though there are no fees for public schools, direct costs of schooling include purchasing textbooks, stationary, school uniforms; and transportation to and from school. Note also that the opportunity cost of schooling is increasing with age, which may explain the observed patterns.

[^10]:    ${ }^{18}$ One of our outcome variables, years of schooling, is not binary: thus we use OLS estimation in its case. For convenience we use the term LPM throughout the text.

[^11]:    ${ }^{19}$ The first stages are decomposed following Angrist and Imbens (1995).
    ${ }^{20}$ Though we use the term completed family size, it refers to completed as at the time of the survey.
    ${ }^{21}$ Whilst we do not explicitly consider non-linear effects of family size in this paper (see Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) for an analysis), our use of different instruments affecting different margins of increase in family size allows us to see whether there is any evidence of non-linearities in the effects of family size on children's education.

[^12]:    ${ }^{22}$ We first strip out the effects of control variables on education outcomes and family size. So the vertical (horizontal) axis shows residuals from a regression of the education outcome (family size) on the control variables.

[^13]:    ${ }^{23}$ Exceptions include Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), who provide direct evidence on the likely validity of twin and same-sex instruments respectively. Angrist et al. (2011) address the issue mainly by comparing twins and sex-composition estimates, as the omitted variables bias associated with each type of instrument should act differently.

[^14]:    ${ }^{24}$ This is a widely recognised concern in this literature; see for instance Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2001), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009).
    ${ }^{25}$ Recent UNESCO statistics for Mexico show that $98 \%$ of girls and $98 \%$ of boys are in primary school; $72 \%$ of girls and $70 \%$ of boys are in secondary school (UNESCO, 2007); evidence from Parker and Pederzini (2000) shows that the gender gap in education in Mexico has fallen substantially over the last 30 years, to the extent that girls and boys below the age of 20 no longer display significant differences in educational attainment, as measured by years of schooling. Duryea et al. (2007) analyse the educational gender gap in Latin America and the Caribbean and find that the most striking differences are across income groups and not gender.

[^15]:    ${ }^{26}$ Angelucci et al. $(2009,2010)$ document the importance of extended family networks for this population in providing mutual support to households, and making schooling decisions.
    ${ }^{27}$ We pool post-programme data from surveys in October 1998 and May 1999, from control villages only, to keep the analysis uncontaminated by any potential programme effects. We retain households where the firstborn child is below 18 years old - not just 12-17 years of age as in main analysis - to boost sample sizes. Compared to our main sample, households here have fewer children on average; parents are also on average younger, but more educated, as we retain younger households here.

[^16]:    ${ }^{28}$ As further reassuring evidence, we re-emphasise that there is no relation between all-female births and any of the covariates in our model- see Table 2. Another salient point is that whilst we cannot control for savings in our data, results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of proxies for resources (mother's and father's education, household assets, home and land ownership).

[^17]:    ${ }^{29}$ For the twin birth instrument on the other hand, the direction of the correlation between the instrument and the error term is unclear (see section 5.1.3) so this method is not useful without imposing assumptions to sign the bias.

[^18]:    ${ }^{30}$ Differential birth spacing may place differing demands on household resources (both monetary and time), with older siblings of twins likely to have fewer resources available to them than older siblings of singletons. Differential birth endowments directly affect outcomes if parents choose to reinforce or compensate for these differences in their investment decisions. Economies of scale may also be higher in twin households, of which there is evidence in China (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009).
    ${ }^{31}$ It is positive if parents reinforce birth endowments and the birth spacing effect is small, and negative otherwise.
    ${ }^{32}$ Note however that we do observe some IV estimates in the non-pooled subsamples that are statistically distinguishable from their OLS counterparts: in particular, for years of schooling, primary school completion and lower secondary school completion of second-borns using twin at third birth as an instrument; for years of schooling and primary school completion of first-borns using twins at second births as an instrument, though significantly different at the 10 per cent level only.

[^19]:    ${ }^{33}$ Thus, in line with Angrist et al. (2011), we see that while both instruments have a strong effect on the propensity to have an additional child, the sex composition instrument induces an effect on a wider range of family size than the twin births instrument.

[^20]:    ${ }^{34}$ The figures in the columns give the relative likelihood that compliers have the characteristic listed in column (A). For instance a figure of 0.75 means that the population of ff compliers is $3 / 4$ as likely to have a non-qualified father compared to the overall population.

[^21]:    Notes: Control for socio-economic variables listed in Table 1. Note also that using the sex of the $\mathrm{n}^{\text {th }}$ birth as an instrument, we condition implicitly on the sex of the first $\mathrm{n}-1$ births.

    * Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%-5 \%$ level. ** Denotes statistical significance at the $1 \%$ level or less. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses.

