

Alternative choices over the future spending squeeze

Rowena Crawford


Progress to date

- How much of the planning spending cut has been achieved to date depends on the definition used
- Prime Minister has favoured "Total spending less debt interest" focussing on a £25bn cut over 2016–17 and 2017–18
 - on the same basis now a £30bn cut over those two years
 - more importantly a £38bn cut over five years to 2019–20
 - compares to £11bn cut over four years to 2014–15, so only 23% of the planned 2010–11 to 2019–20 cut done by end 2014–15
 - in part due to faster growth in pensioner benefits over the earlier period
- We will focus on "Departmental Expenditure Limits" (DEL)
 - essentially spending by Whitehall departments on admin and services


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– 39% of the planned 2010–11 to 2019–20 cut done by end 2014–15

Planned and implied departmental spending



Planned and implied departmental spending



Some departments faring particularly badly


- NHS, aid and schools (non-investment) spending have been relatively protected
- Other areas have therefore fared worse than total DEL figures imply:



Allocated period Unallocated period Total consolidation (2010-11 to 2015-16) (2015-16 to 2019-20) (2010-11 to 2019-20)

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
The changing size of the state



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Sources: EFO December 2014, ONS

The changing role of the state




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
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Sources: PESA 2014, DWP Benefit Expenditure tables 2014, EFO December 2014, ONS


Planned and implied departmental spending



How could future tax increases/welfare spending cuts change the picture?




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


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
Some possible alternative scenarios



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Some possible alternative scenarios



The cost of higher borrowing

- Any additional spending financed from higher borrowing would result in higher debt and a greater proportion of spending going on debt interest spending
- Running a current budget surplus (borrowing 1.2% GDP) from 2017-18 onwards rather than coalition plans and zero borrowing in 2019-20 would result in:
 - 2.4% national income higher debt in 2020-21
 - £1.5 billion higher debt interest payments (2015-16 terms)
- Impact would be larger if higher levels of borrowing are maintained in the longer term
 - E.g. see HMT projections in chart 1.9 (p27) of Autumn Statement




Summary

- Current coalition plans imply large cuts to departmental spending still to come
 - Cumulative cuts over whole consolidation could reach 22% for all departmental spending, and 41% for unprotected areas
- Cuts beyond 2015-16 could be reduced by further welfare spending cuts, tax increases and/or higher borrowing
- Tory, Labour and Lib Dem fiscal rules all allow for greater borrowing than currently forecast under coalition policy
 - Tories to a lesser extent than Labour/Lib Dems as aiming for zero borrowing rather than borrowing up to amount spent on investment
- Any additional spending financed from higher borrowing would result in higher debt and a greater proportion of spending going on debt interest spending
 - Impact would be relatively small up to 2019-20; would be larger if higher levels of borrowing are maintained in the longer term
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Some possible alternative scenarios (£bn figures)



Some possible alternative scenarios (£bn figure)

