








The third most important thing that happened yesterday?

Carl Emmerson



Faster growth in GDP – but only temporary

Comparison of forecasts for real GDP growth and trend GDP



Institute for Fiscal Studies

Public sector net borrowing, £ billion

	2012–	2013–	2014–	2015–	2016–	2017–	2018–
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Budget 2013	120.9	119.8	108.4	95.5	67.0	42.7	_
AS 2013	115.0	111.2	96.0	78.7	51.1	23.4	



Public sector net borrowing, £ billion

	2012– 13	2013– 14	2014– 15	2015– 16	2016– 17	2017– 18	2018– 19
Budget 2013	120.9	119.8	108.4	95.5	67.0	42.7	-
Forecasting changes							
Tax	-4.3	-3.4	-9.6	-13.2	-14.5	-14.6	
Spend	-1.6	-3.2	-2.9	-3.7	-1.8	-5.3	

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Neutral switch							
Tax		-3.0	-3.0	-2.5	-3.1	-4.7	
Spend		3.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	4.7	
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Neutral switch							
Tax		-3.0	-3.0	-2.5	-3.1	<i>–</i> 4.7	
Spend		3.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	4.7	
Measures							
Tax		-0.0	+0.1	-0.5	+0.4	+0.6	
Spend		-2.0	+0.0	+0.6	0.0	0.0	
AS 2013	115.0	111.2	96.0	78.7	51.1	23.4	-2.2



Notes: Numbers might not sum due to rounding.
Source: HM Treasury; Office for Budget Responsibility; IFS calculations.

Public sector net borrowing, £ billion


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Neutral switch							
Tax		-3.0	-3.0	-2.5	-3.1	-4.7	
Spend		3.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	4.7	
Measures							
Tax		-0.0	+0.1	-0.5	+0.4	+0.6	+0.9
Spend		-2.0	+0.0	+0.6	0.0	0.0	-20.7
AS 2013	115.0	111.2	96.0	78.7	51.1	23.4	-2.2



Notes: Numbers might not sum due to rounding.
Source: HM Treasury; Office for Budget Responsibility; IFS calculations.

The cure (December 2013): 10.1% national income consolidation over 9 years (£166bn)

Dec 2013: 8.6% national income (£141bn) hole in public finances






Spending and revenues over time







A freeze on total spending, but annually managed spending forecast to rise























Other pressures within DEL to bear in mind

Existing policies that cost money in 2016–17 onwards:


- Ending contracting out into DB pensions increases public sector employer NICs (£3.7bn a year)
- Dilnot reforms to social care funding (£1.0bn per year)
- New tax-free childcare scheme (£0.8bn per year)

Autumn Statement announced new policies for which money is available up to 2015–16 but not beyond:

- Free school meals extension (£0.8bn in 2015–16)
- Scrapping cap on HE student numbers (£0.3bn in 2015–16, increasing to £0.7bn in 2018–19 and further thereafter)
- Energy prices and efficiency (£0.3bn + £0.1bn in 2015–16)



Without further benefit cuts, plans for total spending imply historically low public service spending



Departmental spending beyond 2015-16

- DELs being cut by an average of 2.3% a year over the five years from April 2011 to March 2016
- Without further AME cuts the DEL cuts would accelerate to 3.7%
 a year over the three years from April 2016 to March 2019
- To reduce the DEL cut to 2.3% a year would require a further £12bn cut (in today's terms) to social security spending (or other AME) by 2018–19
- Compares to the estimated £25bn cut by 2018–19 from measures already announced by Mr Osborne
- Would still imply cumulative cut to DELs from April 2011 to March 2019 of 17.1%



Capping social security spending

- Budget to set cap for future spending on "welfare in scope"
 - social security and tax credit spending less state pension, JSA and JSA passported housing benefit
- OBR to assess compliance with the cap in each Autumn Statement
 - debate and vote in parliament needed to change cap or exceed it
- If welfare spending risen undesirably then forcing an active decision could lead to better policy making
- Could reduce risk in the public finances, but increase income risk faced by benefit recipients
- Better to review all spending frequently regardless of whether higher or lower than forecast, or at least cap individual components
 - proposed new annual OBR report on trends and drivers in welfare in scope spending could help with this

Strengthening the long run public finances?

- Chancellor re-iterated intention to increase the SPA
 - Pensions Bill already going through parliament plans to introduce reviews of the SPA every five years
 - confirmed principle that "people should expect to spend up to a third of their adult life in retirement"
- Long-run public finance projections suggest further adjustment is needed and increasing SPA is a coherent response to rising longevity
- Scrapping cap on student numbers will increase long run cost to the public finances of student loans
 - (costly because subsidised interest rate and not all loans repaid)
 - Treasury estimates around £0.7bn a year
 - "The new loans will be financed by selling the old student loan book": economically nonsense as selling an asset for what it is worth does not strengthen the public finances

Conclusions

- Latest forecasts suggest underlying health of economy and public finances little changed since Budget
- New policy measures have little impact on borrowing through to 2017–18, further significant squeeze on spending pencilled in for 2018–19
- Budget surplus forecast for 2018–19 and debt to fall faster
- Under current policies over the three years from April 2016
 - Annually Managed Expenditure forecast to rise
 - 10.6% additional cut to departmental spending required
 - significant additional pressures on spending not accounted for
- Forecasts imply historically low levels of spending on public services in 2018–19
- is this realistic, or might it imply either less deficit reduction or a combination of further net tax rises or benefit cuts?
 Institute for Fiscal Studies