



# Wage regulation and the quality of police applicants

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## Motivation

- Pay rates for public sector workers often set nationally
- 1. Implies spatial variation in public sector pay differentials relative to private sector outside options
  - Might expect worker quality to be lower where relative pay is lower
  - Existing literature: Borjas (2002); Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013);
     Hoxby and Leigh (2004); Propper and Van Reenan (2010); Britton and Propper (2016)
- 2. Implies wages cannot adjust to compensate for spatial variation in the disamenity of working in the public sector
  - Might expect worker quality to be lower where disamenity is higher
  - Existing literature: Rosen (1986); Roback (1982, 1988); Di Tommaso, Strom, Saether (2009)



# This paper

- Utilises a unique dataset to analyse the impact of centrally regulated pay on the quality of police applicants in England and Wales
- Contributions:
  - Consider both channels: spatial variation in outside labour market options and spatial variation in the disamenity of policing
  - Novel data (individual test scores from the national assessment taken by applicants to the police) provides direct measure of 'quality'



## Context

- 43 police forces operating at the county or metropolitan level
- Pay scales set at the national level (small adjustment in London)



## The police recruitment procedure

![](_page_4_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_4_Picture_2.jpeg)

# The Police SEARCH<sup>(R)</sup> Assessment Centre

(Structured Entrance Assessment for Recruiting Constables Holistically)

Made compulsory across forces in 2004 to introduce a level of consistency in recruitment across England and Wales

		Interactive			Written			Psychometric Tests		
		Jones	Levy	Messan	Rubin	Dipping	Protest	Interview	Verbal Logical Reasoning	Numerical Reasoning
"7" competency areas	Community & Customer Focus	~	$\checkmark$		~	$\checkmark$	~			
	Effective Communication	~			~	$\checkmark$				
	Oral Communication	~	$\checkmark$	~	~			~		
	Written Communication					$\checkmark$	~		$\checkmark$	
	Personal Responsibility		~	~	~					
	Problem Solving	~		~	~	~	~	~		~
	Resilience		~	~				~		
	Respect for Race & Diversity	~	~	~	~	$\checkmark$	~	~		
	Teamworking	~	$\checkmark$	~			~	~		

9 exercises

Table 1: Exercise by Competency Matrix

![](_page_5_Picture_6.jpeg)

## The police recruitment procedure

![](_page_6_Figure_1.jpeg)

Our data

Information on 41,000 candidates who took the national assessment in (2007), 2008, 2009, (2010) :

-Submitting force

-Pass/Fail and test scores

-Characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity, prior police experience (e.g. PCSO), other work experience)

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## Distribution of candidate test scores (2008)

![](_page_7_Figure_1.jpeg)

**To pass post-Nov 2007**: Oral>=50%, Written >=44%, RFD>=50%, Overall>=50% (**To pass pre-Nov 2007**: Oral>=60%, Written>=44%, RFD>=60%, Overall>=60%)

![](_page_7_Picture_3.jpeg)

#### Candidate characteristics associated with scores

	Probability of passing	Overall score (%)	Written score (%)	Oral score (%)	RFD score (%)
Age	3.8**	0.930**	1.224**	0.558**	1.045**
Age squared	-0.1**	-0.014**	-0.019**	-0.009**	-0.016**
Male	-6.2**	-1.820**	-2.434**	-1.014**	-2.255**
GCSEs	1.2	0.371*	1.840**	1.082**	0.176
A levels	9.8**	2.397**	5.933**	1.736**	1.813**
Graduate	16.8**	4.491**	9.767**	2.381**	3.303**
Experience: PCSO	13.2**	4.003**	2.685**	2.006**	3.902**
Experience: SC	9.2**	2.860**	3.120**	1.473**	2.682**
Mixed white	-3.1*	-0.512*	-3.395**	-0.161**	0.139
Asian	-20.9**	-3.793**	-15.309**	-2.801**	-2.190**
African	-28.8**	-5.436**	-19.627**	-4.656**	-1.827**
Chinese	-10.3**	-2.433**	-10.194**	-3.974**	-1.614*
Other	-26.9**	-5.903**	-19.962**	-5.271**	-2.486**
Missing	-5.3**	-1.126**	-3.939	-0.702**	-1.012**
Constant	17.6**	42.231**	47.661	86.282**	49.329**

Note: Baseline is 2007, female, <GCSE qualifications, no prior police experience, white ethnicity. Sample size: 41,485. \*\*,\* indicates significance at the 1%,5% level.

![](_page_8_Picture_3.jpeg)

$$Q_i = \alpha + \beta \ln(W_r^P / W_r^O) + \rho A_r + X_r \gamma + \tau + \varepsilon_i \quad [1]$$

- *Q<sub>i</sub>* is applicant quality
  - measured using candidate test score at national assessment

![](_page_9_Picture_4.jpeg)

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- $W_r^P$  is local police wage;  $W_r^O$  is local 'outside' wage

![](_page_10_Picture_5.jpeg)

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- *A<sub>r</sub>* are measures of the local disamenity of policing
  - Crimes per 1000 population, proportion of crime accounted for by: theft, criminal damage, dom. burglary, non-dom burglary, public order offences, drugs, shoplifting, vehicle crime, violence without injury, violence with injury

![](_page_11_Picture_7.jpeg)

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- X are local area characteristics
  - Educational composition of population, unemployment rate, house prices

![](_page_12_Picture_9.jpeg)

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- X are local area characteristics
  - Educational composition of population, unemployment rate, house prices
- T are time dummies

![](_page_13_Picture_10.jpeg)

#### Measuring the relative wage

- What is  $\ln(W_r^P/W_r^O)$  ?
- Assume applicants motivated by how police wages compare to average wages across *all* employees in their local area
- Ideally estimate:

$$\ln W_{i,r} = \alpha + X_i \beta + \sum_r \theta_{1,r} F_r + \theta_2 P_i + \sum_r \theta_{3,r} P_i F_r + \eta_i$$
<sup>[2]</sup>

and use estimated  $\theta_{3,r}$  for the relative wage  $\ln(W_r^P/W_r^O)$  in region r

- Difficult to find a dataset with sufficient sample size at local level
- If police wage genuinely national,  $\theta_{3,r} = \theta_{1,r}$  and can simply estimate

$$\ln W_{i,r} = \alpha + X_i \beta + \sum_r \theta_{1,r} F_r + \eta_i$$
[3]

• and use -  $\theta_{1,r}$  for the relative wage in region r

![](_page_14_Picture_10.jpeg)

#### Measuring the relative wage

- Estimate [3] using data from the Labour Force Survey
  - Pool 2005 to 2010; estimate police forces using local authority areas
  - Sample: all employees aged 20-50
  - Control for: sex, age, education, age\*education, ethnicity, time

![](_page_15_Figure_5.jpeg)

## Headline results (1/2)

- Relationship between applicant quality and relative wage [controlling for area characteristics and time]:
  - 10% increase in relative wage associated with:
    - ~ 0.9 percentage point higher overall score
    - ~ 1.2 percentage point higher probability of passing
    - ~ 2.1 ppt higher written communication score, 1.8 ppt higher respect for race and diversity score, 0.9 ppt lower oral score

![](_page_16_Picture_6.jpeg)

# Headline results (2/2)

- Relationship between applicant quality and relative wage AND disamenity of policing [controlling for area characteristics, time]:
  - 10% increase in relative wage associated with:
    - ~ 1.3 percentage point higher overall score
    - ~ 3.1 percentage point higher probability of passing
  - Additional reported crime per 1000 population associated with:
    - ~ 3.9 percentage point lower overall score
  - 1% increase in proportion of crime that violence involving injury:
    - ~ 1.8 percentage point lower overall score
- For comparability:
  - 1 standard deviation  $\uparrow$  in rel. wage ~ 1.1 ppt  $\uparrow$  in overall score
  - − 1 standard deviation  $\uparrow$  in crime rate ~ 0.7 ppt  $\downarrow$  in overall score
  - 1 standard deviation ↑ in proportion crime that violence with injury

Institute for

~ 1.6  $\downarrow$  in overall score

## Impact on the composition of applicants

- To what extent does the impact on quality manifest itself through observable characteristics of candidates?
- Controlling for applicant characteristics (age, sex, education, ethnicity):
  - Reduces associations slightly (e.g. impact of 10% increase in relative wages falls from 1.3ppt to 1.0ppt)
  - Suggests most of the impact is coming from unobservable quality
- Association with applicant characteristics:
  - Higher outside wage associated with lower average age of applicants, and smaller proportion who are female or white
  - Higher proportion of crime being violent associated with smaller proportion of applicants who are white or have A-levels or above

![](_page_18_Picture_8.jpeg)

# Conclusions

- National police pay scales do result in geographical variation in the quality of police applicants
  - Higher relative wage associated with higher quality candidates
  - Greater disamenity of policing is assoicated with lower quality candidates
- Both effects are important
  - In this case offsetting: effect of higher relative wage partially offsets effect of lower attractiveness of policing in some areas
- Largely manifested through unobservable characteristics
- However magnitude of effects is relatively small
  - E.g. Relative wage differences imply a 5ppt difference in overall score between Hertfordshire and Dyfed Powys
- There remains the important question of the impact of police officer quality on police force productivity

![](_page_19_Picture_10.jpeg)