

Institute for
Fiscal Studies

The long-term effects of in-work benefits in a lifecycle model for policy evaluation

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What we do


- Study effect of tax credit reforms on education and employment decisions over the lifecycle
- Using a lifecycle model of female labour supply, human capital and savings
 - Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and (1999), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Adda et al (2008), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011)
- With parameters estimated using British panel data (BHPS)

Standard approaches

- Features of traditional welfare evaluations (e.g. Brewer et al, 2006):
 1. Estimate impact of reform packages
 2. Use static framework
 3. Focus on short-run labour supply response
- Counter-examples: Ham and Lalonde (1996), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Haan and Prowse (2010), etc
- This paper: first attempt to study UK tax and benefit system in dynamic context
 - Focus is on female response to UK tax credit reforms
 - Dynamic effects via education, experience, productivity and family composition
 - Also investigate impact on education


Background to reforms: budget constraints

Families with child aged 4, £50 childcare



Background to reforms: budget constraints

Families without children



Literature: employment impact of WFTC/EITC

- WFTC
 - + 2-7ppt increase in employment rate for lone parents
 - Smaller, possibly negative impact for second earners in couples
 - Blundell et al (2005), Brewer et al (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Francesconi et al (2009)
- EITC
 - Positive and substantial impact on employment rate for lone parents (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001))
 - Modest negative impact for second earners (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes (1998))

Literature: impact of WFTC/EITC on other outcomes

- Couple formation and dissolution
 - WFTC: mixed evidence (Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Gregg et al (2007), Francesconi et al. (2009))
 - EITC: small and ambiguous (Eissa and Hoynes (1999), Ellwood (2000))
- Childbearing
 - WFTC: Fall in fertility for lone parents, rise for couples (Francesconi and van der Klaauw, (2004), Brewer et al (2008))
 - EITC: little effect (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009))
- Anticipation and labour market attachment effects?

Model: overview of female lifecycle

Life in three stages:

1. Education (up to 18/21)
 - Secondary, A-levels or university (determines type of human capital)
2. Working life (18/21-59)
 - Labour supply {0hrs, 20hrs, 40hrs} and consumption
 - Partnering and childbearing
3. Retirement (60-69)
 - Consumption only

Model: dynamics of female earnings

- Log wage equation

s =schooling
 i =individual
 a =age

$$w_{sia} = \ln W_s + \alpha_s \ln(e_{ia} + 1) + v_{sia}$$

↑
↑
↑
↑

Log wage
Market wage rate
Experience
Productivity

$$v_{sia} = \rho_s v_{sia-1} + u_{sia}$$

- Experience accumulation

$$e_{ia+1} = e_{ia} (1 - \delta_s) + \delta_{sPT} 1[l_{ia} = 20] + \delta_{sFT} 1[l_{ia} = 40]$$

↑
↑
↑

Depreciation rate
PT accumulation rate
FT accumulation rate

Model: dynamics of family income

- (Exogenous) family formation dynamics
 - Children
 - Model youngest child
 - Characterised by age
 - Arrival probability depends on family characteristics
 - Departure with certainty when child reaches age 18
 - Partners
 - Characterised by education, employment status and wage
 - Arrival and departure probabilities depend on family characteristics

Model: dynamics of family income

- Male wage equation and selection into employment

$$w_{s^{m}ia}^m = \ln W_{s^m}^m + \alpha_{s^m}^m \ln(a - 18) + v_{s^{m}ia}^m$$

↑
↑
↑
↑

Log wage
Market wage rate
Age
Productivity

$$v_{s^{m}ia}^m = \rho^m v_{s^{m}ia-1}^m + u_{s^{m}ia}^m$$

$$u_{s^{m}ia}^m \sim N(0, \sigma_{us^m}^2)$$

Ongoing couples

$$v_{s^{m}ia}^m \sim N(0, \sigma_{vs^m}^2)$$

New couples

- Detailed model of UK tax and benefit system (FORTAX)
 - Taxes: income tax, NI, council tax
 - Benefits: child benefit, maternity grant, tax credits, income support, housing benefit, council tax benefit, free school meals

Model: decision-making environment

- Risk averse individuals faced with uncertainty
 - Own productivity (health)
 - Family dynamics: partnering/separation, child bearing
 - Partner employment and income
- No insurance market
 - Only implicit insurance through human capital, savings and public policy
- Credit constraints during working life
 - So public policy may facilitate transfers across lifecycle
- Decisions taken to maximise expected lifetime utility

$$V_a(X_{ia}) = \max_{\{c,l\}_{a,\dots,A}} E \left\{ \sum_{b=a}^A \beta^{b-a} U(c_{ib}, l_{ib}; X_{ib}) \mid X_{ia} \right\}$$


Diagram illustrating the components of the utility maximization equation:

- $V_a(X_{ia})$ is labeled as **Value**.
- X_{ia} is labeled as **State variables**.
- $U(c_{ib}, l_{ib}; X_{ib})$ is labeled as **Utility function**.
- c_{ib} is labeled as **Consumption**.
- l_{ib} is labeled as **Labour supply**.


Model: data and estimation

- Model estimated using BHPS data:
 - Unbalanced panel of 5,300 females over 16 waves, 1991–2006
- Multi-step estimation procedure
 1. Fix interest rate, discount rate, intertemporal preference parameter
 2. Estimate some parameters outside structural model
 - Male selection model
 - Family dynamics and childcare costs (reduced form)
 3. Estimate remaining parameters by method of simulated moments (MSM)
 - Parameters include: cost of education, female wage equation, experience accumulation, taste for employment, distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
- Results below based on data simulated by the model


Model fit: female log hourly wage



Model fit: female employment rate



Model fit: female employment rate by age of child



Lifecycle employment effects of reforms

	Total	Single childless	Single mother	Couple childless	Couple mother	Tax adjust
Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):						
1999+WFTC	0.015	0.000	0.103	-0.001	-0.042	–
2002						
2004						

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2002	0.005	0.007	0.050	0.000	-0.038	–
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2004	0.006	0.025	0.032	-0.003	-0.031	–

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1999+WFTC	0.015	0.000	0.103	-0.001	-0.042	–
2002	0.005	0.007	0.050	0.000	-0.038	–
2004	0.006	0.025	0.032	-0.003	-0.031	–
Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):						
1999+WFTC	0.014	-0.002	0.103	0.000	-0.043	+0.014
2002	0.002	0.002	0.046	0.001	-0.039	+0.039
2004	0.005	0.021	0.029	-0.003	-0.027	+0.029

Note: “Tax adjust” = change in basic rate of income tax

Education effect of reforms

	Basic	Intermediate	Higher
1999 baseline	0.318	0.472	0.209
Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):			
1999+WFTC	0.014	-0.003	-0.011
2002	0.023	-0.005	-0.017
2004	0.034	-0.009	-0.025

Employment effects of reforms, allowing for education response

	Total	Single childless	Single mother	Couple childless	Couple mother	Tax adjust
Revenue neutral effect, no education response (ppt/100):						
1999+WFTC	0.014	-0.002	0.103	0.000	-0.043	+0.014
2002	0.002	0.002	0.046	0.001	-0.039	+0.039
2004	0.005	0.021	0.029	-0.003	-0.027	+0.029

Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income tax

Lifecycle employment effects of reforms allowing for education response

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2002	0.002	0.002	0.046	0.001	-0.039	+0.039
2004	0.005	0.021	0.029	-0.003	-0.027	+0.029
Revenue neutral effect, with education response (ppt/100):						
1999+WFTC	0.005	-0.006	0.080	-0.002	-0.051	+0.021
2002	-0.010	-0.006	0.014	-0.001	-0.048	+0.050
2004	-0.012	0.012	-0.017	-0.006	-0.037	+0.045

Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income tax

Conclusion

- Develop a female lifecycle model to study UK tax and benefit system in dynamic context
 - Dynamics via education choices, experience accumulation, productivity and family composition
- Estimated on UK data
- Used to understand effect of UK tax credit reforms
- Results suggest:
 - Lifecycle employment effects (holding education fixed):
 - Large for lone mothers and mothers in couples
 - Marginally positive overall
 - But education choices sensitive to reforms
 - Lifecycle employment effects (allowing education response):
 - Effects fall substantially
 - Overall effect now negative