

What can micro-data tell us about the UK's productivity puzzle?

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The "productivity puzzle"

- Employment and hours worked have fallen less than output
 - Labour productivity (output per hour) has fallen



Changes to real output per hour in the UK by recession



What do we do?

- Show how different firms have responded to the recession
 - And hence how productivity has changed for different types of firms
- Investigate the role of wages:
 - What contribution have they made to the fall in productivity?
 - Why is this time so different?



What do we find?

- Firms held on to workers but reduced wages and investment
 - More so in small firms and those that invested more in training
 - Hence productivity has fallen more in these firms
 - May provide some evidence of "labour hoarding"
- Firms are not just replacing expensive workers with cheaper ones
 - Wages have fallen dramatically, even amongst workers in the same job



What does this mean?

- Why have wages fallen so far?
 - Perhaps workers prefer lower wages to the risk of unemployment?
 - Higher labour supply may mean there is greater competition for jobs
 - Fewer collective agreements?
- What does this tell us about why productivity has fallen?
 - Perhaps wages are a signal of productivity or vice versa
 - Lower investment may mean they have access to less or poorer quality capital (machines and technology)





Productivity, investment and profits in the Great Recession: evidence from UK firms

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What do we do?

- Use data on a large sample of firms from 1997 to 2009
- Focus on firms that are observed at least twice
 - Hence biased towards larger firms that survive
- Examine how outcomes of interest change over time *within firms*
- Estimate trend productivity rates prior to the recession
- To what extent did productivity diverge from this trend in 2008-09?
- Repeat for investment (and profits)



Descriptive statistics

- Half of firms saw output fall relative to trend
- Half of firms saw productivity fall relative to trend
 - Three quarters amongst firms whose output fell relative to trend
 - Can think of these firms as "labour hoarding"
- % of firms making a positive investment fell from 77% to 73%
- To what extent did productivity and investment fall relative to trend?
- How did this vary by type of firm?
- Which types of firms were more likely to hoard labour?



What happened to productivity and investment?



Note: All estimates are based on a sample of reporting units (RUs) that appear at least twice between 1997 and 2009, excluding the top and bottom 1 per cent of RUs according to GVA and number of employees.



What might help to explain these changes?



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Which firms were more likely to "hoard labour"?

- Labour hoarding: below trend productivity amongst firms with below trend output (a negative demand shock)
- Before the recession, firms that hoarded more labour had:
 - Higher profits
 - Higher wage bills and more training (more skilled workers)
 - Higher vacancy rates



Summary

- Productivity and investment both fell relative to trend
 - More so in small firms than in larger ones
- Small firms responded differently to the recession than larger ones:
 - Small firms maintained employment but reduced wages and investment
 - Large firms cut their workforce but not so much wages or investment
- Wages might have fallen within firms but how was this achieved?
- To what extent can changes in the composition of the workforce help to explain the falls in wages and productivity that we see?

