We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles and binary games of complete information. We provide conditions under which we can recover both the interaction effects and the distributions of potentially correlated unobservables across goods in single-agent models and across players in games. We establish similarities in identification between these two models. Strengthening our assumptions for games, we provide an equivalence relation between discrete choice models for bundles and binary games that relies on the theory of potential games. Potential games are particularly useful for games of three or more players.
Authors
Associate Professor Rice University
Natalia Lazzati
Working Paper details
- DOI
- 10.1920/wp.cem.2013.0413
- Publisher
- IFS
Suggested citation
Fox, J and Lazzati, N. (2013). Identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games. London: IFS. Available at: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/identification-discrete-choice-models-bundles-and-binary-games (accessed: 20 April 2024).
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