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External publications
October 2004
Article
Learning trust
Type: External publications
Authors: Iris Bohnet, Heike Harmgart, Steffen Huck and Jean-Robert Tynan
Volume, issue, pages: ELSE working paper
JEL classification: C72, C91, L14
Now published in: Journal of the European Economic Association [Details]

We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More sursprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard.

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